Today, Europe is entering a new chapter in its approach to migration. On June 12, 2026, the European Union’s (EU) Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into application, introducing a new framework for screening arrivals, processing asylum claims, managing returns, and distributing responsibility among member states (European Commission). According to the European Commission, the Pact is intended to establish stronger external borders, faster asylum procedures, greater solidarity between member states, and safeguards for people in need of international protection. As the EU implements its new migration framework, it must also consider how to prevent migration pressures from becoming a catalyst for democratic erosion.
Examining the 2015 migration crisis remains necessary for building a present-day migration system capable of achieving both border and democratic security. With instability in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, more than one million migrants and asylum seekers arrived in Europe between 2015 and 2016 (Journal of Common Market Studies). The crisis became a defining stress test for European democratic governance, revealing significant differences in how member states understood their obligations, identities, and the limits of liberal democratic norms. More importantly, it demonstrated that migration crises can place pressure not only on border systems, but also on the democratic institutions responsible for responding to them.
Hungary and Austria provide two contrasting examples. Both countries experienced significant migration pressures and were subject to the same European Union asylum framework, including the Dublin Regulation and relocation policies. Nevertheless, they adopted noticeably different responses (Journal of European Integration). Hungary pursued an increasingly restrictive approach under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, while Austria initially adopted a more open approach under Chancellor Werner Faymann, before also moving towards greater restrictions as domestic political pressure increased.
The difference cannot be explained by geography or public opinion alone. Both countries experienced increased concern about immigration during the crisis (European Commission). Instead, the strength of domestic democratic institutions helps explain why similar pressures produced different outcomes. The comparative research in this report identifies three institutional “guardrails” as particularly important for a functioning democracy: judicial independence, media freedom, and electoral integrity. These institutions constrain executive overreach by increasing the legal, political, and electoral costs of extreme government action. By examining the differing responses of Austria and Hungary during the 2015 European migration crisis, lessons can be drawn about how to better protect democratic guardrails when similar pressures arise in Europe and even beyond.
Hungary entered the migration crisis after significant institutional changes had already weakened these safeguards. Fidesz returned to power in 2010 with a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority, providing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government with the ability to make substantial constitutional and institutional changes (Journal of Democracy). Austria, by contrast, entered the crisis with stronger democratic institutions and a political system that continued to provide meaningful constraints on executive authority.
Judicial independence was among the first areas affected. In 2011, Fidesz introduced a new constitution known as the Fundamental Law, which restructured the Constitutional Court, restricted its jurisdiction over budgetary matters, and expanded the bench through partisan appointments (Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area). The government also lowered the mandatory retirement age for judges, forcing the early departure of sitting judges (EU Law Stories: Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence). These changes weakened the judiciary’s ability to constrain government action independently.
Media freedom was also diminished. The Hungarian government established a Media Council with the power to grant and revoke broadcasting licences, while state advertising was directed overwhelmingly towards pro-government outlets. Independent media were also acquired by government-aligned oligarchs (Party Colonisation of the Media in Central and Eastern Europe). This process narrowed the range of information available to Hungarian voters before the migration crisis reached its peak.
Electoral competition was similarly affected. Electoral boundaries were redrawn in 2011, and this restructuring helped Fidesz convert less than half of the popular vote into a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority in 2014 (Journal of Democracy). Voting rights were also extended to ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, a group largely in support of Fidesz (Diaspora and Transnationalism). These changes reduced the electoral pressure facing the governing party and allowed it to pursue policies without needing to build broader political coalitions.
These institutional changes mattered greatly when the migration crisis arrived. In June 2015, the Hungarian government approved construction of a four-metre razor-wire fence along its 175-kilometre border with Serbia (European Journal of Criminology). Irregular border crossing was also criminalised as a felony punishable by up to eight years in prison (European Journal of Criminology). Additionally, the Szeged Regional Court issued 142 criminal convictions for illegal entry within one week in September 2015, with some hearings lasting as little as 27 minutes and occurring without adequate translation or legal representation (Amnesty International). In Hungary, migration became a political instrument through which existing institutional weaknesses could be reinforced.
The Hungarian government also used migration as part of its domestic political messaging. Government-funded national consultations and billboard campaigns portrayed asylum seekers as criminal threats and connected migration to claims about external political enemies. For example, the 2018 “Stop Soros” legislative package imposed a 25 percent tax on foreign-funded NGOs supporting asylum seekers and gave the government powers to restrict individuals from border areas for supporting “illegal immigration” (Hungarian National Assembly).
Austria demonstrates that public pressure does not inevitably produce the same outcome. Austria’s Constitutional Court had developed as an independent institution, while its coalition-based political system encouraged consensus governance (ICL Journal). When the migration crisis arrived, Chancellor Werner Faymann initially supported an open-door approach, similar to Germany’s in 2015, and Austria experienced a threefold increase in asylum applications compared with the previous year (UNHCR).
However, Austria did move towards stricter immigration policies as support for the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) increased. Austria’s Constitutional Court remained capable of reviewing legislation without political interference, while opposition parties and coalition partners continued to create political pressure on the government.
Austria’s media environment also remained more pluralistic. Austria ranked 11th on the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index during this period, while outlets including public broadcaster ORF and Der Standard provided competing perspectives on government policy (Freedom House).
Finally, electoral competition remained meaningful. Chancellor Faymann resigned in May 2016 following poor electoral performance by his party and growing public and internal dissatisfaction with his handling of the crisis (Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies). His resignation demonstrated that Austria’s political system retained the ability to hold leaders accountable for their policy choices.
While restrictive immigration policies are not inherently evidence of democratic failure, the process through which those policies are developed and implemented can reveal whether democratic institutions remain strong enough to constrain government power.
Austria and Hungary reveal the necessity to treat democratic resilience as part of crisis prevention. The objective should not be to force every government to adopt the same immigration policy. Austria and Hungary demonstrate why that would be unrealistic. Governments will legitimately disagree about asylum, borders, integration, and immigration. Instead, international institutions should establish a democratic floor below which crisis responses cannot fall.
A recommendation would be the creation of an independent Democratic Crisis Monitoring Mechanism within the European Union. This mechanism would monitor three areas: judicial independence, media freedom, and electoral integrity, operating alongside, rather than replacing, the safeguards already being developed through the EU Pact. The European Commission’s implementation framework already includes a crisis-response component as well as safeguards for applicants and vulnerable people and increased monitoring of fundamental rights. The proposed mechanism would expand this logic by ensuring that institutions in member states remain capable of checking government power during a crisis and that attempts to undermine these guardrails trigger independent review.
Additionally, it is necessary to strengthen independent information systems during migration crises. Governments should not be the sole source of information about migrants, asylum seekers, or security threats during a crisis. Public broadcasters and independent journalists should have access to emergency funding that allows them to continue reporting even when political pressure or economic instability threatens their operation. European institutions should also publish regular assessments and place pressure on governments to explain major emergency measures publicly. This would ensure that citizens encounter competing information rather than a single government-controlled narrative.
Europe now has an opportunity to apply the lessons learned in 2015. Responses to future migration crises must protect both the people seeking refuge and the institutions responsible for governing the crisis. Protecting democratic institutions should be treated not as a secondary consideration during migration emergencies, but as a primary component of long-term peace and stability. Ultimately, the lesson of 2015 is that Europe’s ability to withstand a crisis depends on the strength of the democracies responding to it.