Expert roundup: Can Trump’s outreach bring Kim Jong Un back to the table?

President Donald Trump’s overtures to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have revived talk of diplomacy after years of impasse, but the path back to the engagement looks far different than it did at their first summit eight years ago.

Trump’s strategy of highlighting his “very good relationship” with Kim while scaling back U.S.-South Korea military exercises appears designed to lure Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.

However, his outreach has drawn only denials and denunciations from North Korea so far.

Unlike in 2018, Kim now leads a more confident regime that has deepened ties with Russia and China, blunting the impact of sanctions and advancing its nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang has also made clear that it will not engage on denuclearization, for long a central U.S. objective.

As Trump again bets on leader-to-leader diplomacy with Pyongyang while downplaying military cooperation with Seoul, the question is whether his willingness to step away from Washington’s norms can produce an opening — or simply give the DPRK more leverage.

To help make sense of Trump’s outreach to Kim, NK News spoke to former U.S. officials about the messaging from both countries and the prospects for renewed diplomacy. Participants in the roundup are:

Gen. (Ret.) Robert Abrams, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), U.N. Command (UNC) and U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC)
Frank Aum, former senior advisor for North Korea in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Mintaro Oba, former Korea Desk Officer at the U.S. Department of State
Evans Revere, former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs at the U.S. Department of State
Sydney Seiler, former national intelligence officer for North Korea in the U.S. National Intelligence Council

Editor’s note: Interviews have been edited for length and clarity.

Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump shaking hands at Panmunjom | Image: Trump White House Archived via Flickr (June 30, 2019)

Q. President Trump has revived some elements of his 2018 approach, including emphasizing his “very good relationship” with Kim Jong Un and calling for a reduction in U.S.-ROK military exercises. What do you think Trump is actually trying to accomplish through this outreach, and why is he pursuing it now?

Revere: President Trump is facing a strategic defeat in his war against Iran, rapidly declining domestic popular support, rising anger among voters about the economy, and the prospect of a major defeat in the November congressional elections. In this context, Trump needs a “win” or at least something that he can portray as a policy success to stem the tide of bad news. His summit with Kim Jong Un in 2018 allowed him to create the appearance of progress with North Korea. The Hanoi Summit in 2019 showed that such progress had been little more than an illusion. Nonetheless, as a mechanism to divert attention from his domestic troubles, another summit with the North Korean leader may offer him a little relief.

Oba: Donald Trump is operating from a position of profound weakness here, far weaker than in 2018. He is mired in an unpopular war ahead of pivotal midterm elections in the United States that may weaken his power. It seems like he believes diplomacy with Kim Jong Un would make him look like a master dealmaker at a critical moment, shift public attention away from Iran, and give him the means to punish allies he sees as uncooperative.

Abrams: I’m actually not sure what he’s trying to accomplish and I’m not sure what his end state is. Anyone who says they can accurately predict what President Trump is going to do, I would question the veracity of that statement. He is by nature unpredictable in foreign affairs and other things. That’s not a criticism. It’s just a statement. 

Seiler: The absence of dialogue between the DPRK and the United States has not been a result of Donald Trump’s North Korea policy. It’s been a result of Kim Jong Un’s U.S. policy. 

Ultimately there’s a bit of gamesmanship going on and Kim Jong Un has been backfooted somewhat by Donald Trump’s outreach, which is a classic negotiating tactic. A U.S.-DPRK summit will let the president return to the limelight and pursue his relationship with Kim Jong Un. If it doesn’t work, he can say, “I tried and I will keep trying. Kim Jong Un’s a good friend of mine, and when the time is right, I’m sure we’ll talk.”

Kim Yo Jong speaking during a party meeting | Image: KCTV (Aug. 11, 2022)

Q. In the past few days, we have seen conflicting statements from Washington and Pyongyang regarding the two leaders’ apparent communications. Why are the two sides offering different positions, and how likely is it that Trump and Kim are engaging actively?

Seiler: Part of the goal here is to remember that Kim Jong Un has been in a period where he sees no value in talking to the United States. He’s got a relationship with Russia. I don’t think that there’s actually going to be any serious breakthrough in anything with the United States as long as things are going so well for Kim in his Russia-centric international relations strategy.

Aum: Trump seems to be overselling engagement to create momentum, like he tried to do in the case of Iran, but North Korea is correcting the record. I don’t think North Korea will engage unless Trump makes a clear gesture that specifically addresses North Korea’s demands, which include abandoning denuclearization and offering unilateral gestures like canceling joint military exercises.

 

Revere: North Korea is exploiting President Trump’s eagerness for a summit. Trump’s keen desire to meet with Kim Jong Un has led the U.S. president to make a major unilateral concession to Pyongyang that will weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance and diminish the alliance’s deterrence capability. Pyongyang has pocketed this major concession and, by dismissing the importance of the U.S. move, Kim Jong Un has put the ball back in the U.S. court in the hope that Trump will make further concessions to obtain a meeting with Kim Jong Un. 

Oba: Fan fiction is not diplomacy. It seems most likely that Trump is characterizing a scenario he desperately wants with Kim Jong Un rather than any real conversations. In any case, Pyongyang clearly feels the need to signal at a high-level that there is no active engagement — unsurprising, because North Korea has leverage over Trump by keeping the door open to future summit diplomacy, but little to gain by engaging now.

South Korean and American soldiers taking part in the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint exercise in 2022 | Image: U.S.-ROK 2nd Infantry Division

Q. The Trump administration asked South Korea to shorten this year’s Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, with some Seoul officials indicating they were not aware of Trump’s push to scale back drills before he made the request on social media. What does this episode tell us about how Trump views alliance management, and what risks or opportunities could this approach create for U.S.-ROK deterrence against North Korean threats?

Abrams: We ought to be careful about drawing conclusions from one episode and making a generalization about how President Trump approaches alliances. There have been several other cases over the last year and a half where there has been a lot of coordination between both sides, particularly in the economic side of things. 

This wouldn’t be the first time that President Trump has taken the initiative. And President Lee Jae Myung has said, “Hey, we’re happy to do whatever we can to support dialogue between the United States and North Korea.”

It’s regrettable to me that the day before the start of the exercise was when the announcement was made, because the planning for these semiannual exercises goes on for months. Now, all is not lost […] Did they get training value from it? Of course they did. But honestly, from my own experience, there’s a reason why that exercise is 10 or more days long, because you need to conduct continuous operations to really feel the value of the training environment.

Seiler: We continue to have an alliance. Nobody questions our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and our commitment to holding up our end of the mutual defense treaty. If you are worried that the alliance is going to collapse during Donald Trump’s four years, I think you can be relatively certain that it will not.

Tactically, the president does things for shock effect, for leverage, and they can be disconcerting […] so you do have a diplomatic mess to clean up afterward.

Aum: Trump doesn’t seem to value alliance coordination. Alliance management often appears more like alliance coercion or presenting fait accomplis. This approach is, in general, very detrimental to alliance relations and confidence in the extended deterrence commitment. On the other hand, the Lee administration may be willing to look past this coordination faux pas if Trump’s unilateralism can actually get North Korea back to the table and increase the likelihood of inter-Korean engagement. But Lee will also have to figure out how to keep the timely transition of wartime OPCON on schedule since joint exercises are necessary for the certification of certain milestones related to OPCON transition.

Oba: Donald Trump is applying a mafia boss lens to alliance management; everything is transactional, and he thinks he is owed a measure of loyalty for providing security for our allies. This weakens deterrence and makes us all more insecure. But there’s a small upside Seoul should consider: high-profile threats to the alliance from Trump create more urgency around shows of U.S.-Korea unity and coordination elsewhere. Under Ambassador Kang [Kyung-wha] in Washington, Korea has more momentum to strengthen ties on Capitol Hill, in the private sector, and people-to-people to buffer against the instability from the top. That could be good for the alliance in the long run.

Trump and Kim during their second summit in Hanoi | Image: Rodong Sinmun (March 1, 2019)

Q. If Trump and Kim were to meet again, what would each side realistically have to put on the table to make the meeting worthwhile? Could Trump offer enough without undermining Washington’s core objectives?

Aum: Just to get a meeting, Trump will need to abandon denuclearization and maybe offer some unilateral gestures, such as a moratorium on strategic asset deployments and a cancellation of major military exercises. If a meeting happens, Trump would then need to put on the table relief from the major UN sectoral sanctions. For its part, North Korea would have to at least offer what was on the table in 2019, including a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing, the dismantlement of the entire Yongbyon complex, the institutionalization of bilateral engagement, and perhaps even North Korean willingness to engage with South Korea. I think Trump could offer all of these and, in doing so, tangibly reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and enhance security for the United States and its allies. But North Korea would need to provide its own security guarantees to Washington and Seoul, and South Korea and Japan would need to accept the reality of a nuclear North Korea.

Revere: North Korea’s main goals at a summit will be to: (1) weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance, including by demanding reductions in U.S. forces deployed in Korea and U.S. assets deployed in the region in support of South Korea, and (2) obtain U.S. acceptance or acknowledgment of the DPRK’s status as a permanent nuclear weapons power. President Trump’s unilateral changes to U.S.-ROK exercises have probably given Pyongyang hope that it will be able to achieve its first goal. His frequent reference to North Korea’s status as a “nuclear power” may also give the DPRK reason to believe it can also achieve its second goal. 

Seiler: Kim Jong Un’s logic is this: I’m a nuclear power now. As a nuclear power with sovereign rights to the full package, I’m going to test missiles. I don’t think an arms control approach will work because I don’t think Kim is near where wants to be. And the only way that arms control would be feasible is if he got to a certain point where he felt basically there’s no impact on his nuclear program by any deal.

Singapore and Hanoi were about locking in [North Korea’s] nuclear weapons status and still having some type of relationship with the United States. The value of that has greatly diminished since then. Kim might see little value in getting anything so complicated with a president that’s only going to be around another two years and may be considerably weakened by the midterms.

Abrams: The Hanoi summit in late February 2019 was an abject failure for Kim Jong Un. He was humiliated on the world stage. That happened for a number of reasons. The biggest one is Kim Jong Un miscalculated Trump as a dealmaker. Secondly, there was a lot of state-to-state coordination and discussion at the working level about the framing of what a possible agreement would be. President Trump was absolutely correct in walking away from a bad deal. [North Korea] essentially wanted all sanctions removed. It was basically a nothing burger from North Korea.

If there’s going to be a meeting, Kim Jong Un is going to secure his bare minimum before he even agrees to have the meeting. He’s going to want the US to make concessions just to agree to have a meeting. And he’s going to want them in writing. They’re going to look for sanctions removal, financial aid, all kinds of assistance and handouts, and they’re going to want to be welcomed back into the international order. If there is any mention of denuclearization in any pre-meeting agreement, North Korea is not going to agree.

Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump during their summit in Hanoi | Image: Trump White House Archived via Flickr (Feb. 27, 2019)

Q. If another Trump-Kim summit takes place, what would constitute a meaningful outcome this time? Is there a realistic path toward a substantive agreement, or is the more plausible goal simply to reopen a diplomatic channel and establish a framework for further negotiations?

 

Oba: Summits and stability are better than fire and fury. I think keeping Donald Trump and North Korea invested in a diplomatic process that keeps the potential for tension and miscalculation lower is a worthy outcome on its own given the personalities at play. Under a different U.S. leader, I would like to see us create more sustainable U.S.-North Korea diplomatic channels and explore options on economic engagement and sanctions relief that could increase our leverage over Pyongyang long term — but it’s hard to envision such outcomes right now.

Abrams: What’s most desirable is opening diplomatic channels. From my perspective, talking is always a much preferred alternative to fighting or threatening each other to fight. Also, I would really like to see open channels between North and South Korea. I’m a big fan of diplomacy. We’re not going to solve things using the military element of national power. It’s going to take a lot of time and energy to rebuild some trust. So, there’s going to have to be some tiny baby-step confidence building measures that are going to have to happen in the hopes that we can get somewhere.

Aum: A meaningful outcome would include an interim agreement that provides the mutual concessions outlined above. This agreement would then establish the foundation for diplomatic engagement that could address any outstanding issues. North Korea would not accept talks that just re-open diplomatic channels, which would be, for them, talks for the sake of talks.

Revere: North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons and is not interested in discussing denuclearization. Pyongyang’s goals include weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance and obtaining acceptance of its status as a de facto nuclear weapons state. Under normal circumstances, neither of these outcomes would be acceptable to any U.S. administration. But Donald Trump’s approach to these matters may be very different […] We should be prepared for uncomfortable surprises coming out of any summit. A U.S.-DPRK summit is highly unlikely to produce a serious, implementable denuclearization agreement. A summit is more likely to produce vague statements about bilateral relations, assurances about good intentions and non-hostility and other statements designed to reduce tensions. But the cost to the U.S. of obtaining such an outcome may be high. 

Edited by Alannah Hill