Sharing its eastern border with Iran, its northern border with Turkey, its western border with Syria and Jordan, and its southern border with Saudi Arabia, Iraq is arguably the single most geopolitically important country to the U.S., China, and Russia in the entire Middle East. In turn, the lawless western desert province of Anbar is perhaps the most geopolitically vital area in Iraq, and the most strategically important asset in Anbar is the huge Akkas gas field. With the new Iraqi Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, having taken office on 16 May and showing every sign of being open to new Western energy initiatives across the country, U.S. firms have positioned themselves centre-stage to take control of the Akkas field’s development. So, what are their key objectives here and how do they aim to achieve them?

In broad terms, Iraq’s government wants the Akkas gas field to produce 400 million standard cubic feet per day (MMscfd) by 2030 — a near tenfold increase on the current output of 43 MMscfd — according to a recent statement from the Oil Ministry. An interim target of 143 MMscfd should be achieved by mid-2027, given the existing contract alone with Western multinational SLB (formerly Schlumberger) that covers the drilling of six wells and the construction of a processing facility with a capacity of 100 MMscfd, commented Mohammed Yassin Hassan, director general of Iraq’s Midland Oil Company, which works alongside SLB on the Akkas field. To this effect, the end of July saw the Oil Ministry sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a consortium comprising U.S.-based companies ConocoPhillips and TI Capital, plus Novaterra Energy to assess the exploration and development potential of the Akkas site and surrounding areas. This followed ConocoPhillips agreeing to acquire a 42% interest in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited from UK supermajor BP to redevelop five producing oil fields in the Kirkuk area of northern Iraq — the Baba dome (of the Kirkuk field), the Avanah dome (of the Kirkuk field), the Bai Hassan field, the Jambur field, and the Khabbaz field. TI Capital is also partnering with U.S. supermajor Chevron to establish a crude oil pipeline that would run from Iraq’s Kirkuk to the Syrian Mediterranean port of Baniyas. With a targeted capacity of up to 2 million barrels per day (bpd), the project will allow Iraq to export its crude oil directly to European and global markets via the Mediterranean. Novaterra Energy, meanwhile, also signed a major agreement alongside ConocoPhillips with the state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC) to re-enter the country and rebuild its damaged gas infrastructure with the target of increasing gas output by 4 to 5 million cubic metres per day within one year. Related: Dutch TTF Gas Jumps 2% as Winter Storage Race Heats Up

These deals followed a flurry of agreements and partnerships with U.S. companies — 48 in total — that were signed during the first official visit to the country by newly ensconced Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi. Not only did they include major oil and gas field development programmes, and the build-out of supporting domestic and international energy infrastructure, including the Iraq-Syria Pipeline, but also a deal with U.S. global satellite communications giant Starlink to introduce services to Iraq. In broad terms, many of these deals fall within a reimagining of the Middle East that involves the sidelining of Iran under its current regime, while the U.S. rolls out more relationship normalisation deals (‘Abraham Accords’) between key Middle Eastern Arab states and Israel, brokered by Washington, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. As a precursor to this, Washington aims to dramatically increase the investment and corollary physical presence on the ground of leading American companies in those targeted countries, similar to the early investment part of China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’.

The construction of the Iraq-Syria crude oil pipeline is an obvious example of this broader strategy to isolate Iran under its current regime from the rest of the Middle East, with the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, saying that Iraq’s latest oil pipeline agreements would lead to a programme “that will make the Strait of Hormuz an afterthought”. The introduction of wide-ranging U.S. and UK sanctions on Russian firms operating in Iraq that led to the exit of Russian heavyweights Lukoil and Rosneft from key developments in north and south of Iraq is another key example, with their positions taken by Western firms. Granting Starlink an operating licence in July is also a highly strategic, multi-layered move that serves as a cornerstone of the ongoing U.S. push to pivot Iraq further to the West. The system gives Iraq, its military, and international energy consortiums real-time communications to monitor assets, secure energy corridors, and coordinate defences in areas previously vulnerable to regional disruptions. It also gives Iraq a communication network that completely bypasses terrestrial infrastructure controlled by regional neighbours or local political militias — most notably Iran and the Tehran-controlled militias.

Securing Akkas fits perfectly within this pattern too. Certainly, its 5.6 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves should allow it to produce the Oil Ministry’s planned 400 MMscfd of gas within the required timelines, given the quality of the companies looking to become involved in the project. But even without that, its geographic positioning makes it vital to U.S. plans across the regions because oil and gas companies are legally entitled to secure their oil and/or gas field operations around the world through whatever means they feel necessary, provided the indigenous government agrees. As an additional beneficial adjunct to this is that Akkas is one of three big gas fields that form a skewed triangle across southern Iraq, stretching from the Mansuriya field — crucially, very close to the eastern border with Iran — down to Siba field in the south (extremely close to the key Iraqi Basra export hub), and then all the way west across to Akkas itself, which is extremely close to the border with Syria. Along the spine of the triangle, running from east to west, are the historical ultra-nationalist and ultra-anti-West cities of Falluja, Ramadi, Hit and Haditha, and then Iraq turns into Syria, and it is just a short hop to the key strategic ports of Baniyas and Tartus, and to Latakia. All three were globally strategic sites for Moscow, with Tartus being a huge naval base and the only Mediterranean port to which Russia had access. Baniyas is just a short ride from Khmeimim airport, which – under a deal struck in 2015 – became a dual-use civilian-military airport-airbase for use by Russia. And just a short flight away from those two key assets was Russia’s Latakia intelligence-gathering listening station.

Baniyas had also been seen by Russia and Iran as the final part of a long-planned ‘land bridge’ from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea by which they could exponentially increase weapons delivery into southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights area of Syria to be used in attacks on Israel, as also analysed in depth in my latest book on the new global oil market order. This core aim of this policy was to provoke a broader conflict in the Middle East that would draw in the U.S. and its allies into an unwinnable war of the sort seen recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. A new agreement signed on 9 August by Syria’s new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa ended Russia’s autonomous sovereign control over these strategic outposts, and Washington is determined that Russia never comes back.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

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