Ofra Bengio, a scholar of Middle Eastern history and politics, points to an important dimension of the historical relationship between Jews and Kurds in an article titled “Jews, Israel and the Kurds: Deciphering a Myth.”

She writes that the long-standing relations between Jews and their Kurdish neighbors later laid the groundwork for relations between Jews, Israel, and the Kurds.

According to her, these ties were reinforced by a “sense of shared destiny of two small and persecuted peoples,” whose surrounding countries had denied them the legitimacy of an independent state.

Beyond the ‘patriot’ vs ‘separatist’ dichotomy

In Tina Ghazimorad’s article in The Jerusalem Post about the Kurdish struggle, a one-sided image of the history and demands of Iran’s Kurds is presented.

The dichotomy between “patriotic Kurds” and “separatist Kurds” overlooks the distinctions between Kurdish identity, the political demands of Kurds, and the specific programs of Kurdish parties.

In this narrative, the struggle of Kurdish parties against the Islamic Republic – which has constituted an important part of the political history of Iranian Kurdistan for nearly five decades – is viewed primarily through the lens of “separatism.”

To demonstrate Kurdish patriotism, Ghazimorad refers to Taq-e Bostan and Bisotun, two historical monuments in Kermanshah province, and uses these ancient sites to draw conclusions about the present-day political situation.

Among other things, she concludes that the Kurds of Ilam and Kermanshah are patriotic and supporters of Reza Pahlavi.

Yet even Bisotun and Taq-e Bostan, the very monuments cited as evidence of Kurdish “patriotism,” cannot in fact substantiate such a conclusion.

Bisotun, in addition to containing Darius’s official account of consolidating his power and suppressing uprisings, also records his account of Gaumata the Magus and subsequent uprisings and resistance in the land of Media.

Even the violence committed in Kurdistan during the early years of the revolution by forces loyal to Khomeini is presented in Ghazimorad’s narrative largely within the framework of “fighting separatists.”

In this account, the same forces that committed crimes in Kurdistan on Khomeini’s orders are placed within the category of patriotic Kurds, Kurds who are today portrayed as loyal to Reza Pahlavi and with whom Israel is also advised to establish relations.

I come from Javanrud, a city in Kermanshah province near Taq-e Bostan. Since childhood, first because I had a Kurdish name, and later because I was forced to study in Persian from my very first day of school and experienced the university gozinesh selection process, I have directly lived through the Islamic Republic’s systematic discrimination.

In my city, during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, on November 21, 2022, protesters returning from the funeral of Erfan Kakaei, a teacher who was killed the previous day by the Islamic Republic’s repressive forces, were targeted with DShK heavy machine guns and machine-gun fire.

The Islamic Republic justified this violence by claiming that it was fighting “separatism,” the same accusation that has been used for decades to suppress Kurds.

From ‘separatism’ to ‘cooperation with Mossad’: The continuation of a security policy against Kurds

The accusation of “separatism” against Kurds is not a phenomenon exclusive to the Islamic Republic; it has a long history, whose roots can be traced back to the era of the first Pahlavi monarchy and the centralizing policies and nation-state-building process of that period.

The roots of this approach can be found in the security-oriented and centralizing policies of both the first and second Pahlavi governments – policies within which Kurdish political and identity-based demands were defined as threats to territorial integrity and the authority of the central government.

At that time, Kurdish political struggles and demands for rights were repeatedly confronted with the same label and answered with repression and violence.

The Islamic Republic not only failed to abandon this security framework but, in many cases, expanded it. Over the past five decades, membership in or association with Kurdish political parties, political activism, and even civil-society activities in Kurdistan have faced accusations such as “moharebeh” [enmity against God], “acting against national security,” “membership in opposition groups,” and “separatism.”

In recent years, another accusation has been added to this framework: “cooperation with Israel and Mossad.” In the new regional environment, and particularly with the intensification of the confrontation between the Islamic Republic and Israel, accusations of links with Israel and its intelligence service have also entered the Islamic Republic’s security discourse.

The case of Mohammad Faramarzi, Vafa Azarbar, Mohsen Mazloum, and Pejman Fatehi clearly illustrates this trend.

These four men, members of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, were my friends and fellow party members. They were arrested in 2022, and for 18 months – until the day before their executions – their families and lawyers had no precise information about their fate or place of detention.

Amnesty International stated in February 2023 that the four had been subjected to enforced disappearance for months and were at risk of torture, other ill-treatment, and an unfair trial.

They were ultimately executed on January 29, 2024. The Islamic Republic had accused them of cooperating with the Mossad and of participating in a plan to carry out a sabotage operation in Isfahan.

The Islamic Republic has pursued the same pattern of confronting Kurdish parties outside Iran’s borders as well, under the banner of fighting “separatists” and “Israeli agents.”

On the day after the beginning of the recent war, attacks on the headquarters and camps of Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan Region entered an unprecedented phase.

At the time of writing, according to intelligence data from the Kurdistan Regional Government, these attacks have been repeated more than a thousand times.

A significant portion of these attacks has targeted the headquarters of Kurdish parties, including the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and during this same period, 13 members of my party have been killed as a result of these attacks.

The 1979 Revolution and the beginning of the confrontation with the Islamic Republic

The 1979 Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic marked a turning point in this process.

Kurdish political forces demanded recognition of the political and cultural rights of the people of Kurdistan within the new political structure.

On August 19, 1979, Ruhollah Khomeini issued an order for jihad against Kurdistan and ordered the deployment of military and law-enforcement forces to confront opponents.

Afterward, the modern, well-equipped army inherited from the Pahlavi government, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other government-affiliated forces entered Kurdistan.

Summary executions, brief trials, and the absence of due process, alongside large-scale military operations, created a painful experience in the political memory of Kurdistan.

Jina Amini and ‘Jin, Jiyan, Azadi’

The state killing of Jina Amini in September 2022 introduced a new phase into this historical process.
Jina, a young Kurdish woman from Saqqez, died after being detained by the morality police in Tehran, and protests first spread across Kurdistan and then to many cities throughout Iran.

The slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” also acquired particular significance in this process. The slogan has its roots in the traditions of Kurdish women’s struggles, but during the 2022 protests it moved beyond its original context and was used in cities across Iran. As a result, a slogan of Kurdish origin became part of the shared discourse of nationwide protests.

Kurdish parties were among the important political actors and organizers of protests in Kurdistan during the Jina uprising, and the people of Kurdistan repeatedly responded to their calls for protests and strikes.

This pattern over the past five decades shows that Kurdish parties, despite changes in the forms and methods of their struggle, have maintained considerable capacity for social mobilization in Kurdistan.

A recent example was the Kurdistan-wide general strike of January 8, 2026, which followed a call by six parties belonging to the coalition of Kurdish political parties, in protest against the killing of protesters in Lorestan, Ilam, and Kermanshah, and in response to the repression and violence of the Islamic Republic.

Following this call, more than 50 cities in the provinces of Ilam, Kermanshah, Lorestan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan witnessed widespread strikes and closures.

The political struggles of Kurds in Iran have a history extending back more than a century, and the issue of Kurdish identity has been one of their enduring components.

Kurds regard themselves as a nation, a concept based on shared historical, cultural, and linguistic elements and a collective will.

Nevertheless, the political demands of different Kurdish currents have not been the same across historical periods.

If Israel seeks to understand Iranian society, particularly Iran’s Kurds, such an understanding requires moving beyond limited and individual narratives.

Studying the decades-long history of Kurdish parties’ activities, together with examining Kurdistan’s social and political developments, can provide a more comprehensive picture of this society and its demands.