For decades, the working assumption behind globalisation was simple: trade creates interdependence, and interdependence creates incentives for cooperation. 

The events of September 2026 suggest a more complicated reality is taking hold. Interdependence itself is becoming an instrument of pressure, wielded not only against the states directly targeted by sanctions but against everyone connected to them through trade, finance and shipping. The unfolding Russia sanctions regime illustrates exactly how.

Consider the case of VTB Bank. On 14 September, Washington sanctioned Russia’s VTB over allegations that it helped Iran evade its own sanctions by building financial channels between Moscow and Tehran. 


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What makes this significant is not that another Russian bank was punished; VTB was already heavily sanctioned over the Ukraine war, but that the target was a financial intermediary, not merely an energy producer. It reminds us that modern sanctions increasingly reach into the networks of banks, payment systems, shipping lines, insurers, and commodity traders that keep global trade moving, rather than stopping at the borders of the sanctioned state itself.

Then came the legislative shift. New US legislation passed on 18 September gives the president authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major purchasers of Russian oil and gas, and on entities that help Russia evade sanctions. Countries do not automatically face these tariffs, but the authority now exists. 

That changes the calculation behind every energy transaction: a government must weigh not only whether a purchase is commercially sound, but what other relationships it might jeopardise. This is a genuine transformation in how international economic decisions get made.

The underlying philosophy should be resilience, not bloc membership. Bangladesh does not need to decide whether the future belongs to Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Its more urgent task is ensuring that no external confrontation between those capitals can force it into an economically damaging choice — and that requires diversification built well before the pressure arrives.

Bangladesh is unusually exposed to this shift precisely because its economic relationships are so widely spread. Its trade, finance, remittance and investment ties run through the United States, the European Union, China, India, Japan, the Gulf states and Southeast Asia, among others. That diversification is normally an asset. But in a world where tensions between major powers can transmit through financial and commodity networks simultaneously, breadth of exposure can just as easily become breadth of vulnerability.

Nowhere is this dilemma sharper than in the garment sector, which generates more than four-fifths of Bangladesh’s export earnings and employs roughly 40 lakh workers. Its competitiveness depends on Western buyers, but its production depends on imported energy, imported machinery, imported raw materials, international shipping and foreign banks. 

Bangladesh’s garment industry is therefore simultaneously plugged into several geopolitical blocs at once — which is precisely why the country needs strategic flexibility rather than a fixed alignment with any one of them.

India offers the clearest regional illustration of what happens when these pressures converge. Russian crude reportedly supplies more than 40% of India’s oil imports, even as India maintains a deep economic relationship with the United States. New Delhi’s response has been to defend its right to secure affordable energy for its population while continuing to engage with Washington, rather than treating the new law as forcing an immediate rupture.

The lesson for Dhaka is not to copy India’s energy mix. Rather, it is that dependence concentrated in one domain — energy, in India’s case — can generate vulnerability in an entirely different domain, namely market access.

China complicates the picture further. It remains one of Bangladesh’s largest trading and infrastructure partners even as it becomes more central to emerging alternative financial and supply-chain arrangements outside the Western-led system. At the same time, Bangladesh’s largest export markets remain firmly Western. Balancing these two realities requires deliberate structural care — Bangladesh must avoid letting economic diversification quietly harden into dependence on any single alternative network.

Russia and Iran’s search for workarounds to Western sanctions, and the refusal by Russia and China to renew independent UN monitoring of Iran sanctions on 17 September, point to a wider institutional fragmentation. 

Bangladesh should read these developments not as an invitation to join one bloc or another, but as evidence that the global economic system itself is splintering into competing arrangements with different rules.

This is where payment systems deserve particular attention. Every ordinary trade transaction now depends on a functioning chain: a bank, correspondent banking relationships, a currency, insurance, shipping and compliance checks. If any single link in that chain touches a sanctioned entity, even indirectly, a wholly legitimate transaction can stall. Bangladesh needs to build the institutional capacity to understand exactly where its financial-network exposures lie.

That points to a broader requirement: sanctions compliance should become a genuine national capability, not an afterthought left to individual banks. This is not about helping anyone evade sanctions — quite the opposite. It means investing in stronger bank compliance, better corporate due diligence, shipping-risk monitoring and closer coordination between government and industry, so that ordinary Bangladeshi exporters and importers do not get caught in someone else’s crossfire.

None of this should be confused with passivity. Bangladesh can maintain constructive relationships with the United States, China, India, Russia, Japan, the EU and the Gulf states simultaneously. Strategic autonomy does not mean treating every country identically; it means preserving the ability to cooperate with different partners on different issues without letting any one relationship dictate all the others.

Geography offers Bangladesh real leverage here. Sitting between South and Southeast Asia with access to the Bay of Bengal, the country has genuine connectivity options through India, China, Myanmar and the wider region. But that connectivity needs to be built deliberately across multiple corridors, not concentrated in one, connectivity diversification should accompany trade diversification, not lag behind it.

Energy remains the clearest illustration of the underlying principle. Bangladesh’s experience with LNG and crude oil, where roughly a fifth of imported fuel passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and where a single terminal shutdown or regional flare-up can spike prices and trigger factory stoppages, shows what happens when any link in the chain of supplier, route, financing and market becomes overly concentrated. The identical logic applies to export markets, technology, financial services, infrastructure, telecommunications, and food and fertiliser supply.

That, in turn, means measuring dependence rather than simply celebrating trade volume: what share of exports rests on one market, what share of energy rests on one route, how many banks provide indispensable correspondent services, and how quickly alternatives could be activated if one link broke. Answering these questions consistently would give Bangladesh something it currently lacks — an economic vulnerability map.

The underlying philosophy should be resilience, not bloc membership. Bangladesh does not need to decide whether the future belongs to Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Its more urgent task is ensuring that no external confrontation between those capitals can force it into an economically damaging choice — and that requires diversification built well before the pressure arrives.

The world is moving toward what might be called “fragmented interdependence”: countries remain connected, but those connections are increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry rather than pure commercial logic. 

Bangladesh cannot reverse that shift. What it can control is how exposed it chooses to be. For Bangladesh, strategic autonomy will not be secured by choosing the right side of a geopolitical divide; it will be secured by ensuring that the country has enough economic relationships, routes, markets and partners that it never has to choose a side merely to keep its economy running.

Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst. He is a Research Fellow at Bangladesh Neeti Gobeshona Kendra.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.