“It’s virtually certain the RPO opted to use ITD even though they knew it wasn’t allowed. They perceived it to be both a simpler and more practical method of protection than blocking, given the location and timing of the planned work.”
Blocking – where trains are prevented from entering a worksite – was the approved safety method at the site.
The RPO also lodged their ITD on an old paper form, rather than digitally, because they’d forgotten their iPad and reading glasses, the commission wrote.
Nine trains passed during the 63 minutes the RPO and two subcontractors were at the site, with gaps of six to 11 minutes between them.
The trio arrived at the site about 9.20am to do maintenance on a trackside grease applicator before one subcontractor walked about 8m from the control box to fix a wheel sensor, kneeling between the tracks to lift it into position.
At 10.14am, a northbound train being used for driver training rounded a curve about 220m away.
The RPO saw the train approaching and called out to the subcontractor, but they didn’t respond because they were focused on removing a ring spanner stuck vertically on the sensor equipment, the commission wrote.
“The RPO reached [the subcontractor] and pulled them upward and away from the track. At the same time, the ring spanner was dislodged.”
The train came to a stop 5m from where the pair had been, 16 seconds after its emergency brake was pulled from about 180m away. The subcontractor’s tools and equipment were still in the centre of the track.
No one was hurt.
Investigators were told it was common for RPOs to use ITD at the site, and others with limited sightlines for similar reasons, the commission wrote.
“The misalignment between planned work and compliant protection methods may not be isolated to this incident.”
Neither subcontractor had the required competencies or current medical certification to work in the rail corridor, and the RPO had no way of checking.
Other contractors had since been found to be missing the required certifications, KiwiRail told investigators, and there was no robust system for auditing protection officers’ safety documentation, the commission wrote.
KiwiRail accepted the commission’s recommendations to improve worksite protection planning and to audit protection measures used by rail protection officers.