The publication on September 6 of the full text of the framework agreement between Armenia and the United States on TRIPP (“Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”) shows that the project is gradually moving from the political sphere to the practical one.
This is no longer merely about the intention to open transport communication across the territory of Armenia, but about the creation of a concrete mechanism for its implementation. The American and Armenian sides have agreed to establish a joint structure in which the United States receives 74% and Armenia 26%. At the same time, Yerevan retains sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory, while the rights to develop the relevant sections are granted initially for 49 years.
For Washington, this is an opportunity to gain a long-term economic presence in the South Caucasus. For Armenia, in turn, it is a chance to attract capital and create infrastructure including railway and road communications, pipelines, telecommunications networks and other facilities. However, the main significance of the project is revealed not so much in the American-Armenian agreement as in its geographical continuation.
TRIPP is intended to provide transport connectivity through the territory of Armenia between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Therefore, the agreement between Washington and Yerevan effectively creates one of the elements of a larger system, the full functioning of which will require the participation of Azerbaijan. It is precisely on the linkage of the Armenian section with Azerbaijani infrastructure that it will depend whether the project turns into a full-fledged international route.
Against this background, the meeting of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on August 31 in Bishkek was telling. The sides discussed practical steps on TRIPP, as well as trade, energy, transit, border delimitation and the development of bilateral relations. Among the results already achieved were noted the supplies of Azerbaijani petroleum products to Armenia and the transit of grain and other goods through the territory of Azerbaijan.
This is important not in itself, but as an indicator of the changing nature of relations between Baku and Yerevan. Until recently, the main content of bilateral contacts consisted of security issues and closing the page of enmity. Now trade operations and transit are gradually being added to them. The economic component thereby becomes a practical continuation of political normalization.
For Azerbaijan, TRIPP has an entirely concrete significance. The new route is intended to provide a direct overland connection with Nakhchivan and at the same time can be integrated into the Middle Corridor system. Through Azerbaijan, this direction gains access to the Caspian, and further on to Central Asia, Turkey and European markets. Moreover, the project is not emerging out of nowhere: Baku has already been consistently expanding trade, investment and transport cooperation with the states of Central Asia, while the Caspian is increasingly turning into a space of economic interaction.
For Turkey, the significance of the project is also obvious. A connection with Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan creates an additional overland communication route in an eastern direction and expands the possibilities of linking the Turkish transport system with routes passing through the Caucasus and the Caspian.
However, the most interesting question concerns the states that today regard TRIPP with wariness. First and foremost these are Iran and Russia. Their concern has quite understandable geopolitical reasons, since the project strengthens the presence of the United States in the region and changes the customary configuration of external forces. But if one separates the political side from the economic one, it turns out that both countries are potentially capable of deriving quite tangible benefits from the new system of communications.
For Iran, the key problem remains the possible strengthening of the American presence near its northern border. Tehran is also interested in ensuring that new regional routes do not weaken its own positions. At the same time, however, opportunities open up that are hard to ignore.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly stated that the implementation of TRIPP is capable of expanding Armenian-Iranian trade and creating conditions for a railway connection between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea. At the same time, it is important not to confuse these projects: the Persian Gulf – Black Sea railway itself is not directly part of TRIPP, but is viewed as one of the possible accompanying results of regional unblocking. According to Pashinyan, the new infrastructure will allow Armenia to obtain railway communication with Iran, while the restoration of the relevant communications may open the way for Iranian cargo to the Armenian and Georgian directions.
For Tehran, this means several potential advantages. Iran gains the opportunity to increase trade with Armenia, expand the use of overland routes to the Black Sea and obtain additional options for bringing its goods to foreign markets. In the long term, a more branched network of communications reduces dependence on individual routes and makes it possible to redistribute cargo flows more flexibly.
Thus, the Iranian position may turn out to be more complex than simple rejection of TRIPP. Tehran is capable of opposing certain political and military-strategic consequences of the American presence while simultaneously supporting those elements of regional unblocking that correspond to its trade interests. In other words, the question for Iran is not necessarily whether a new route is needed at all, but on what terms it will function.
With Russia the situation is even more interesting. Moscow perceives the strengthening of American influence in the South Caucasus as a potential threat to its former positions. Russian representatives have also expressed concerns regarding the possible appearance of American military or intelligence infrastructure in Armenia. However, there are no such provisions in the published framework agreement. Therefore, these statements should be regarded as Moscow’s assessment of the possible consequences of the project, rather than as a description of its legal content.
At the same time, Russia itself has made it clear that it sees in TRIPP an opportunity for its own participation. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated that the project would only benefit from Russian participation. He argued this on the grounds that the Armenian railway network is managed by a subsidiary of Russian Railways, that transit through Armenia must take into account the rules of the Eurasian Economic Union, and that on the relevant section of the Armenian-Iranian border Russian border guards continue to perform their functions jointly with the Armenian side.
Behind these statements there is also an entirely material interest. TRIPP may create additional opportunities for the movement of Russian cargo through Azerbaijan and Armenia in the direction of Turkey and other markets. Pashinyan himself said that the railway infrastructure being created could connect Armenia with Russia and Central Asia via Azerbaijan and ensure significant volumes of freight traffic from East to West.
For the Russian economy, the possibility of linking the new direction with already existing transport routes is especially important. If the infrastructure is technically compatible and political conditions allow it to be used without serious restrictions, Russian carriers will be able to obtain an additional option for delivering cargo to the south and west. This is not about replacing existing routes, but about expanding their range.
Here another important aspect arises. Russia is interested in the development of the North – South international transport corridor passing through Azerbaijan to Iran. The more closely the various directions in the South Caucasus are interconnected, the more opportunities will appear for redistributing cargo among them. Therefore, in the long term TRIPP may be viewed by Moscow not only as an American initiative, but also as a potentially suitable element of a broader transport system.
However, Russian interest runs up against an objective limitation – the sanctions regime. International companies and financial structures may avoid operations that could create additional sanctions risks for them. Therefore, Moscow’s potential benefit from the new route does not mean automatic participation of Russian business in its operation. It will be necessary to find a model of interaction in which the economic advantages are not outweighed by political and financial restrictions.
It is precisely here that the main contradiction surrounding TRIPP manifests itself. For the United States, the project is a way to consolidate a long-term presence in the region. For Armenia, it is an instrument for expanding communications. For Azerbaijan, it is an opportunity to connect Nakhchivan with the country’s main transport system. For Turkey, it is an additional direction to the east. And for Iran and Russia it simultaneously carries both political risks and potential economic opportunities.
At the same time, the implementation of the project is by no means guaranteed by the very fact of signing the agreement. Issues of construction, border procedures, the customs regime, security, financing and commercial operation still have to be resolved. Particularly important will remain the reconciliation of the interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia, since it is precisely through their territories that the interconnected system of communications is to pass.
But already now a situation is taking shape around TRIPP in which it will be more difficult for the project’s potential opponents to reject it entirely than it seems. The more new routes are connected with one another, the higher the potential value of access to them for all participants in the region. Therefore, states may seek to influence the rules of operation of the new system, to secure participation in projects connected with it and at the same time to limit undesirable geopolitical consequences.
This is precisely what may become the main paradox of TRIPP. A project that today is perceived by Moscow and Tehran primarily through the prism of the strengthening of American influence potentially creates their own economic incentives for them. If these incentives turn out to be strong enough, regional competition may gradually shift from a struggle against new routes to a struggle for participation in them.