Space, which once seemed distant and mysterious to us, is now measured in very concrete terms: the availability of connectivity through Starlink, restrictions on the use of terminals in motion, Starshield services, and satellite data that provide early warning of Russian attacks. Our daily activities, communications, and navigation depend on satellites, as does our security in wartime. Meanwhile, debris is accumulating in orbit, spacecraft are becoming targets of military threats, and states are finding it increasingly difficult to agree on common rules. Despite the destruction and the departure of scientists, Ukraine is gaining unique experience in using space technologies for defence and recovery.
How can Ukraine protect itself against the risk of satellite communications being cut off? How does space debris threaten life on Earth? Why is destroying a satellite dangerous for the attacker as well, and what is needed to advance Ukrainian science? Ukrinform discussed these questions with Anna Hurova, who holds a PhD in law specialising in space law and is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Space Studies (Chaire Espace) at the École normale supérieure (ENS–PSL) in Paris. At the International Astronautical Congress in Türkiye earlier this month, she presented “From Debris to Diplomacy,” a game she developed to simulate space threats and the search for joint solutions.
DIVERSIFYING PARTNERS IS BECOMING KEY TO UKRAINE’S TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY
– Anna, let us begin with the most pressing issue at the moment — restrictions on Starlink operations. Is it possible to establish legal safeguards against a recurrence of this scenario, or to devise an alternative backup mechanism?
– Since there has been considerable speculation on this subject, I would first like to clarify something. The company operating Starlink is subject to US jurisdiction. This means it must comply with legal acts that US government authorities issue in relation to it lawfully and within their powers. Therefore, even when senior officials from various countries say that the head of the company can make such a decision unilaterally, I do not believe this assertion is legally accurate.
The answer to the second part of your question follows from this. The same question is being asked in the capitals of many countries that long relied on stable cooperation with the United States and are now developing policies on what is known as technological sovereignty.
The best legal protection may be to conclude specific intergovernmental agreements with clear mutual obligations. And I would emphasise that this means multiple agreements with different countries. In today’s complex geopolitical circumstances, diversifying partners is becoming key to technological sovereignty when a country lacks its own space capabilities. Put simply, we need to cooperate not only with the United States, but also with various European countries, Japan, Canada, and other countries.
For example, I have come across information indicating that two-thirds of the space-based intelligence Ukraine receives comes from France through the CSO-3 (Composante Spatiale Optique) satellite, which is part of a military satellite constellation. I also previously read that, back in September last year, an agreement was signed between the Ukrainian company Nova Enerhiia Ukrainy and France’s Prométhée to establish a consortium to launch a constellation of small satellites, giving Ukraine sovereign access to space-based observation data. However, I have not found any further information about this.
– You mentioned intergovernmental agreements as a safeguard. To what extent can they protect Ukraine against a halt in the sharing of satellite intelligence if its partners’ political positions change?
– These agreements concern the sensitive issue of national security. Therefore, regardless of whether an agreement is concluded directly with a government or with a private entity under a particular country’s jurisdiction, political will has a significant influence. It depends on the circumstances in which the country providing the information finds itself.
The best protection, therefore, is to diversify partnerships and conclude specific agreements that establish clear procedures for data sharing and the consequences of refusing to share it. Framework agreements on cooperation alone are insufficient. Another safeguard is our contribution to the common European security architecture: it is important not only to receive information from our partners, but also to share our own.
At international forums, the restrictions on Starlink operations are currently being discussed as an example of Ukraine’s technological dependence. At this point, it no longer matters whom that dependence is on. Because, as with drones and missiles, it is vital for Ukraine to have its own “eyes in space”.
THE IDEA BEHIND MY GAME ABOUT SPACE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPERIENCE REAL RISKS AND LEARN TO REACH AGREEMENTS
– You recently presented the game “From Debris to Diplomacy” at the International Astronautical Congress in Türkiye. What is this game about?
– In 2017, I defended my dissertation on space debris, and even then I realised that it is the “heart” of space regulation: cybersecurity, authorisations, and licensing are all connected to it. But I wanted to make the game model not merely technical, but specifically about people: how they reach agreements, how they understand the rules. I also hold a master’s degree in psychology, and for me, law is precisely about human behaviour.
In the game, four teams represent different regions and manage satellites. A team rolls a die, moves, and encounters a hazard or finds itself in a situation that requires a response. For example, it has run out of fuel. Fuel has to be purchased, and money can be earned by selling satellite data to another team. This is where negotiations begin: what price to offer, what arguments to use to persuade the other team to buy specifically from them. The game clearly establishes that there is a cause and there is an effect — and you need to think about how to find a way out of the situation together.
– What space threats do players have to overcome?
– Anti-satellite tests, for example. In November 2021, Russia shot down its own satellite, creating a cloud of space debris. This is also a political act — to show that they can do it. Such situations are included in the game. One of the most unpleasant cards is a radiation leak in a satellite. Then you have to compensate for damage caused to other satellites, repair your own, and also take care of the safety of the region where it is located. All of this requires substantial funds and entails serious obligations. But if you have arranged insurance coverage in advance, the corresponding card can completely change the situation.
There is even the effect of the solar wind: a satellite may simply stop working. There is also a card involving the destruction of a satellite with people on board. This is an entirely different risk when human health and life are at stake. My idea is to convey, in a simple, accessible form, the problems that already exist in space. A person draws a card and decides how to respond.
– Do you have feedback from players?
– Over nine or ten test sessions, something came up every time that even I had not realised was possible. I tested the game with specialists from the European Space Agency, and they said: “Oh, I had not even thought of that.” What matters here is not only gaining knowledge, but also experiencing it all yourself in a safe environment. So that afterwards, a person returns to their workplace to design a satellite or work with documents, but has at least some idea of the indirect risks that may arise in space.
BECAUSE OF SPACE DEBRIS, WE MAY ONE DAY LOSE THE TECHNOLOGIES WE USE EVERY DAY ON EARTH
– How can space debris threaten people on Earth?
– Do you check the weather forecast in the morning? And when you get lost, do you turn on Google Maps? All of this could simply stop working because of space debris. I already belong to a generation that basically does not understand paper maps. And the generation after mine — even less so.
There is the Kessler effect: debris becomes so abundant that it creates a domino effect. There is no longer any need to launch anything new: collisions themselves will generate new fragments and destruction. If you have seen the film “Gravity”, it shows just how dangerous space debris can be. If the amount of debris keeps growing, we risk losing the ability to use Earth’s orbits safely. We could lose satellites and the technologies we have grown accustomed to. That is how this affects every person. When I began writing my dissertation in 2014, people were already asking me about this. Since then, it has only been getting worse.
– So how do we prevent orbit from becoming a rubbish dump? Are any rules already in place?
– There are UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, developed within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. They provide general guidance for national legislation on designing satellites so that they leave as little space debris as possible. However, fragments are produced not only by collisions — a satellite can also explode on its own.
There are UN Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. The European Space Agency also has its own standards. For example, previously, a satellite could continue circling in orbit for another 25 years after the end of its operations. Now these periods are being shortened to five years, and, where the risk is high, even to one year. Regulation is becoming stricter. But this is not enough. It is like climate change: there are rules, but the problem remains and is often not resolved in accordance with the established rules.
– So how can a satellite that no longer works be removed? Why does this lead to disputes?
– It depends on the orbit. If it is very low, around 300 kilometres, it is enough to switch off the engines, and the satellite will gradually deorbit and burn up in the atmosphere. Higher up, additional energy and money are needed to bring the satellite closer to the atmosphere. If it has no energy left, another satellite has to be sent to pull it out.
A kind of satellite service station, satellite tow trucks. This is no longer just a project: companies have launched and tested these technologies. But not yet on an industrial scale. In Japan and France, legislation already provides for in-orbit services. And here is the paradox: to clean up, we have to launch satellites again.
There is also a political aspect. Even during negotiations on the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Russia objected to establishing a legal framework for this activity, arguing as follows: another satellite approaches and grabs an object — that is military activity, aggression. Therefore, a clear agreement must be reached, and written consent obtained from the country that owns the satellite. Otherwise, even cleaning up can be considered aggression.
DESTROYING A SATELLITE IN SPACE ALSO THREATENS THOSE WHO DESTROY IT
– You mentioned Russia’s actions in space. Moscow has stated that Western commercial satellites helping Ukraine are “legitimate targets” for retaliatory strikes. Western allies point out that Russia could threaten Starlink satellites in orbit; indeed, there have already been instances of commercial spacecraft being stalked. Are there any regulations against such actions?
– The principle of proportionality applies in humanitarian law. Even if they call a satellite a legitimate target, destroying it could cause disproportionate harm to other countries. The technical aspect must also be considered: the debris would threaten other satellites, and their owners could respond economically, politically, or in other ways.
My personal scholarly position is that deliberately destroying a satellite to create space debris can be regarded as the use of a weapon of mass destruction. In my opinion, this falls under the prohibition in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty because it could destroy many surrounding satellites. Perhaps those who drafted it had something else in mind, but this is how I see it. And Russian satellites are up there too. They would have to carry out more avoidance manoeuvres and spend money. The Russians may do terrible things, but there are legal, political, and economic consequences for them as well.
It is now much easier to hack a satellite remotely, redirect it, or make it transmit incorrect data. There is a great deal of discussion about cyberattacks today. And Russia’s threats reflect a desire to make an impression. It is like the thousand times we were told they would press the nuclear button.
– Then how can compliance with rules and recommendations in space be secured if Russia ignores international decisions on Earth?
– This is a multilayered question. The International Court of Justice has already issued rulings that Russia does not comply with. International law includes the concept of state sovereignty. This means that a state must assume obligations itself, rather than someone else doing so on its behalf, and forcing it to fulfil those obligations is very difficult. Space law is not just the 1967 Treaty. There are five treaties, and countries have joined them to varying degrees. For example, very few states have joined the Moon Agreement. There are also UN General Assembly resolutions, which are advisory. Now there is an increasing shift towards soft law, meaning recommendations. A country determines at the national level what it is prepared to do. And then, of course, the question arises: how are we going to interact?
Political will is very important here. There are what one might call gentlemen’s agreements, such as the Artemis Accords. Countries have declared that they share certain values. If you are part of that group and have an economic interest in it, you have to abide by the agreements. Otherwise, you lose money and political standing.
The second instrument is technical standards. For your satellites to be purchased, and for you to receive funding, you have to meet those standards. Otherwise, no one will buy them from you. So, in practice, there is a limited number of instruments of influence, and even fewer means of enforcement.
– Has the war affected Russia’s standing in the space sector?
– Russia’s space programme has lost a great deal as a result of its attack on Ukraine. But a certain group of states, including spacefaring nations, still supports them, whatever they say or do.
SPACE IS SHARED, AND WE ARE ALL CONNECTED
– What place will space have in our lives in 50 years?
– Space will be inseparable from the digital world. Space services already use artificial intelligence, and, as already noted, a satellite does not have to be physically destroyed — it can simply be hacked. This is also something for our scientists to take note of: cyber issues and space issues are closely connected.
At the congress in Türkiye, SpaceX presented its plans to create data centres in space, with talk of a million satellites. But I spoke with space debris specialists: for now, debris removal technologies are not sufficiently developed for such an enormous fleet. Launches and removal must develop together.
– Will international rules have to be rewritten for this?
– One of the programme heads at the European Space Agency said at the congress in Türkiye that the Outer Space Treaty is outdated and needs to be rewritten. It does indeed. But the political will is not there yet. At international conferences, people even say: “No, no, I am not proposing the adoption of a new convention, please do not think that.” As though proposing a new convention were something foolish.
I think that, sooner or later, common rules will emerge anyway. Not necessarily a new treaty — they could be technical standards covering most spacefaring countries. Otherwise, everyone regulates separately, yet space is shared, and we are all connected. Satellites simply travel along an orbit. Whose orbit is it? Everyone’s.
– And how can countries that oppose each other politically reach agreements?
– Coordination requires communication. Even with artificial intelligence, the question will arise: who should manoeuvre out of the way? Political disagreements get in the way of this, but I think countries will eventually arrive at a coordination mechanism. This is my personal opinion.
There was a case where one country — I no longer remember which — called a lawyer at the COPUOS secretariat: “We cannot manoeuvre to avoid a potential collision. Contact them, because we have no direct contact.” Can you imagine: the satellite is already in orbit, there is no direct communication between the parties, and they are calling the UN. And it is travelling at eight kilometres per second. That is why a mechanism is needed to help establish contact in crisis situations and reach agreements, even if the countries are not partners.
UKRAINE HAS UNIQUE EXPERIENCE IN USING SPACE TECHNOLOGIES
– Despite the destruction and the departure of scientists, Ukraine continues to showcase developments in the space sector. What are our prospects?
– The war is destroying the material infrastructure, and people are leaving. But at the same time, we have unique experience in using space technologies: in the military sphere, for evacuations, crisis management, and the restoration of agricultural land.
At international forums, Ukraine is often cited as an example of how valuable satellite data are. I think this is our resource — showing how we use them. This is expertise we can even sell, bringing funds into Ukraine.
There is interest. Even I have been contacted by companies from Spain, although I am a researcher, far removed from business. They said: “We want to work together, but we do not know how. How do we contact government bodies, how do we provide these data?” So the willingness to cooperate is there; we need to help establish these connections.
– How can satellite data help Ukraine obtain compensation for the damage caused?
– They are already being used for demining, environmental impact assessments, and preparing claims for international courts. This is happening even during the war.
People may not believe in these courts, but as a lawyer, I understand that if there is a document, an official record, it can help even several years later. To obtain compensation, the damage must first be proven. And that requires data, assessments, and evidence.
Take the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant — satellite data helped cross-check information and verify statements. This is also part of countering disinformation. Obtaining compensation will be a long process, but there must be a basis to rely on.
– What is needed for Ukrainian scientists to return?
– I will probably say something very simple and unpopular: they need to be paid a decent salary. People may say that now is not the time, but when someone cannot pay their rent…
We have many sincere enthusiasts who want to help Ukraine and create added value. I am not talking about astronomical salaries, but they must be enough to live on. This is the foundation of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
A person may live abroad with a heavy heart and help Ukraine; I know many such people. But they need to feed themselves and their family. I do not want to remain silent about this.
– And what should be preserved in Ukraine’s scientific tradition, and what should change?
– We still have an inferiority complex, even though our engineering tradition is very strong. If the foundations were poor, our engineers would not be able to work and adapt abroad. These foundations need to be supplemented with modern technologies, innovations, and access to what is happening in the world. But on a salary of 100 euros a month, you cannot travel anywhere.
The advantage I have abroad is the opportunity to attend international conferences and exchange experience. This is supported financially, and people simply say: go, because it is important.
I also like the interdisciplinary approach. In France — I am talking about this academic tradition because I know it — biologists, physicists, and lawyers work on a problem together. We, however, often divide a problem along disciplinary lines, and this is a significant limitation. Lawyers work separately, engineers separately. Then engineers create something they cannot put into practice because of international rules, or lose money because of a contract they have not read. Not everyone, of course, but it happens. That is why interdisciplinarity and openness to dialogue are very important to me.
Olga Budnyk, Ankara