Between two distinct Syrian experiences—the rise and dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, and the trajectory of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s movement in Suweida—a shared lesson emerges about the limits of local proxies once the strategic priorities of foreign powers shift.
For years, the SDF operated as a powerful military and administrative structure controlling vast territory with sustained American backing. Al-Hijri’s movement, by contrast, has functioned primarily as a local instrument within Israel’s security and political calculations in southern Syria.
This contrast sharpened on August 25, when the SDF announced its dissolution, ending a project that had relied heavily on U.S. support. Al-Hijri, meanwhile, continues to pursue an isolated political and security path for Suweida, while Israel presents itself as a protector of the Druze community and a barrier against forced security arrangements.
On that same day, al-Hijri escalated his rhetoric beyond appeals for protection, declaring the Druze an integral part of Israel. The statement dramatically raises the stakes of his reliance on Tel Aviv and complicates Suweida’s future relationship with Damascus.
These developments place two central questions at the forefront: Can Israel protect al-Hijri? And can al-Hijri convert that protection into a viable political project for Suweida?
The Limits of External Protection
Israel can obstruct military arrangements, deter adversaries, and shield a geographic pocket. It cannot, however, independently grant Syrian, regional, or international legitimacy to a local political project. Nor can it build sustainable institutions, an economy, or a long-term political settlement for Suweida.
Meanwhile, the broader Syrian landscape is shifting. The SDF has begun integrating into the state. Washington is recalibrating balances among Damascus, Ankara, and Tel Aviv. Syrian-Israeli security relations are re-entering U.S.-sponsored negotiations.
Al-Hijri’s challenge lies in the limits of hard power. Suweida faces not only the question of immediate protection, but the deeper question of what follows.
The precedent from southern Lebanon is instructive. Israel established a security zone and relied on a local proxy force—first under Saad Haddad, later under Antoine Lahad’s South Lebanon Army (SLA). When Israel withdrew in 2000 and its security calculus shifted, the proxy collapsed almost instantly.
The lesson for Suweida is clear: a local force’s value is tied to the specific function it serves for its foreign patron. When that function evolves, the proxy’s survival is tested.
Divergent Strategic Priorities
Israel’s interests in southern Syria revolve around border security, pressure on Damascus, and countering rival regional actors. Al-Hijri’s needs are far broader: he seeks protection that can be transformed into a sustainable political framework, economic viability, administrative legitimacy, and integration into regional arrangements.
A critical miscalculation would be assuming that tactical security support equates to a shared long-term vision for Suweida. If a broader security understanding with Damascus becomes the more pragmatic path for Tel Aviv, local leverage risks becoming a bargaining chip rather than a strategic asset.
Washington’s Role and Shifting Regional Balances
Israel may hold leverage in the south, but Washington retains the ability to reorder relations among the principal actors. Recent U.S. initiatives aim to reactivate Syrian-Israeli security talks while preventing Israeli-Turkish competition from escalating inside Syria.
As Washington works to establish security understandings between Damascus and Tel Aviv, local proxies—much like the SDF—cease to be central to the strategic equation. Al-Hijri’s position becomes increasingly precarious if Damascus emerges as the primary negotiating partner for regional powers.
Al-Hijri may point to current Israeli protection, but military defense alone does not resolve internal governance, resource distribution, institutional development, or long-term relations with the central state. External protection can buy time; it cannot generate legitimacy.
The Question Facing Suweida
Ultimately, the issue is not whether external support will diminish, but whether local proxies remain relevant once engagement with Damascus becomes the higher strategic priority.
The fate of Lahad’s militia and the dissolution of the SDF offer two different paths—but one shared lesson: when the strategic map changes, the value of local proxies is recalculated, and their future depends less on their patrons’ promises than on the political realities that follow.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.