The Vatican has a theology of politics that is critical of some aspects of the liberal order. But it’s not a political theology of (counter)revolution against the liberal order (in part because of the Vatican’s natural suspicion of populism). Its diplomacy differs from that of most nation-states, and it certainly doesn’t propose a vision of the end of history based on a literalist reading of the Bible. Vatican diplomacy is a specifically Roman Catholic expression of theology of the presence of the Church in history—which holds in a paradoxical relationship the diplomatic activity of the Vicar of Christ and the prophetic message of the Bible and of Jesus Christ. It is grounded in the Gospel message and stands worlds apart from biblical fundamentalism. The Vatican rejects a geopolitical theology that unfolds under the sign of the apocalypse and upholds a vision of the Church with a universal vocation that stands in opposition to nationalism. It’s a vision deeply at odds with an apocalyptic frame, which is more about destroying a civilization than building it. As Leo XIV wrote in the encyclical Magnifica humanitas:

In the international context, the Holy See’s diplomacy adopts the Gospel’s principle of mercy as a concrete criterion for political action. This is one of the ways in which the Holy See places itself at the service of humanity, thereby appealing to consciences in the name of charity and truth, defending the dignity of every person and speaking up on behalf of the poor, migrants and victims of war. In this way, papal diplomacy expresses the catholicity of the Church and contributes to the building of a civilization of love, where even new technologies can be oriented toward the common good.

Of course, the Vatican’s efforts in diplomacy and peacemaking can’t be undertaken without U.S. involvement. But pax vaticana has always differed significantly from pax americana, and those differences have only become more extreme over time. This may in large part stem from how America has long viewed its place in history. On January 1, 1968 (curiously, the same day as the first celebration of the World Day of Peace, instituted by Paul VI), the Austria-born political scientist Stanley Hoffmann wrote an article in Foreign Affairs about the U.S. approach and how it differs from that of Europe.

“[Europeans] are skeptical about the possibility of success in applying recipes, abroad or even at home, that worked once in a particular circumstance. They are not sure enough that their history has been a success to want to extend its lessons to the universe. But Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from their experience are of universal application, and they are reluctant to recognize that they are tied to the special conditions that made the American success possible.”

Almost sixty years on, this still holds. But something else has profoundly changed. Hoffman expressed his confidence in what he saw as the nonideological, nonapocalyptic vision of the American style of foreign policy.

“The vision they [Americans] express is reformist rather than revolutionary, and they are not so historically grounded as ideologies. While the United States hopes to revamp political life along certain lines, while it envisages global change, its purpose is improvement without apocalypse. The American vision lacks the prophecies and ‘valued revelations’ of ideologies and contents itself with embellishments and ameliorations on a basically accepted design, rather than a repudiation of this design altogether.”

Trumpist rhetoric—from Vance, Hegseth, and others in the administration, and echoed by some high-profile U.S. Catholic prelates, public intellectuals, and media personalities—now posits American history as religiously centered, with the idea that there is a greatness to return to. No pope has had to deal with an administration that looks at the country this way. Leo’s theology of politics rejects the politicization of the sacred and the sacralization of politics. It differentiates itself from populism so as to recover the meaning of institutions and structures as instruments for the common good. As Leo wrote in his April message to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences: “Divine power does not dominate, but rather heals and restores. It is precisely this logic of charity that must animate history, for human activity inspired by charity helps to shape the ‘earthly city’ in unity and peace, rendering it—however imperfectly—an anticipation and a prefiguration of the ‘City of God.’” It is a different way of conceiving the relationship between the Church and the (end) times, and it was well articulated by Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican Secretary of State, in a speech delivered in Brussels last January: “The Church does not dominate history, nor does it simply merge with it; it travels as the presence that accompanies, discerns and listens to history.”

This is the diplomatic challenge for the Vatican now: untangling Catholicism not from identification with the West per se, but from the superpower that continues to lead it. This emerging conflict over theologies of politics could have implications that are more fundamental than those posed by the “culture wars.”

Reproduced with permission by Commonweal.