Hungarian thaw, Slovak freeze: How the post-Orban era could chill relations on the Danube – European Council on Foreign Relations

Europeans have greeted the fall of Viktor Orban with relief. Hungary under Peter Magyar is likely to remain prickly and nationalist, but certainly less corrupt and less openly hostile to the European project than it was under his predecessor. Yet Magyar’s arrival may also revive a quarrel long kept dormant by the alliance between Orban and Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico: the fraught relationship between Slovakia and its Hungarian minority.

The danger lies less with Magyar himself than Fico, who faces re-election next year and may find nationalist agitation useful amid mounting economic troubles. But the new Hungarian leader, eager to burnish his own nationalist credentials at home, has occasionally prodded at Slovak sensibilities too. This matters beyond the Danube basin: another bout of Slovak-Hungarian antagonism could paralyse regional cooperation and complicate EU decisions.

To understand why relations could sour, it is necessary to grasp just how close Fico and Orban were. They overlapped as prime ministers for eight of the last 16 years. If Fico amplified Orban’s influence in Brussels, the two leaders helped each other win elections at home. Hungarian state-controlled TV, watched widely in Slovakia’s Hungarian-speaking south, lavished favourable coverage on Fico and on Peter Pellegrini, Slovakia’s president. In return, Fico tolerated Budapest’s practice of distributing passports to ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, many of whom voted overwhelmingly for Orban in Hungarian elections. To ensure their loyalty, Budapest generously funded sports teams and cultural events across the border.

The closeness of the Orban-Fico partnership helped sweep unresolved disputes under the carpet. That lasted until December 2025, when a long-suppressed issue burst into view, in an indication of possible future trouble.

The Benes decrees

The December 2025 row centred on the Benes decrees, a shameful set of post-war Czechoslovak laws under which ethnic Germans and Hungarians were stripped of property and expelled from the country on the grounds that they collaborated with the Nazi aggression. Amid the chaos that followed the war, the decrees were never fully implemented in Slovakia. Many properties designated for nationalisation were never seized. For decades the issue lay dormant.

That is, until the Fico government revived the decrees several years ago in order to expedite the construction of a new highway. Hundreds of properties, worth tens of millions of euros, were expropriated on the basis that they should have been confiscated decades earlier under the Benes decrees.

The backlash was immediate, particularly among ethnic Hungarians. When Progressive Slovakia, the main liberal opposition party (and of which the author is vicechair), objected to the practice, Fico pushed through legislation in December 2025 criminalising criticism of the Benes decrees. The move outraged most Hungarians in Slovakia and beyond, who consider the decrees indefensible relics of ethnic punishment.

Fico’s coalition partners added insult to injury. Rudolf Huliak responded to criticism by asking whether Slovaks needed to “start learning Hungarian again”.

A trial balloon for nationalism

At first glance, the government’s actions seemed uncharacteristic and counterproductive. In December 2025, Orban was running for re-election. Fico’s steps forced him to distance himself from his erstwhile ally. They also handed Magyar an opening to accuse the Orban government of failing to defend the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia.

Even more damagingly for Fico, the episode alienated the main party representing ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, which until then was broadly sympathetic to the government. The party effectively switched sides, with its leader even speaking at opposition rallies. This matters because ethnic Hungarians, though shrinking in number, remain Slovakia’s swing voters. There never was a non-populist Slovak government without them in the coalition. Even Fico needed their support to form a majority in the past.

Yet what seems like a foolish self-inflicted wound may have been a rehearsal for 2027 election campaign for Smer, Fico’s party. Much like Orban earlier this year, Fico has few accomplishments to run on. The economy has tanked under his rule. Public debt is out of control. Tax hikes have failed to rein in the budget deficit while making labour more expensive and investment less attractive. In February this year, Samsung announced the closure of its mammoth Slovakian factory.

Like Orban, the Slovak prime minister may choose to wage a quixotic campaign against a parade of largely invented enemies, such as Brussels, Ukraine and—now—Hungary.
 

When economic arguments are weak, nationalism is tempting. Like Orban, the Slovak prime minister may choose to wage a quixotic campaign against a parade of largely invented enemies, such as Brussels, Ukraine and—now—Hungary. Seen this way, the Benes affair was not a mistake, but a test of whether anti-Hungarian sentiment still animates voters. The results are mixed. The opposition bloc gained support during the controversy, yet some of the smaller opposition parties sided with the government, suggesting that old nationalist reflexes remain potentially useful.

The new Hungary

Magyar has handled the issue reasonably well. He has wisely avoided demanding an outright repeal of the Benes decrees, which would wreak havoc on property rights not only in Slovakia but also in the Czech Republic. Such demands could also trigger calls by Bratislava for compensation for wartime damages inflicted during Hungary’s occupation of bits of Slovakia during the second world war.

Instead, Magyar limited himself to urging Bratislava to stop using the decrees as a basis for expropriations, and to repeal the recent law banning criticism of them. This is a sensible goal shared by the Slovak opposition. But Magyar has also repeatedly referred to Slovakia as “Felvidek”, an old Hungarian term meaning “upper lands”, which many Slovaks interpret as implying that their country is merely an appendage of its bigger southern neighbour. Equally damaging was Magyar’s remark in June 2026 that Hungary is “the only country in the world that borders itself,” alluding to territories in Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine and Romania that once formed part of Hungary.

If Fico runs on anti-Hungarian sentiment, there is a risk that both Bratislava and Budapest will weaponise intra-EU meetings to score points. The consequence would be felt well beyond their borders.

The Slovak prime minister’s term expires next year. Should Slovakia’s opposition take power, merely lowering the temperature will not be enough. Repealing the law criminalising criticism of the Benes decrees is easy. Addressing the economic woes specific to Slovakia’s south will be harder. Poor train and highway connections, as well as the outbreak of disease threatening the region’s wine industry have all fuelled resentment.

The hardest of all will be confronting the darker chapters of the shared Slovak-Hungarian history. Progressive Slovakia has called on the two countries to seek a common interpretation of the most divisive chapters of this past. Such an effort would require Magyar to show greater understanding of Slovakia’s sensibilities. If his rise coincides with a change of government in Slovakia next year, it could offer an opportunity to move beyond ignoring mutual grievances towards an honest search for a resolution.