FRANKFURT — In Bruges, one can spend an afternoon admiring medieval façades, watching tourist boats glide quietly along the canals, and wondering whether time has somehow been suspended. In Brussels, a short train ride away, the scenery changes: European Union flags, multilingual conversations and government buildings remind one that this small country sits at the center of some of Europe’s most consequential institutions.
What is less immediately visible, however, is that Belgium itself is a remarkable exercise in political coexistence.
Here is a country smaller than many Southeast Asian metropolitan areas, yet divided by language, regional identity and differing political outlooks. The Dutch-speaking Flemish live mainly in the north, the French-speaking Walloons in the south, while Brussels is officially bilingual and highly international. There is also a small German-speaking community in the east. These differences are not merely a matter of which language one uses to order lunch. Historically, they have been intertwined with questions of economic power, political representation, education and regional autonomy.
Belgium’s response has been neither to erase these differences nor to insist that everyone become culturally identical. Instead, it has progressively built a federal system that gives substantial powers to its regions and language communities.
It is an ingenious arrangement, although hardly an efficient one.
Belgian politics is famous for its coalition-building and lengthy negotiations. Brussels, for example, took more than 600 days following its 2024 regional election to form a new government, finally reaching an agreement in February 2026. To an outsider accustomed to governments being formed in a matter of days or weeks, this can seem almost comical.
But there is a more serious lesson behind the apparent dysfunction. Belgium has, in effect, institutionalized disagreement. Rather than pretending that linguistic and regional differences do not exist, it has created mechanisms through which those differences can be negotiated.
For Southeast Asia, this is worth pondering. Ours is hardly a homogeneous region. Asean encompasses dozens of ethnic and linguistic communities, several major religions and political systems ranging from electoral democracies to one-party states and constitutional monarchies. Within individual countries, regional identities can be just as politically significant.
Malaysia provides an obvious example, with its ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional diversity. Indonesia’s enormous archipelago contains hundreds of ethnic groups and languages. The Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar likewise demonstrate how questions of identity, geography and political authority can become deeply intertwined.
Belgium’s first lesson, therefore, is that recognizing differences can sometimes be more useful than pretending they do not exist.
A community that feels its language, culture or regional interests are being ignored is unlikely to become more cooperative merely because politicians keep proclaiming national unity. At the same time, recognition of difference must not become an excuse for abandoning the common good.
Belgium’s federalism attempts to strike precisely this balance. Regions and language communities enjoy considerable autonomy, but the country remains bound by common institutions, economic interests and national responsibilities.
That distinction is important for Southeast Asia’s continuing debates over decentralization and regional autonomy. Greater local authority can make government more responsive, but autonomy without accountability can simply produce parochialism. Conversely, excessive centralization can create resentment, particularly when local communities feel that decisions are being imposed upon them by distant capitals.
There is another Belgian lesson that may be even more relevant: Economic grievances can eventually become identity grievances.
When one region believes it contributes more to the national treasury than it receives, while another feels economically neglected, arguments over fiscal transfers can acquire linguistic and cultural dimensions. What begins as a dispute about money can eventually become a dispute about identity.
Southeast Asian governments should take note. Regional inequality, unequal infrastructure and disparities in economic opportunity can easily acquire ethnic or cultural interpretations. Addressing the economic problem early is therefore often considerably easier than trying to resolve an identity conflict after it has taken root.
Bruges offers a gentler lesson. The city has preserved its historic character while turning its heritage into an economic asset. Modernization does not necessarily require demolishing the past. For Southeast Asia, with its extraordinary historical and cultural inheritance, preserving heritage can itself be part of a modern economic strategy.
Belgium is, of course, no perfect model. Its political arrangements can be cumbersome, and its institutional complexity comes with considerable costs. Its history and circumstances are also very different from those of Southeast Asia.
But perhaps that is precisely why its experience is useful. Unity does not necessarily require uniformity. A diverse society does not become stable because its citizens stop disagreeing. It becomes stable when disagreement can take place within institutions that people broadly accept; when economic grievances are addressed before they become identity battles; and when different communities retain enough confidence in the common system to keep participating in it.
For Southeast Asia, that may be Belgium’s most valuable lesson. We are unlikely to become less diverse — and there is no particular reason why we should want to. The real challenge is to become better at living with the differences we already have.
After all, in a region as diverse as ours, expecting everyone to think alike would be unrealistic. The more useful ambition is rather more modest: to disagree differently, without ceasing to move forward together.