US President Donald Trump’s recent offer to discuss North Korea’s nuclear arsenal signals a potential shift towards diplomatic engagement, though Pyongyang has shown no immediate urgency to negotiate

While economic re-engagement and phased sanctions relief offer potential pathways back to dialogue, deep mutual distrust and North Korea’s growing military alignment with Russia complicate regional security dynamics

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo*

The recent offer of US President Donald Trump to discuss with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on the question of reportedly fifty-seven nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea is diplomatically significant, for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development has already raised the alarm of the US. As such, the US reactions will have profound impacts on the geopolitics of Northeast Asia, including the security interests of South Korea, Japan, China and even Russia.

South Korean sources have mentioned that North Korea possesses eighty to one hundred nuclear weapons, while President Trump’s remarks pointed to fifty-seven nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea. Regardless of the number of nuclear weapons developed by Pyongyang, North Korea appears to have no urgency in discussing with President Trump over its nuclear weapons.

Kim Jong Un has recently demanded that North Korea’s nuclear power status should be recognized, and his government is treating South Korea as a “hostile” and an “enemy” state. As North Korea possesses a significant number of nuclear weapons, its leverage over the US has increased considerably. The bargaining power of North Korea in 2026 is vastly different from the 2018 Singapore Summit during which North Korea and the US signed a joint agreement with the consensus on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. At present, North Korea is uninterested in the issue of denuclearisation – a position contrary to South Korea and Japan.

Geopolitical friction and regional security

The move by President Trump on August 16 to shorten the military drills with South Korea from eleven days to five days appeared to placate North Korea. Yet, North Korea did not appear to give in to the US-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. On August 20, North Korea fired ten short-range ballistic missiles into the sea as a sign of protest. Obviously, North Korea played hardball and did not appear softer even if the US and South Korean sides reduced the length of the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. If Washington adopts any transactional diplomacy on North Korea, Pyongyang will follow suit. In other words, if the US discusses with North Korea over the latter’s nuclear weapons programme, the latter will not make any concessions easily.

Although North Korea has rapidly developed nuclear weapons, it has not used any proxy, unlike the case of Iran that mobilized its proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah to attack or encroach upon any US military presence. Perhaps partly because of the relationship between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, and perhaps mainly due to the self-restraint of North Korea, conflicts in the Korean Peninsula are fortunately non-existent so far. The self-restraint exercised by North Korea and the reluctance of all sides – South Korea, China, Japan and the US – to witness conflicts are the twin factors maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Still, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has immediate ramifications for the security of South Korea and Japan. Although South Korea has been working with the US to operate joint command forces and produce nuclear deterrence guidelines to deter the North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea appears to refrain from developing nuclear weapons as it supports denuclearisation officially. As such, South Korea has limited options in dealing with North Korea, except for relying on its military patron the US to negotiate with North Korea, and appealing to China to bring North Korea to the bargaining table.

Arguably, to defend itself against the North Korean nuclear threat, the South Korean military may have to consider developing a nuclear weapons alternative. Public opinion in South Korea has shown that 76 per cent of Koreans support South Korea’s move to develop its nuclear arsenal (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 8, 2026).

However, South Korea may find both the US and China diplomatically unreliable in dealing with North Korea. President Trump’s unpredictability in his foreign policy toward North Korea will likely bypass the South Korean leadership, and his transactional diplomacy implies that South Korea must pay more for US weapons. At the same time, South Korea sees China as being reluctant to push North Korea back to the bargaining table. After all, North Korea has no incentive to talk to the US, at least for the time being.

Economic incentives and pathways to dialogue

What are the incentives that can be used by the US to appeal to North Korea to return to the bargaining table? Arguably, the US should reconsider an entire economic package, like the resumption of the Kaesong industrial zone, which lasted from 2004 to 2016 after the historic 2000 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, to encourage the North Korean leadership to return to dialogue.

Arguably, economic re-engagement with North Korea is the most feasible short-term strategy that can be adopted by the US. The reopening of the Kaesong industrial zone will allow socio-economic interactions between the two Koreas, help marketise North Korea gradually, and perhaps become a move conducive to peaceful coexistence between North Korea and South Korea.

Another important incentive that can perhaps bring North Korea back to dialogue is to offer to lift economic sanctions on North Korea, not immediately but by stages, if Pyongyang decides to discuss its nuclear weapons programme with Washington.

Ultimately, the US side will have to explore the path toward North Korea’s peaceful coexistence with South Korea, especially as peaceful coexistence is and will be in the common interest of all parties in the Korean Peninsula, including the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea.

North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear weapons has already triggered trepidation in Japan, which views military rearmament as necessary to protect Tokyo’s national security against nuclear threats

Therefore, allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect North Korean nuclear sites will arguably be the first step in the direction of peaceful coexistence. The term denuclearisation will likely be politically unacceptable to North Korea, while it will be articulated and demanded by South Korea and Japan. As such, a mid-term solution is perhaps to avoid using the term denuclearisation in the short run, but to utilise a more neutral term like peaceful coexistence, which is perhaps acceptable to all stakeholders. Peaceful coexistence is the realistic objective, while denuclearisation may have to be seen as a distant long-term ideal.

In short, the US and South Korea can offer to help North Korea reopen the Kaesong industrial zone, while the US can also offer to lift economic sanctions on North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang’s agreement to allow the IAEA to inspect its nuclear sites.

Multilateral trade frameworks and regional alliances

On the other hand, South Korea can consider working with China to set up a free trade economic zone in Northeast Asia, ideally together with Japan eventually. At present, given deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations over remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regarding Taiwan in November 2025 (stating that any Chinese attack on Taiwan would be an “existential crisis” for Japan), such a free trade zone cannot be easily established between South Korea, China and Japan. However, in the short run, South Korea can perhaps engage China to set up a free trade zone through which North Korea will later be invited to join the bloc.

Japan’s participation in the Northeast Asia Free Trade Zone will indeed be beneficial to Northeast Asian economic prosperity, making it more economically attractive for other Asian states to consider joining the capitalist bloc eventually. Unlike ASEAN, which binds Southeast Asian states together in an economic and pragmatic union, Northeast Asia lacks such a regional economic bloc that can and will lure North Korea’s long-term economic participation, especially if North Korea’s economic situation oscillates from the current economic boom to a more uncertain and unstable scenario.

Indeed, relations between North Korea and Japan encounter diplomatic hurdles. Japan sees North Korea as a real security threat as the latter fires missiles into the sea from time to time, apart from the historical legacy of Pyongyang’s abduction of Japanese citizens to North Korea (12 of the 17 abducted Japanese citizens have not yet returned home). North Korea has recently criticised Japan for rapid military rearmament. Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, accused Japan of trying to revive the ambitions of “a war criminal state” (Bloomberg, August 5, 2026). Profound mutual distrust and the lack of diplomatic relations have made Japanese-North Korean relations difficult.

Given historical animosity between Japan and North Korea, it can indeed be argued that Japan’s participation in a free trade zone composed of China and South Korea will not necessarily incentivise North Korea to join. Ideologically, North Korea sees both Japan and South Korea as falling under the “imperialistic” intentions and influence of the US. As such, even if a free trade zone were established between South Korea and China, North Korea would perhaps be ideologically reluctant to join unless Pyongyang were deeply affected by a sudden economic downturn.

Rearmament and great power dynamics

Both South Korea and Japan are relying on the US for military protection and deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear threats. However, there are signs that Japan has begun to increase its armaments without depending heavily on the US, while South Korea has also produced its own weapons to defend itself against North Korea. Japan is acquiring 400 US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and developing home-grown weapons to strengthen its defensive capabilities versus North Korea. The nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea have already triggered Japanese military rearmament, which naturally incurs criticism from both North Korea and China.

On the other hand, if President Trump adopts transactional diplomacy to demand that South Korea shoulder more responsibility for its military expenditure, it is only a matter of time before South Korea accelerates its rearmament, expands its own military programs, and adopts the option of nuclear deterrence, even though current official rhetoric supports denuclearisation.

China’s position on North Korea is critical to peaceful coexistence in the Korean Peninsula. South Korea has already lobbied the Chinese mainland to function as a go-between and persuade Pyongyang to talk to Seoul on peaceful development. Some critics of Chinese foreign policy maintain that China is eager to maintain North Korea as a buffer state against the US-led alliance composed of South Korea and Japan.

Arguably, this is a long-held conspiracy perspective regarding China’s intention to keep North Korea as a buffer against Western allies. If the Chinese mainland is eager to reunify Taiwan, then China arguably remains open-minded to embrace a scenario in which both North Korea and South Korea are reunited one day, although this scenario appears difficult and impossible in the short run. The bottom line for China is to maintain peace in the Korean Peninsula; any military conflicts would deeply affect China’s northeast provinces—a scenario detrimental to the interests of the Chinese mainland.

The developmental model of East Germany, which collapsed in November 1989 and reunited with West Germany in October 1990, cannot work in the current standoff between the two Koreas. The collapse model of East Germany would be extremely dangerous to the security of Northeast Asia because handling nuclear weapons in North Korea requires stable governance and strong leadership. As such, the peaceful coexistence model between South Korea and North Korea, as advocated by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, is arguably the best and most feasible one; the challenge is how to move all parties toward peaceful coexistence.

Strategic implications of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict

Given that China is North Korea’s most important and largest trade partner, it holds the economic power to lobby North Korea to return to the bargaining table. The question is whether China will be willing to do so. As such, President Trump’s September meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping will likely be an occasion for the former to lobby the latter to persuade Kim Jong Un to return to the table. If top-level friendship is a crucial factor influencing North Korea’s move to return to dialogue, the Trump-Xi meeting will be an important one, hopefully bringing about another historic Trump-Kim meeting.

Some commentators believe that President Trump has a personal stake in meeting Kim Jong Un before the US elections by the end of 2026, because holding such an important meeting would likely boost the popularity of the Republican Party. It remains to be seen whether Kim Jong Un would really like to help Trump boost his presidential popularity. The timing of any Trump-Kim meeting will be crucial.

If President Trump meets Kim Jong Un, it remains unknown whether the former will lobby the latter for a more diluted form of North Korea’s military involvement in the Ukrainian war. North Korea’s military alliance with Russia led to Pyongyang deploying an estimated 11,000 to 14,000 soldiers to the Ukrainian war, of whom 2,200 to 2,300 reportedly died. While there were reports that North Korean weapons were initially less effective,

The US has the transactional options of providing concrete economic incentives to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons diplomacy and bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table

North Korean and Russian militaries have reportedly addressed those issues. Still, North Korea views its military sacrifice in the Russo-Ukrainian war as a heroic and nationalistic action protecting the Pyongyang-Moscow military alliance. If so, even if President Trump wants to see reduced North Korean involvement in the Ukrainian war, Kim Jong Un would not be willing to make concessions. After all, North Korea gains combat experience, technological know-how, and financial transactions from Russia through its involvement in the conflict. Unless President Trump’s transactional diplomacy is economically attractive enough to North Korea, Pyongyang is unlikely to make concessions regarding its military entanglement in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

From a strategic perspective, Russia will not be pleased to see a meeting between Trump and Kim, as the military alliance between Russia and North Korea is expected to remain solid and untouched by third parties. Geopolitically, Russia may prefer to retain North Korea as an ideological and military bulwark against the US-led alliance composed of South Korea and Japan. Russia’s war in Ukraine has already deeply alarmed Japan, especially given territorial disputes over the southern Kuril Islands (known as the Northern Territories in Japan). Geopolitically, Russia will view any Trump-Kim meeting with suspicion and caution.

Future prospects

President Trump’s offer to talk to Kim Jong Un over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme signals a de facto, if not de jure, recognition of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons status—a demand recently made by Kim Jong Un.

Such a gesture appears designed to lure Kim back to the bargaining table, even though the North Korean leadership has not yet indicated a positive posture towards dialogue with the US over its nuclear development. Arguably, the US should re-engage North Korea economically by offering to reopen the Kaesong industrial zone and slowly lifting economic sanctions stage by stage. In exchange, North Korea should allow the IAEA to inspect its nuclear sites, with technical details deferred to a subsequent stage of negotiations.

On the other hand, to enhance US economic re-engagement with North Korea, South Korea should consider accelerating the establishment of a free trade agreement and organisation with China. Eventually, once North Korea opens and liberalises its economy, Pyongyang may be lured to join the capitalist free trade zone, thereby accelerating the pace and broadening the scope of marketisation in the North Korean economy. Economic re-engagement and enhanced socio-economic interactions with North Korea will deepen Pyongyang’s marketisation, open its economy further, liberalise its society, and hopefully lead to a peaceful coexistence scenario in the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear weapons has already triggered trepidation in Japan, which views military rearmament as necessary to protect Tokyo’s national security against nuclear threats. South Korea officially supports denuclearisation, but eventually, it must rely more on its own nuclear deterrence rather than depending excessively on the US against an increasingly powerful North Korea. China is eager to see the peaceful coexistence of all stakeholders in Northeast Asia, but it must lobby North Korea toward maintaining peace in the Korean Peninsula.

If peaceful coexistence is in the common interest of all parties in Northeast Asia, the think tanks assisting President Trump should strategize further and make efforts to achieve this ultimate objective, ultimately reaching a win-win scenario for all stakeholders. The US has the transactional options of providing concrete economic incentives to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons diplomacy and bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. These transactional options will have tremendous geopolitical implications for other stakeholders in Northeast Asian security: South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.

*Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is a political scientist, veteran commentator, and author of numerous books and academic articles on Hong Kong, Macau, and Greater China. He is also an honorary professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong.