A tale of two tenders: understanding Poland’s complex high speed fleet procurement plans

POLAND: Policymakers continue to push for two parallel state-backed high speed rolling stock tenders as part of the Port Polska programme, even though the government official now overseeing the scheme says PKP Intercity’s order for up to 55 trains ‘will suffice’. The government is nevertheless insisting a second fleet will still be procured, which could yet be used by new entrants to compete with PKP Intercity. Thomas Wintle investigates.

As the state-backed Port Polska/CPK megaproject moves towards delivery in the early 2030s, tens of billions of złoty of public money are being committed to a new high speed rail network, alongside billions more available for rolling stock. The first services are due to launch in 2032, when long-distance passenger rail demand is forecast to have grown by up to 50%, with more recent estimates suggesting passenger numbers could more than double from 89 million in 2025 to 182 million by 2050.

These trends promise a potentially lucrative new rail market segment, giving the state an obvious interest in how much of that value is captured by the companies it controls. But as main construction approaches, those responsible for Poland’s future rail market are pulling in different directions over how public money and other forms of state support should be used. The debate centres on how best to procure high speed rolling stock and, more broadly, how the benefits and risks of the projected growth should be distributed.

A new ROSCO

The wider investment programme delivered by state-owned CPK, now branded Port Polska by the government, appeared to answer that question in June when the project delivery body set up Port Polska.KDP as a state-backed leasing company, alongside plans to purchase three separate fleets for the new network. The ROSCO is intended to make the trains available to operators, including new entrants, forming part of Poland’s approach to managing the shift towards passenger rail liberalisation. Port Polska.KDP’s tenders are due later this year for the Aero Express and Regio Express fleets, both of which will be specified for at least 200 km/h running and are intended respectively for airport and regional/inter-regional services across the future network.

Piotr Malepszak © Polish Ministry of Infrastructure

A third tender, for 320 km/h Intercity KDP trains, is also slated for launch in 2026, with the new ROSCO understood to have explored a requirement for around 40–60 trainsets. Expressly designed to allow more operators into Poland’s new high speed market sooner by giving them access to suitable trains without the usual procurement and approval lead times, it will also provide the state-backed ROSCO with a long-term revenue stream from the more competitive market it is helping to develop.

However, since taking over Port Polska in mid-June, Deputy Infrastructure Minister Piotr Malepszak, the government’s newly appointed plenipotentiary for the programme, has repeatedly dismissed the high speed order as unnecessary. He has argued that PKP Intercity’s own procurement of up to 55 trains should be more than enough for Poland’s future needs. Port Polska itself and Poland’s Ministry of Infrastructure, for their part, both reiterated when contacted by Railway Gazette International that the ROSCO’s separate high speed fleet remains part of the programme.

Malepszak’s capacity case

Within days of his June 19 appointment, Malepszak had begun arguing in Polish media that Port Polska should concentrate on trains capable of around 200–230 km/h, which he saw as the more immediate requirement for airport, regional and inter-regional services.

For the 320 km/h market, Malepszak has made a numerical case for relying solely on PKP Intercity. In interviews with Polish media, he said its full 55-train procurement could support up to 30 million train-km a year. In his assessment, that would be enough to cover the Y network linking Warszawa and Łódź with Wrocław and Poznań, as well as extensions northwest towards Szczecin near the German border. The same fleet could also serve the existing north-south CMK trunk line and its planned northern extension, as well as being used for international services towards Czechia via Katowice and Ostrava.

Central and Eastern European high-speed rail projects, including CPK routes. © CPK

‘The PKP Intercity tender will suffice to provide the high-speed rail rolling stock, and CPK should not purchase 40 such trains’, he told Polish business daily Rzeczpospolita. His alternative is therefore to direct the ROSCO towards the much broader market for 200–230 km/h trains needed for airport connections and services extending beyond the high speed core.

An inherited plan

Malepszak’s challenge followed an abrupt change in Port Polska’s political oversight. Port Polska.KDP had set out its three-fleet strategy on June 2 under Maciej Lasek, a former aviation engineer and then the government plenipotentiary responsible for CPK. Just 17 days later, Lasek left the post at his own request, without publicly explaining why, and Malepszak — a career railway manager and former senior CPK executive — was appointed in his place.

Lasek said only that building strategic state infrastructure was ‘not a sprint’ but ‘a true relay race’, adding in a post on X that his own leg was ending and he was handing over ‘with a clear conscience’.

Kiedy obejmowałem funkcję Pełnomocnika rządu ds. CPK, staliśmy przed podzielonym środowiskiem i projektami, które żyły wyłącznie w sferze politycznych obietnic. To był czas trudnych decyzji, głębokich reform i ciężkiej pracy o to, by w Polsce funkcjonowała branża lotnicza, której…

— Maciej Lasek (@LasekMaciej) June 19, 2026

The former Port Polska chief had not always supported a ROSCO either. In July 2024 he said CPK should build infrastructure rather than lease trains, and that PKP Intercity would provide the high speed fleet. By the next year, however, Port Polska was developing a business plan for the pool, with Lasek describing it as an ‘important element’ in preparing to operate the future railway and arguing that train procurement and rolling stock management were ‘necessary’ for the planned high speed lines.

Paweł Rydzyński, President of Poland’s Transport Economics Association and a long-standing analyst of the country’s passenger rail market, said the leadership change was likely relevant to the shift in messaging. ‘It’s worth keeping the timeline in mind’, Rydzyński told Railway Gazette International that ‘some of today’s inconsistencies may therefore simply stem from the fact that he inherited a project prepared according to a different concept and is now trying to modify it’.

PKP Intercity moves ahead

The obvious test of both positions is PKP Intercity’s own order, which has already moved beyond market testing. Launched in December 2025, it covers 20 approximately 200 m-long multi-system EMUs capable of at least 320 km/h, with options for another 35, plus supply of 30 years of maintenance and a dedicated depot. On August 6, all four applicants — Alstom, Siemens Mobility, Talgo and a Hitachi Rail/Pesa consortium — were cleared to enter competitive dialogue, with PKP Intercity aiming to conclude the contract by next year.

The firm order of 20 is intended to support hourly Warszawa – Łódź – Wrocław services and two-hourly trains via Poznań to Szczecin and Berlin, with the first two trains due within five years of contract signature and all 20 within seven. If those delivery targets are met, that would put the first fleet into service around the planned 2032 opening of the initial sections of dedicated high speed infrastructure.

Central to Malepszak’s case against a second state-backed fleet is whether PKP Intercity ultimately exercises options for all 35. ‘However, if we assume that the full option will be exercised’, Rydzyński said, ‘the operational case for Port Polska.KDP to simultaneously purchase a further 40 to 60 320 km/h trains does require very strong justification.’

Why the 200 km/h fleets are different

The Aero Express and Regio Express pools present a different issue. The regional passenger market is dominated by state-owned operators, including national regional train operator Polregio and a number of players owned by the voivodships. However, the evolving network means trains will need to be interoperable between Poland’s existing 3 kV DC network and the new 25 kV AC high speed lines, requiring dual-system stock and giving Port Polska a clearer operational case for those fleets.

Dr Jakub Majewski. © Jakub Majewski

Dr Jakub Majewski, a former deputy head of Poland’s rail regulator and former president of regional operator Koleje Mazowieckie, had drawn much the same distinction last year when he spoke to ProMedia Group’s former title RailTech. Pointing to electrification as ‘the crucial issue’, he said suitable dual-system trains were not available for services linking the regions with the new airport.

He therefore expected the publicly supported pool to focus on those services rather than commercial high speed operations. ‘Because CPK is also trying to support the project with public funds, possibly including EU funds, the rolling stock should be linked to PSO services, and that means it will not be high speed trains’, he concluded at the time.

Asked earlier this summer about the apparent conflicting positions since Port Polska.KDP’s announcement, Majewski suggested the mixed messaging reflected the point at which CPK’s broad vision was being forced into concrete decisions over who should fund and deliver each element.

‘The concept of the CPK as a project and the scope of the company’s activities is evolving’, he told Railway Gazette International. ‘They are moving from the conceptual phase and the overall vision to the stage of specific tasks and actions. At the same time, individual elements are being assigned their own timetables and budgets. It is on this basis that priorities and funding options are determined’, he said. ‘The purchase of rolling stock to operate high speed lines is naturally more appropriate for a rail operator than for an infrastructure manager.’

‘Genuine competition’

The clearest competitive effect of a second high speed fleet would come as the new network opens. Port Polska says 10 operators have expressed interest in competing for subsidised long-distance contracts after PKP Intercity’s current agreement expires in 2030, with another seven interested in fully commercial services. Giving challengers access to ready-to-lease high-speed trains could allow some to enter almost immediately; without them, PKP Intercity would begin with its own fleet, approvals and maintenance arrangements already in place, giving it an opportunity to carve out a larger share of the newly competitive market from the outset.

It would also shift much of the financial risk away from prospective entrants. Rather than commit several billion złoty to trains before knowing what share of the Polish market they could secure, operators could lease them from Port Polska.KDP, leaving the ROSCO to carry much of the financing and asset risk. Rydzyński, the transport economist, said this could enable ‘genuine competition without the need for a new operator to invest several billion zlotys before entering the market.

Port Polska ROSCO officially established. © CPK

‘The rationale for a second pool may therefore stem not so much from a shortage of trains in the system as from the market model’, he added. However, he said there should be a limit on how far the state should go to engineer competition. ‘The essence of a ROSCO should be to create a neutral rolling stock pool available to operators, and thus also to reduce the advantage of a carrier that already has its own fleet’, he said. ‘This, of course, facilitates competition, but it should not mean financing a competitor to PKP Intercity for the sake of competition alone.’

The operating case for a 40 to 60-train pool therefore remains open. ‘Before the second tender is announced, the figures should be disclosed: projected operational workload, number of round trips, expected fleet utilisation rate, and financing costs’, Rydzyński stated. ‘If PKP Intercity’s 55 trainsets do indeed meet transport demand, then the purchase of several dozen more trains by the state-owned ROSCO solely to sit idle whilst awaiting potential lessees would be difficult to justify.’

What does easier entry cost?

Beyond the question of capacity, Port Polska still has to show that a rolling-stock pool and depot expected to cost more than 10.1bn złoty (around €2·4bn) can be financed efficiently enough to justify the intervention. The government-approved CPK multiannual programme provides for 1.74bn złoty to be raised through bond issuance, with the remainder expected to come from equity and debt, although the state would still carry part of the investment risk through its ownership of Port Polska.KDP.

‘Port Polska assumes that the ROSCO can secure financing more easily and on more favourable terms than an individual operator, as the rolling stock is not tied to a single carrier or a single contract’, Rydzyński said. ‘However, this is an assumption underlying the business model, which must be confirmed by specific financing offers. If the total cost of capital and operation for the ROSCO turns out to be higher than the cost of a carrier purchasing rolling stock directly, this difference should be justified by measurable benefits arising from competition.’

PKP Intercity, meanwhile, already has an established track record of raising long-term bank and EIB finance for rolling-stock investment. One former Polregio vice-president has argued that its stronger market position could allow it to finance equivalent high speed trains even more cheaply than Port Polska.KDP.

The scope for supporting the ROSCO with public money may also be constrained. ‘Public funding for the purchase of high speed trains would, in all likelihood, be deemed state aid’, Majewski, the former rail regulator, said. That would not necessarily prevent such support, but could bring it within EU rules intended to prevent public funding from giving particular companies an undue competitive advantage.

‘The rolling stock pool model only partially overcomes this barrier’, he continued. Making the trains available through a leasing pool rather than funding an individual operator could reduce concerns over favouring a particular carrier, but would not remove the state-aid question altogether. He also stressed that, at this stage, ‘the priority is to fund infrastructure so that there is actually something to run on’.

Fleet remains on paper

For now, Port Polska and the infrastructure ministry continue to present a second high speed fleet as part of the programme. ‘Port Polska.KDP does not limit its plans solely to the procurement of rolling stock with a speed of 200-230 km/h’, the two bodies said in a statement in August. ‘The procurement of high-speed trains capable of operating at 320 km/h remains part of the company’s plans and is intended for long-distance services operated on the new high speed infrastructure.’

But remaining in the programme is not the same as proceeding at the intended scale or pace. Port Polska had only got as far as issuing a request for proposals by the time PKP Intercity had already moved four bidding groups into competitive negotiations. ‘It is difficult to imagine launching a multi-billion programme to purchase rolling stock against the position of the government plenipotentiary, who oversees the implementation of Port Polska’, Rydzyński said. If that disagreement persists, he added, the decision would likely move above Port Polska.KDP itself, to the infrastructure ministry.

‘If Piotr Malepszak maintains his current position, I believe it is far more likely that part of the KDP’s role in the ROSCO programme will be scaled back or redesigned than it is that a tender will be announced in exactly the form announced on June 2’, Rydzyński stated.

Majewski was similarly sceptical about the timetable. ‘The PKP Intercity project is definitely at a more advanced stage. I don’t think Port Polska will skip several stages and announce the final tender this year.’