French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez met in Madrid during the former’s state visit. Both leaders have significantly increased their countries’ respective foreign debt, for which they are already paying enormous interest—and which, following the latest rate hike and given the immediate economic outlook, is expected to rise even further.

Specifically, Macron, who is already in the final months of his last presidential term, is leaving France with a debt, as of today, of 3.59 trillion euros—1.3 trillion more than when he took office, the largest increase in the entire European Union. For his part, Pedro Sánchez has increased Spain’s debt by 563,000 million euros more than when he took office at the Moncloa Palace—an additional 46.9%—bringing it to 1.74 trillion euros. France will have to allocate 120,000 million annually just to pay the interest on its debt; Spain, whether it has a budget or not, must pay 40,000 million eurosfor the same purpose.

It is one of the greatest threats to Europe—if not the greatest—according to what was discussed in the debates heldduring the 38th Seminar on Europe organized by the Association of European Journalists (APE), held at the headquarters of the Diario Madrid Foundation.

Raymond Torres, director of Economic Analysis at Funcas, emphasized precisely this imminent danger: “We must urgently address the problem of debt. It is true that, following the crisis Greece experienced, we are now equipped with better tools to combat a debt crisis, but if the country suffering from and triggering it is a nation like France, the consequences for all of Europe would be far more severe.”

The situation is all the more serious because the rise in interest rates forces financing costs higher, even more so than the temporary increase in defense spending. It is, therefore, the main risk to debt sustainability and the credibility of the new European fiscal framework.

In the specific case of Spain, far from stagnating, spending by all levels of government has increased by 19% during the three-year period of the [budgetary] extension, excluding interest payments and NextGeneration European funds, while tax revenue has risen by nearly 24%. Furthermore, actual spending by the central government and Social Security is 14% and 20%, respectively, above the budgeted amounts under the extension, which amounts to a deviation of 78,000 million euros. Torres emphasizes that this budgetary inertia makes it difficult for new social priorities, such as housing and education, to be adequately reflected in public accounts.

The seminar organized by the APE also sought to address the big, broad question: What role is left for the EU? Given the fierce struggle between the United States and China—and the rest of the world—it has become necessary to choose sides, one way or another.

Starting from the shared conviction that we would be much worse off if the EU did not exist, speakers such as former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfonso Dastis, and José María de Areilza, a professor at ESADE and secretary general of the Aspen Institute in Spain, warned of the urgent need to undertake those reforms that never seem to materialize, while other major global fronts are opening up, such as the threat posed by the nuclear arms race or the race for supremacy in Artificial Intelligence (AI).

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Areilza pointed out that there is at least one group of countries—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Japan, Germany, and Poland, among others—that aspire to acquire nuclear weapons and that, given current geopolitical tensions, they would do so outside the framework of nonproliferation controls. He warned of China’s strategic and dialectical shift, “which no longer speaks of peaceful rise on the international stage, but rather of a struggle to achieve global power.” In his very precise and forceful statements, Areilza described Russia as “a power in decline” that “exports instability to ensure its own security,” and denounced as “obsolete” the Spanish—and therefore European—policy of maintaining a buffer of shared interests with Morocco. This theory advocates maintaining strong ties and relationships across a wide range of sectors, as it allows for better and easier resolution of a potential general conflict between the parties when they clash over an interest in a specific sector. Areilza points out that, in light of the current issue arising from the situation in Ceuta, this theory would only remain valid if Spain—and Europe—were to add firmness to the aforementioned buffer of interests.

For his part, General Enrique Silvela, director of the Division of Coordination and Security and Defense Studies, clarified that “when we talk about the defense of Europe, we are actually talking about NATO, not the EU.” After stating that “President Donald Trump should be heeded, but not taken literally,” he insisted that “the United States will not abandon NATO, but the other members must find ways to contribute to the Alliance.” He acknowledged that the European France-Germany engine is not functioning well, that nationalist impulses and ambitions are evident—which prevent better and faster development of our defense—and that the gaps arising from the impressive technological advance must be substantially addressed, for example, by filling the gaps needed to counter hypothetical attacks on Europe by swarms of drones armed with explosives.

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Juan González Barba, former Secretary of State for the European Union, spoke of the dangerous decline in European investment in its own projects. “Over the past three years, more than 200,000 million euros have flowed out of Europe to be invested elsewhere in the world, particularly the 120,000 million of that amount invested in the United States. This is a trend that, if it continues, will contribute to a loss of faith and mistrust in our own strengths and potential for Europe to grow and compete.”

Along similar lines, Joan Llorach, an economic analyst and co-author with Josep Borrell of The Accounts and Tales of Independence, asserted that “Europe should definitively shelve the policy devised by François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl of giving money to the ‘establishment’ in an attempt to catch the train that has just left the station.” A strategy that, in his view, has done nothing but squander a great deal of money without ever managing to catch, one after another, the trains we failed to board in time.