The election campaign is focused mainly on who will be Israel’s next prime minister, but behind it another battle is already underway that could prove no less consequential: who will get the keys to the Defense Ministry.
After October 7, years of war and deep erosion in the IDF and reserve system, the next defense minister is not expected to be merely the minister who approves operational plans or manages the defense budget.
From right: Yair Golan, Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, Ofer Winter
(Photos: Dana Kopel, Ryan Preuss, Shalev Shalom, Shutterstock/meunierd)
He will have to contend with rebuilding the military, the Iranian threat, the future of the Gaza Strip, the reality in the West Bank, relations with the United States — and one of the most politically explosive issues in Israel: Haredi conscription.
The identity of the minister will, of course, depend on the government that is formed. Different names emerge in each of the main political scenarios, including four figures who also represent three very different security approaches: Brig. Gen. (res.) Ofer Winter, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and former Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan.
The debate among them is not simply about who would use more force. It goes to a much deeper question: How should Israel conduct itself after the failure that transformed its security doctrine — whether to pursue decisive victory and sovereignty, fundamentally change the equations with its enemies in the region or combine military force with political separation and preservation of international alliances.
If the next government is formed by the right-wing bloc, one of the names that could emerge as a candidate for defense minister is Brig. Gen. (res.) Ofer Winter. Unlike defense ministers who came from the General Staff after long careers at the military’s highest levels, Winter is building his standing precisely as someone who criticizes from the outside the way the system operated for years.
At the heart of his approach is the argument that over the years Israel adopted a language of “containment,” “deterrence” and “rounds” instead of one of victory and decisive defeat. In his view, October 7 demonstrated the price of an approach in which Israel’s enemies are given time to arm and grow stronger while the system tries to buy periods of quiet.
Ofer Winter: A shift toward a more proactive and offensive military
(Photo: Shilo Shalom)
Winter demands a shift toward a more proactive and offensive military whose objective in war is not to restore deterrence for a few years but to remove the threat. He rejects reliance on temporary arrangements with terrorist organizations as a substitute for military victory and seeks broad changes in command culture and in the way decisions are made in the IDF.
His position on the West Bank is also clear. Winter opposes withdrawals and territorial concessions, supports strengthening settlements and applying Israeli sovereignty and advocates systematically dismantling terrorist infrastructure while maintaining full Israeli security control.
If he receives the Defense Ministry, one of his central tests would actually be within Israeli society. Winter presents Haredi conscription as an integral part of rebuilding the military after the war. He speaks of a service law that would apply to everyone, while at the same time arguing that the number of Haredim who enlist can be increased significantly through tailored frameworks and trust-building with the Haredi public.
Alongside that, he wants to change the way those already serving are treated, with broader compensation for combat soldiers and reservists and a clear preference for those who shoulder the security burden.
Naftali Bennett is in a different political scenario. If he succeeds in forming the next government, he would of course be the natural candidate for prime minister rather than defense minister. But unlike many prime ministers, Bennett has made clear that he intends to shape security policy closely himself, meaning the question of who formally holds the portfolio may be less significant than his direct influence over the system.
Bennett describes his doctrine through an image he has repeated time and again: Israel needs to stop being merely a “villa in the jungle” and become a “gorilla in the jungle.” In other words, not a country that shelters behind fences and defense systems waiting for the next threat, but an unpredictable regional power that takes the initiative, attacks and changes the reality around it.
ennett proposes appointing a civilian military secretary who will be subordinate to the Prime Minister – and who will not come from the IDF
(Photo: Elad Gutman)
The clearest example is Iran. Bennett wants to sever the equation under which Israel fights Tehran’s proxies while Iran itself remains protected. In his view, if Hezbollah fires on Israel, Tehran should know that it too may pay the price. This is essentially a continuation of the “Octopus Doctrine” he previously promoted: Instead of fighting only Iran’s arms in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen, act against the head of the octopus as well.Bennett also sees Qatar as a target for a policy shift and says he intends to designate it an enemy state. At the same time, he wants to keep Qatar and Turkey out of any role in shaping Gaza’s future and instead build a deeper axis with Egypt and a special, discreet relationship with President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi.
In his view, Cairo is a key player in any future arrangement in the Strip, from preventing smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor to creating mechanisms that would allow Israel to safeguard its security interests without giving renewed influence to countries that, he says, assisted Hamas.
Bennett also wants to address what he sees as one of the roots of the October 7 failure: the way intelligence assessments reach the political echelon. He argues that information is processed and filtered within the system until it is presented to decision-makers as one consolidated assessment.
He therefore wants to create a more independent capability around the prime minister that would make it possible to challenge the security establishment and hear alternative assessments, for example by appointing a civilian military secretary who would answer to the prime minister and would not come from the IDF.
On the Palestinian issue, he continues to oppose a Palestinian state. His proposed solution is neither full annexation nor withdrawal, but a version of the “shrinking the conflict” approach: Israeli control of Area C, Palestinian civil autonomy in Areas A and B and full freedom of action for the IDF wherever required.
In a scenario in which a government is formed by centrist parties and the current opposition, Gadi Eisenkot is one of the most natural candidates for the Defense Ministry, assuming he is not the one heading the government.
Unlike the other two, he has already served as IDF chief of staff, sat in the war Cabinet and was closely involved in security decisions since October 7.
Eisenkot warns against a process that will lead to a binational state
(Photo: Ariel Schalit/AP)
Eisenkot represents an approach that combines a willingness to use significant force with greater caution about what is supposed to follow military action. He is not associated with a soft military doctrine. On the contrary: As chief of staff and Northern Command chief, his name became associated with the “Dahiya Doctrine,” based on the use of broad, destructive force in a war with Hezbollah and strikes on infrastructure used by the organization.
But in his view, military force must serve a strategic objective. Between wars, he favors the “campaign between the wars” model: systematically striking enemy force buildup while trying to avoid being dragged into a full-scale war at a time that does not serve Israel’s interests.
The biggest gap between him and Winter is over the West Bank. Eisenkot warns against a process that would lead to a binational state and sees separation from the Palestinians as a strategic Israeli interest.
At the same time, he does not currently support establishing a Palestinian state and favors preserving full IDF freedom of security action. Under his approach, the Palestinian Authority should continue managing the civilian life of the Palestinian population, while Israel retains security responsibility. He has also made clear that communities and farms established legally should not be evacuated.
Eisenkot opposes unilateral annexation. In his view, such steps could damage not only relations with the Palestinians but also the strategic alliance with the United States, the Abraham Accords and the legitimacy that enables Israel to use force in various arenas.
For him, ties with Washington and the regional system are not constraints on national security but part of it.
He has called for the establishment of a moderate Palestinian entity as an alternative to Hamas and for the deployment of a new international force in southern Lebanon. In the West Bank, Golan has presented a plan for separation from the Palestinians that includes a determined fight against both Palestinian and Jewish terrorism, evacuation of illegal outposts and delineation of borders.
Yair Golan presented a plan for separation from the Palestinians
(Photo: Yariv Katz)
As a prospective defense minister, Golan seeks to build a moderate regional axis with Egypt, Jordan and the Abraham Accords countries. Within the military, he focuses on strengthening the ground forces and expanding troop numbers, restoring autonomy to the General Staff level and ensuring that every military action serves a clear political objective.
When Eisenkot — who according to all polls is the leading candidate for prime minister in the bloc opposing Netanyahu — was asked what he thought about giving Golan the Defense Ministry, he replied that there were better candidates for the job.
Whoever among the candidates ultimately reaches the Defense Ministry will quickly discover that alongside Iran, Hezbollah and Gaza, another front awaits him at home: IDF manpower.
The long years of war, the extraordinary number of reserve-duty days and the need to expand the military have transformed Haredi conscription from a social and political dispute into a genuine security issue.
On this point, the gaps between Winter, Bennett, Eisenkot and even Golan are actually smaller.
Winter speaks of universal service alongside frameworks that would allow Haredim to serve without giving up their way of life. Bennett demands a dramatic increase in Haredi participation in the burden and wants to link service to rights and economic benefits. Eisenkot also sets significant Haredi enlistment as a condition for a new service law and argues that the IDF’s manpower needs must be at the center of any arrangement.