264Brussels calls its “Made in Europe” rules a bold industrial strategy. In reality, forcing public money towards European suppliers looks increasingly like protectionism dressed up as economic policy — threatening competition, raising costs and risking a damaging trade confrontation with Britain and other allies.

There is a familiar danger whenever politicians decide that the answer to foreign competition is to tell their own bureaucracies to buy domestic.

It begins as industrial strategy. It ends, all too often, as protectionism.

The European Union’s proposed “Made in EU” provisions are being presented as part of a wider effort to strengthen European industry, reduce dependence on China and protect strategic supply chains. Those are understandable objectives. Yet the mechanism being proposed deserves considerably more scrutiny than it has so far received.

The European Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act would introduce local-content and low-carbon requirements for products purchased through public procurement, public auctions and subsidy schemes. Strategic sectors affected would include steel, aluminium, electric vehicles, batteries, solar and wind technology, hydrogen and nuclear power.

The scale is substantial. Public procurement across the EU is worth more than €2 trillion annually, equivalent to roughly 14 per cent of the bloc’s economic output. Brussels therefore possesses a formidable lever with which to steer purchasing towards European manufacturers.

That is precisely why the policy should not be dismissed as a minor technical adjustment.

Consider electric vehicles. Under the proposal, vehicles purchased through public procurement would have to be assembled within the EU, while 70 per cent of their components, excluding the battery, would have to be EU-made. Solar technology would also face European-content requirements. Aluminium would have to meet a 25 per cent EU-content threshold as well as a low-carbon requirement.

Call this what you will. But when governments use their purchasing power to favour suppliers according to where their products are made, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that protectionism is involved.

Brussels will argue that this is defensive rather than aggressive protectionism. The stated target is principally China, whose manufacturers dominate important parts of the green-technology supply chain and whose producers are not necessarily burdened by Europe’s regulatory costs and energy prices.

There is a legitimate strategic argument here. Europe does not want to discover, after dismantling much of its own industrial capacity, that it has simply exchanged dependence on Russian energy for dependence on Chinese technology.

But there is a crucial distinction between securing strategic resilience and building a regulatory fortress.

The problem becomes particularly acute for Britain.

Despite Brexit, British and European manufacturing supply chains remain deeply integrated. The automotive relationship alone is worth around €80 billion a year, according to the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. The EU is Britain’s largest export market for passenger cars, while Britain is the EU’s largest export market for those vehicles.

A British-built car may contain components that have crossed the Channel several times before the finished vehicle reaches a customer. Pretending that the economic relationship can be neatly divided into “European” and “foreign” is therefore rather like trying to separate the ingredients from a cake after it has been baked.

Yet under the current proposal, Britain would not automatically qualify. EU member states, along with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, would be included because they participate in the single market. Other countries could qualify where reciprocal access to procurement or subsidy programmes exists, but the precise list has yet to be established.

That leaves British industry facing the extraordinary prospect of being treated as an outsider in markets upon which it remains heavily dependent — even while European manufacturers continue to rely upon British customers, suppliers, investment and expertise.

The irony is considerable.

The EU says it wants European industry to become more competitive. Yet restricting the pool of suppliers can reduce competition, increase costs and ultimately leave taxpayers paying more for politically preferred products. Reuters notes that some European governments, including Sweden and the Czech Republic, have already warned that excessively strict rules could deter investment and raise prices. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has previously suggested that “sole European preference” should be a last resort.

There is also a broader question.

If Europe responds to Chinese industrial policy by copying its most protectionist characteristics, it risks entering precisely the sort of subsidy-and-tariff race that has distorted global trade for decades.

Europe should certainly defend its strategic industries. It should invest in technology, energy, infrastructure and skills. It should also be capable of confronting unfair competition.

But competitiveness is not created by putting a sign on the factory gate saying: Europeans only.

The EU now has an opportunity to demonstrate that its commitment to an open trading system extends beyond its borders. If Britain — a close ally and deeply integrated industrial partner — is excluded from “Made in EU”, Brussels will have made its choice rather clearer.

It will not merely be protecting European industry from China. It will be protecting European industry from its friends as well.

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