Taiwan Wants to Punish Speech That Welcomes an Invasion. The Cost May Be Its Own Credibility. – JURIST – Commentary

A Chinese influencer lost her right to live in Taiwan over videos backing unification by force. Two courts agreed. The bill now before the Legislative Yuan would go further, and Taiwan’s own draft already offers a lighter option.

Taiwan’s Executive Yuan issued a draft amendment to the National Security Act in December 2025 that would penalize public advocacy of war against Taiwan. This proposed change is widely understood to have been triggered by a series of incidents where several Douyin influencers, who are marriage migrants from China residing in Taiwan, had their residence permits revoked after alleged speech promoting the military unification of Taiwan. The response from Taiwanese authorities sparked a series of debates regarding the tension between protecting the nation against external threats and defending freedom of expression.

The draft was later reviewed by the Legislative Yuan in April 2026, but stalled without a consensus due to its controversial nature. Among the proposed amendments, the most significant, and perhaps the most controversial change in the draft is Article 4, which would impose administrative fines on individuals who promote or support the invasion of Taiwan and the elimination of its sovereignty by mainland China or other hostile external forces.

The tightening of the regulation is seen as a response to the intensified tension across the strait, as well as to recent cases involving the speech of several Douyin influencers from China, notably the case of “Yaya” (Liu Zhenya) in March 2025. Liu, a marriage migrant living in Taiwan, uploaded videos on Douyin with speeches reportedly advocating for the unification of China and Taiwan by the use of military force. Her residence permit was later revoked by the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds that her speech endangered national security and social stability. Liu complained that this measure has violated her basic rights, while the authorities concerned claimed that the revocation was legitimate and had a legal basis, Article 14 of the “Measures for the permission of family-based residence, long-term residence, and settlement of people from the Mainland Area in the Taiwan Area.” Liu applied to the Taipei High Administrative Court for a suspension of enforcement after the revocation. However, the Court dismissed the application, holding that her speech amounts to the advocacy for war and invasion of the country, and there are sufficient grounds to find a threat to national security and social stability. Liu’s subsequent appeal against the ruling was also rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court.

While the Yaya case was not based on the National Security Act, the legal controversies surrounding the Act bear strong resemblance to those in the Yaya case. First and foremost, there is a tension between protection of freedom of expression and the need for national security: should speech in support of war and invasion be protected? Supporters of the draft argue that such an interference is necessary in Taiwan’s situation, where the threat of military invasion is imminent and the cognitive warfare from across the strait poses a serious risk of undermining Taiwan’s democracy. Additionally, such a ban is endorsed by Article 20 of the ICCPR,* the prohibition of any propaganda for war, which is also a supporting argument in the Taipei High Administrative Court’s dismissal of Liu’s application. However, others claim that the revocation of Liu’s residence may diminish Taiwan’s commitment to uphold basic human rights, particularly freedom of expression. Moreover, critics point out that the revocation in fact inadvertently handed Beijing an easy propaganda victory, and made the already polarized Taiwanese society even more divided.

The second problem lies in proportionality: is the revocation of residence under Article 14 of the Measures for the permission of residence, or the NT$100,000 to NT$1 million fine under Article 4 of the draft, the least restrictive means? In a democratic society, an interference with citizens’ rights is only proportionate when there are no other less intrusive means. Article 4-1 of the draft would grant the government the authority to order platform providers to remove the contents concerned, restrict access, or terminate services to the user accounts. With these less restrictive measures in place, the necessity and legitimacy of the administrative fine in the draft and the revocation of residence in the Yaya case may be called into question.

Another issue is the reach of the provision in cases related to speech in the digital space. According to Article 4 of the draft, the scope of this provision extends to speech or other measures “within the national territory” as well as “in cyberspace.” This creates an obscurity in cases concerning digital contents. Take the Yaya case; Liu claimed that she only posted the video on Douyin, the China-only version of TikTok, and that the video on YouTube and the international version of TikTok was uploaded by other fake accounts. Setting aside the authenticity of the claim, it is foreseeable that the following questions will prove challenging in future cases: Is “cyberspace” in the provision restricted to cyberspace “within the national territory,” or cyberspace around the world? How do we decide which territory a Douyin reel belongs to, according to where it is made, where the server is, or the audience it is able to reach?

In conclusion, the issue in the draft of the National Security Act and the Yaya case reflect a broader dilemma faced by Taiwan as well as other democratic countries under military threat: the need to defend itself and its commitment to being an inclusive society that upholds human rights. With research highlighting the threats posed to democracy through cognitive warfare and information manipulation, the demand for defensive measures intensifies. The central challenge for Taiwan, therefore, is finding an approach that effectively addresses the security concerns without eroding the hard-won freedom its citizens have secured over the past few decades.

*Editor’s note: Taiwan cannot accede to the ICCPR as a non-UN member, but the Covenant’s human rights provisions have domestic legal force there under the 2009 Act to Implement the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The UN Human Rights Committee has held that a restriction justified under Article 20 must still satisfy Article 19(3)’s requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality.

Yu-Yue Cheng is a student at the College of Law, National Taiwan University and a JURIST staff writer.