Russia’s three-day parliamentary election opened with turnout running sharply ahead of five years ago, giving the Kremlin and Russian President Vladimir Putin advantageous early data it can present as evidence of mobilization around the current political system—and unity behind Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will reach its fifth anniversary in February 2027.

By Saturday afternoon, 32.58 per cent of eligible voters had cast ballots nationwide, according to Russia’s Central Election Commission. On Friday alone, turnout reached 29.19 per cent, compared with 18.39 per cent at the same point in the 2021 State Duma election. Final turnout in 2021 was 51.7 per cent.

Before the election, Putin explicitly framed the vote as more than a contest for the 450-seat State Duma. The Russian president, who won re-election in 2024 in another wartime election, presented high turnout as a demonstration of national unity and support for Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. The results would also give the Kremlin a possible indicator of the exact level of war fatigue in society, although the most explicitly anti-war candidates have been excluded from the vote.

War in Ukraine, War at Home

Compared with when Putin won the presidential race in 2024, the situation has become substantially worse in terms of how the war affects Russians’ everyday lives. Ukraine’s June 2025 Operation Spiderweb first demonstrated that even Russia’s strategic rear was vulnerable. Since then, Kyiv has expanded deep strikes against refineries, logistics hubs and other critical infrastructure, further strengthening that feeling.

Besides the psychological impact, Ukraine managed to strike half of Russia’s six largest diesel-producing refineries by mid-September, prompting output cuts and export restrictions issued by the Kremlin in order to protect domestic supply.

Moreover, Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina said summer inflation accelerated largely because of the fuel market, with the key rate held at 14 per cent. Official unemployment is barely above 2 per cent, yet businesses continue to report worker shortages; Western officials also estimate Russia is losing around 6,000 more troops a month than it recruits, although these numbers are contested.

‘War fatigue, in other words, has not translated into equivalent Putin fatigue’

Yet the Russian economy has proved more resilient than many expected under Western sanctions. The World Bank estimates that GDP grew by 4.9 per cent in 2024 before slowing to 1 per cent in 2025, while the IMF expects growth of 1.1 per cent this year. The economy absorbed much of the initial shock, but persistent inflation and high borrowing costs are increasingly weighing on growth and exposing the limits of Russia’s war economy model.

Unsurprisingly, support for the war has dropped measurably, although it is far from collapsing. Levada’s August survey found six in ten Russians favoured moving to peace negotiations, while roughly a third preferred continuing. At the same time, 68 per cent supported the actions of Russia’s armed forces and Putin’s approval rating stood at 76 per cent. War fatigue, in other words, has not translated into equivalent Putin fatigue.

The vote itself has become literally overshadowed by the war. Russian authorities reported an intense cyberattack on Moscow’s electronic voting system and an attempted disruption of communications in the Far East. Drone alerts forced voters and election workers into shelters in Sochi, while fourteen polling stations in Russian-occupied Luhansk temporarily lost power after strikes on energy infrastructure. Earlier this week, a local election commission head in Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia was killed in a drone strike, according to Russian authorities.

An Uncomfortable Historical Parallel

What happens after polls close, however, could prove more consequential than the distribution of Duma seats. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed in August that Moscow intends to draft another 300,000 troops after the election. While Putin has explicitly denied that a new mobilization is planned, the concerns themselves point to a striking historical echo, taking us back to September 2021, when Russians last voted in a State Duma election.

After that vote, held on 17–19 September 2021, US intelligence began assembling what former CIA director William Burns later described as a ‘detailed picture of preparations for a major invasion’. President Joe Biden sent Burns to Moscow on 2–3 November to warn Putin of the consequences. Burns later said Putin had not yet made an irreversible decision at the time, but was ‘clearly leaning hard’ towards invasion. Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February 2022, just over five months after the election.

Five years later, John Ratcliffe made an unannounced trip to Moscow, making him the first CIA director since Burns to visit the Russian capital, on 25 August, a month before the election. According to media reports, the goal of Ratcliffe’s visit was to warn Russia against attacking the Baltic NATO members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Washington Post reported that US intelligence assessed Moscow as seeing opportunities to pressure American interests and allies in Europe, while Ratcliffe warned against a major escalation in Ukraine. President Donald Trump subsequently rejected suggestions that Putin would attack NATO territory and played down the visit.

‘If we accept the historical comparison at face value, its logic would place some form of Russian attack on NATO…in February 2027’

If we accept the historical comparison at face value, its logic would place some form of Russian attack on NATO—not necessarily a full-scale invasion—in February 2027, five months from now. But the resemblance should not be overstated. Unlike in late 2021, there is no comparable Russian troop build-up near NATO’s eastern flank.

The threat may instead come in a more limited form, elements of which are already visible: suspected Russian drones have entered NATO airspace, while Germany has blamed Moscow for August’s failed explosives-laden drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport. ISW argues that such limited probes could test NATO without requiring the preparations seen before the invasion of Ukraine.

The echo of September 2021 is therefore difficult to ignore. Five years ago, Russians voted only months before the invasion of Ukraine; today they are voting as the consequences of that war increasingly reach petrol stations, workplaces and even polling stations at home, while Washington is again warning Moscow against a potentially wider confrontation.

Yet the political picture remains remarkably stable. More Russians now favour negotiations, but support for the military remains substantial, Putin’s approval remains high and turnout is running well ahead of 2021. Russians may be increasingly tired of the war, but there is little evidence that they have tired of Putin. Whether the parallel ends there—or again leads into a new phase of confrontation—remains the unanswered question hanging over this election.

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