According to the UNCLASSIFIED 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will continue to field flexible nuclear forces suited to deterring regional nuclear conflict, including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons to the region and globally. The current B61-12 is a welcome and much-needed upgrade for the theater nuclear mission in USEUCOM and for U.S. dual-capable aircraft, but it is not the end. The U.S. and NATO must start developing the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons now.
Given this directive and the urgent need to develop the next generation of weapons, how would the capability to deploy dual-capable aircraft (DCA) worldwide affect extended deterrence, and how would adversaries view the development of such a capability? More specifically, what is the continuing strategic value of forward-deployed theater nuclear instruments like the F-35A paired with the B61-12? Do these specific systems remain primarily a NATO burden-sharing mechanism, or do they offer a broader model for flexible, visible, and politically sustainable regional nuclear deterrence in other non-NATO theaters? Ultimately, are the strategic benefits of this worldwide deployment model worth the costs involved, and what specific capabilities must the next iteration of U.S. and NATO theater nuclear weapons possess to maintain this strategic advantage into the future?
Acres, Maj. Bryce D., “Need for Strategic Nuclear Communication,” AF Fellows (Department of Energy), 2023.
This paper examines how the United States must utilize strategic nuclear communication to maintain a credible deterrent and assure allies in the face of aggressive rhetoric and nuclear breakouts by Russia, China, and North Korea. It frames the strength of the deterrent using Henry Kissinger’s formula, demonstrating that deterrence relies on the potential aggressor’s assessment of both capability and the will to act. Acres highlights that the ongoing modernization of the nuclear stockpile—including the B61-12 life extension program, the W87-1 modification, the W80-4 life extension, and the W93—provides crucial milestones for the U.S. to clearly communicate its capabilities without issuing direct threats. Clear NNSA and DoD messaging on stockpile safety, reliability, and modernization reassures NATO and bilateral allies (like Japan and South Korea) of U.S. defense commitments, preventing independent nuclear proliferation while signaling to adversaries that U.S. deterrent forces remain highly effective and ready to respond.
Adsit, Maj. Lance A., “A Case for Nuclear Modernization,” AF Fellows (Department of Energy), 2021.
Adsit provides a technical and strategic justification for modernizing theater nuclear weapons to counter advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) fielded by peer competitors. He outlines how the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) consolidates several legacy gravity bombs into a single, guided weapon with enhanced reliability, safety, and use control for both strategic bombers and tactical NATO dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Adsit argues that because legacy air-breathing nuclear forces face severe survivability challenges against modern Russian and Chinese IADS, the next generation of regional deterrence must prioritize stealth platforms paired with standoff weapons, such as the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Furthermore, he evaluates the strategic utility of the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N) introduced in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review as a non-strategic, rapidly deployable response option for theater conflicts in Europe and Asia. This capability is designed to complicate adversary calculations regarding constrained nuclear escalation and provide a flexible alternative to strategic nuclear responses.
Alexander, “Legacy to Lethal: Reforming and Accelerating United States Nuclear Bomber Modernization Pathways for 2030-2040,” AFGC 2026.
Notes the ongoing fielding of the B61-12 gravity bomb and the integration of the F-35 dual-capable aircraft as part of current air leg recapitalization efforts. However, rather than addressing tactical theater weapons or regional burden-sharing models, this study focuses strictly on long-range strategic bomber modernization (specifically accelerating B-52H upgrades and compressing the B-21 Raider timeline) to counter the PRC’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture in the Indo-Pacific. It highlights that visibly forward-deploying heavy strategic bombers provides Combatant Commanders with unique signaling, graduated escalation, and recallability advantages in great power competition, but it does not evaluate theater-specific fighter-bomber (DCA) concepts of operation.
Arnholtz, Maj. Derek et al, “Conventional-Nuclear Integration in the 21st Century,” ACSC (Nuclear Planning, Operations and Strategy Elective), 2020.
This study evaluates different command-and-control (C2) and force posture models for Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) to deter great power competitors and assure regional allies. The authors contrast a centralized U.S.-based command (COA 1) with an AOR-specific, tailored force structure (COA 2) where Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) maintain direct control over regional conventional and nuclear assets. They find that centralized postures severely limit operational flexibility and can raise allied doubts regarding U.S. nuclear resolve, whereas regionalizing CNI forces (including tactical DCA and strategic bombers) dramatically increases flexibility and deterrence credibility. The authors identify USEUCOM as the most suitable theater to implement this regional CNI model first due to existing nuclear infrastructure, and they recommend that future regional basing plans and site surveys immediately consider the integration of the next-generation B-21 stealth bomber alongside tactical DCA.
Bergin, Capt. Connor T., “Beyond Brinksmanship: How Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Endangers Strategic Stability,” AFGC 2025.
This paper examines how the transition to multipolar nuclear dynamics complicates the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence across overlapping theaters in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. It cautions that while forward-deployed theater weapons are intended to deter coercion, they also introduce severe strategic costs and “entanglement” risks; the deployment of dual-use systems can blur conventional and nuclear thresholds, increasing the danger of rapid, non-linear escalation and miscalculation during a crisis. Ultimately, it argues that a strategic advantage cannot be sustained through weapons alone, but depends on the survivability and credibility of the systems backing them, which requires prioritizing nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) updates to handle contemporary threat environments.
DaMota, Maj. Cody, “The Conventional-Nuclear Dilemma: Concepts for Fighting Limited Nuclear Wars from Cold War to Today,” SAASS 2022.
This thesis directly examines the strategic rationale of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to expand flexible, tailored U.S. nuclear options, including the worldwide deployment of dual-capable aircraft (DCA), low-yield SLBM warheads, and modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. DaMota explains that these tailored response options raise the nuclear threshold and deter regional aggression by ensuring that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation or “escalate to de-escalate” doctrines. Beyond the delivery systems themselves, daMota offers a critical perspective on how to mitigate the military advantage of tactical nuclear weapons: he argues that training conventional forces to survive and operate in irradiated, contested environments (such as the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment construct) serves as a vital deterrent. By demonstrating that U.S. forces can fight through a limited nuclear strike, the U.S. effectively denies adversaries the area-denial benefits of employing radiation, thereby making the use of tactical weapons less likely.
Douglas, Jamie, “Dealer’s Choice: The Likelihood of Multilateral Treaties, Bilateral Treaties or a Nuclear Arms Race,” SAASS, 2021.
Douglas provides a detailed analysis of how successive U.S. administrations have balanced extended deterrence commitments with nuclear reductions, highlighting the evolving strategic role of dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The paper contrasts the 2010 NPR’s efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and rely on conventional power projection and missile defenses with the 2018 NPR’s conclusion that conventional forces alone are inadequate to deter peer adversaries and assure allies under the nuclear umbrella. Douglas notes that while NATO’s cohesion is formally supported by nuclear sharing arrangements and forward-deployed DCA, allies in non-NATO theaters (such as South Korea and Japan) are uniquely assured by visible, flexible, and forward-deployable air-delivered assets. Because regional partners are often skeptical that the U.S. would risk a strategic ICBM launch—which would overfly Russia or China and invite a counterattack on the U.S. homeland—visible tactical nuclear instruments like DCA and bombers remain critical for reassuring allies of U.S. nuclear resolve.
Dougherty, Maj. Matthew, “The Dragon’s Tail: Deterring China in an Age of Maneuverable Hypersonic Weapons,” ACSC 2022.
Dougherty provides an innovative strategic framework for future theater capabilities by evaluating the development of a dual-use (conventional and nuclear) Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) system, such as DARPA’s HAWC/HACM concept. He argues that deploying dual-use HCMs on intercontinental bombers provides the U.S. with a credible capability to penetrate advanced adversary defenses, hold distant targets at risk, and establish a strategic posture of mutual vulnerability and escalation dominance. However, the paper highlights that the strategic benefits of this dual-use deployment model must be weighed against severe “entanglement” risks and high fiscal costs. Dougherty warns that co-locating conventional and nuclear capabilities on the same dual-use platforms increases the risk of adversary miscalculation, and notes that procuring a sufficient volume of these exquisite weapons creates a massive strain on defense budgets and requires complex overseas basing and logistics agreements
Hardy, Maj. William C. and Maj. David P. Phillips, “Balancing Power: Establishing the Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization as a Political and Nuclear Alliance,” ACSC 2025.
This paper explores a multilateral framework for regional nuclear deterrence, proposing the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization (IPTO) that would integrate U.S. theater nuclear forces, specifically the B61-12 gravity bomb, on dual-capable F-35As based at Kunsan Air Base (South Korea) and Kadena Air Base (Japan). It shows that this forward-deployed model would move regional nuclear deterrence beyond a “primarily NATO burden-sharing mechanism” to a tailored Pacific architecture, which would complicate adversary (PRC and DPRK) planning and close a growing regional deterrence gap. The combat radius of the F-35A from these forward-operating locations would hold critical military and industrial targets in North Korea and eastern China at risk without requiring refueling, signaling clear collective resolve in a crisis. To preserve this strategic advantage into the future, the author asserts that the next iteration of U.S. and NATO theater nuclear weapons must include additional theater-class forces, recommending the development of a “stand-off, air-delivered nuclear capability” for DCA, nuclear variants of ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile systems (GLCM-N/GLBM-N), and SLCM-N.
Henry, Maj. Joshua M., “Containing the Dragon: Maximizing Extended Deterrence Capacity in the Indo-Pacific,” AFGC 2024.
This paper analyzes how U.S. dual-capable bomber deployment strategies enable extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, contrasting the legacy Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) model with the current Bomber Task Force (BTF) construct. It demonstrates that the BTF model—defined by strategically predictable but operationally unpredictable, scalable, and repeatable deployments—has successfully lowered overall geopolitical risk and improved strategic stability compared to CBP. By utilizing CONUS-to-CONUS profiles and intermittent forward rotations, the BTF reduces the logistics footprint and protects the aging dual-capable fleet from overexploitation. The paper underscores that regional extended deterrence is highly sensitive to allied perceptions and that initial security concerns from allies (Japan, South Korea, and Australia) regarding the transition from CBP have decreased as the BTF has integrated directly onto the peninsula through joint exercises and historic landings. To sustain this politically visible and flexible deterrence, Henry recommends expanding staging opportunities and combined exercises at partner bases—such as the B-52 landing at Seoul International Airport and B-2 operations at RAAF Base Amberley—to signal unwavering collective resolve and reinforce the nuclear umbrella.
Kessler, Matthew J., “The U.S. Nuclear Triad: Effects on the U.S. Government Interagency,” AFGC 2020.
This paper evaluates the strategic value of dual-capable aircraft (DCA) paired with modernized theater weapons like the B61-12, asserting that these forward-deployed tactical capabilities are critical to deterring regional adversaries (such as China and Russia) who might assume the U.S. lacks theater options to counter their own local capabilities. It details how the F-35A, certified for non-strategic bombing with B61 gravity bombs, underpins the nuclear umbrella and uniquely assures regional allies, helping to prevent proliferation. However, it notes that the strategic benefits of this worldwide deployment model carry massive interagency costs (averaging nearly $50 billion annually over ten years for nuclear forces), forcing policymakers to navigate complex funding tradeoffs with other operational priorities.
Loup, Maj. Chad A., “Sustaining the Unsustainable: Conventional Operations and Air-Delivered Nuclear Deterrence,” AFGC 2025.
This paper evaluates the operational friction of utilizing dual-capable assets (DCAs) and how the “two-for-one” deterrence model shapes both allied and adversary perceptions. The author explains that forward-deployed theater instruments, such as the B61-12 gravity bomb on fifth-generation DCA platforms (specifically the F-35A), act as a vital, highly visible link to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforcing extended deterrence and assuring allies. However, the paper warns that conventional overuse of these finite platforms degrades core nuclear competencies, lowers mission-capable rates, and triggers “credibility erosion”. Adversaries track DCA movements closely; consequently, when these dual-capable units are heavily saturated with day-to-day conventional tasks, adversaries may discount their nuclear resolve, effectively dulling the “nuclear edge” of U.S. strategic signaling. Moreover, the dual-use nature of these systems introduces a severe “entanglement risk” where adversaries might misinterpret conventional strikes near their territory as preparations for a nuclear strike, elevating the risk of inadvertent escalation. To maintain strategic advantage, Loup recommends rebalancing global force management so that nuclear readiness and specialized training are treated as primary design constraints rather than secondary variables.
McCarty, LCDR James, “A New Cold War: In Search of a Nuclear Arms Treaty,” ACSC SANDS 2020.
This paper highlights the strategic importance of the “nuclear umbrella” and “nuclear sharing” to assure allies and prevent global proliferation, but emphasizes that non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) remain completely unregulated under existing bilateral treaties like New START. It argues that to preserve theater nuclear stability and maintain a long-term strategic advantage, the next iteration of theater nuclear weapons and agreements must move beyond bilateral structures to incorporate a multilateral framework among the P5 states (including China). This next-generation approach must establish strict verification, notification, and accounting rules for tactical weapons and inactive stockpiles rather than relying solely on unilateral deployments that risk fueling a spiraling arms race.
Murphy, Lt. Col. Jordan E., “Assuring the Republic of Korea through Nuclear Sharing: A Blueprint for an Asian Ally,” AWC, 2019.
This study directly addresses whether the NATO burden-sharing model can be exported to non-NATO theaters by proposing a physical bed-down of U.S. B61 weapons at a South Korean airbase, utilizing certified host-nation aircraft like the F-15K or KF-16. It suggests that such a bilateral nuclear-sharing construct has a powerful reassuring effect on regional allies, preventing them from developing their own nuclear forces, but would be viewed by adversaries (like North Korea) as highly provocative, potentially accelerating regional arms races. To maintain strategic advantage, the paper details that future deployments would require substantial host-nation infrastructure investments, including underground Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) vaults, and a robust dual-key command procedure to ensure 100 percent positive control under bilateral authorization.
Paust, Lt. Col. Christian “Nuclear Burden Sharing: Why Germany Should Continue its Participation,” AWC 2021.
This paper explores NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing model, focusing on the transition of European allies (specifically Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to the fifth-generation F-35 dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to carry forward-deployed B61 gravity bombs. It argues that maintaining a visible and unified forward-deployed DCA capability is essential to demonstrating alliance resolve, preventing coercion, and under-writing extended deterrence against Russian theater nuclear modernization and aggressive doctrines. Furthermore, it warns that failing to modernize these systems would severely undermine NATO cohesion and could prompt eastern allies (like Poland) to take over nuclear hosting. This shift would move theater capabilities closer to Russia’s border, escalate regional tensions, and trigger a destabilizing arms race.
Phillips, Maj. David, “A Roadmap for Returning Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons to the Korean Peninsula,” ACSC SANDS 2024.
This study provides a concrete roadmap to deploy B61-12 gravity bombs on dual-capable F-35As to Kunsan Air Base in South Korea (ROK) as a model of regional deterrence. It directly answers non-NATO theater questions by showing that redeploying the B61-12 to the ROK would meet theater nuclear objectives of addressing local conventional superiority and allied concerns, moving beyond a primarily NATO burden-sharing mechanism to a viable Asia-Pacific model. It demonstrates that the F-35A paired with the B61-12 satisfies critical theater-nuclear attributes: forward deployability, day-to-day preemptive survivability (via third-generation hardened aircraft shelters), flexible yield options (including low-yield), high-confidence penetration of advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), and prompt delivery timelines. However, the study notes these strategic benefits come with immense financial and logistical costs, including $450M–$550M for F-35 support facilities, the procurement of Secure Transportable Maintenance System (STMS) trailers, and millions in annual payroll increases for specialized munitions (MUNS), security, and flight personnel. Finally, the paper references the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendations for next-generation capabilities, highlighting that alternative theater nuclear systems like sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on submarines or surface ships meet these attributes but fail to meet the urgent 2027–2035 deployment window.
Scott-DeLeon, Jonathan D., “The Great Flying Fleet: The Bomber’s Conventional Role in the 21st Century Air Force,” SAASS thesis, 2021, 114 pgs.
Although focused on strategic bombers, this thesis addresses the diplomatic signaling utility of forward-deploying strategic assets to assure allies and deter adversaries. However, it notes that the massive costs and high support requirements of maintaining large, high-visibility strategic platforms may not be worth the strategic benefits, as precision-guided munitions (PGMs) on survivable, multirole fighter aircraft can achieve similar tactical outcomes in theater at a fraction of the cost. This implies that a fighter-based DCA model (like the F-35A) paired with advanced munitions offers a far more flexible, cost-effective, and politically sustainable option for regional deterrence.
Stutzriem, Maj. Stephen E., “Fending Off: How Nuclear Modernization is Critical to Deterrence in Great Power Competition,” AFGC 2024.
This research addresses the strategic sufficiency of U.S. nuclear modernization strategies (current, reduction, or expansion) to deter dual great power competitors (Russia and China). Stutzriem argues that the current “just-in-time” one-for-one replacement of the strategic nuclear triad and dual-capable fighter capabilities is insufficient to counter the expanding theater and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of great-power competition rivals.. The paper emphasizes that Russia possesses over 2,000 non-strategic weapons not covered by any treaty, combined with coercive doctrines supporting low-intensity nuclear escalation. To maintain a strategic advantage, the author recommends an expanded modernization strategy that increases and diversifies the U.S. non-strategic and theater-class arsenal, including its weapons range and delivery capabilities. This expanded force posture is assessed against the five fundamental tenets of nuclear deterrence—assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance, and hedging against uncertain risk—showing that a robust, modernized DCA and non-strategic weapons infrastructure is essential to prevent adversaries from perceiving gaps or vulnerabilities in U.S. resolve.
Willey, Maj. Christopher, “A Tattered Nuclear Umbrella? United States Extended Deterrence Effectiveness with South Korea,” ACSC SANDS 2020.
This paper directly addresses the strategic value and political sustainability of extended deterrence in a critical non-NATO theater. Focusing on the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, Willey evaluates allied assurance through Dr. Brad Roberts’ framework, analyzing how public and governmental perceptions shift during security crises. The research highlights that when regional threats escalate, a protégé nation’s “fear of abandonment” can drive domestic pressure for an independent nuclear weapons program or the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. While Willey notes that physically redeploying U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula would be highly provocative and destabilizing to regional rivals like China and North Korea, he argues that politically sustainable, visible, and flexible regional deterrence is best achieved by increasing visible show-of-force exercises and formalizing bilateral consulting bodies, such as the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee. Willey explicitly advises against a multilateral, NATO-like security pact in East Asia, citing deeply rooted historical grievances and economic interdependencies that make such a model unfeasible.