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At the time Israelis were casting their ballots, Washington was conveying a blunt message to the Arab Gulf states preparing for a short but devastating bombing campaign against Iran once the American midterms have passed.
The morning after Israel’s election, the public awoke not to clarity but to a political hangover. Exit polls were contradictory, the margins were exceedingly narrow, and the only certainty was that no political bloc had secured a governing majority. For a country exhausted by years of political turbulence, this was the outcome most Israelis least wanted.
They must now confront the most uncomfortable conclusion: the inconclusive result has not merely paralysed Israeli politics; it has materially increased the probability of a devastating new war with Iran and all that implies for the Middle East. The explanation lies in the intersection of two political calendars: Israel’s unresolved election and the American midterm elections on 3 November.
Benjamin Netanyahu remains a consummate political survivor, but surviving is not the same as winning. When all votes were counted, Netanyahu’s bloc held 53 seats, 11 fewer than its previous total, while the opposition bloc, led by the former chief of staff, Gadi Eisenkot, secured 48. The Arab-led parties hold the balance of power, with 19 seats.
Neither side therefore commands the 61 seats required to govern, and Netanyahu will consequently remain a caretaker prime minister who is politically cornered. However, a leader who has long presented himself as the ultimate guarantor of Israeli security has powerful incentives to seek a diversion beyond the country’s borders.
The timing is deeply troubling. At the time Israelis were casting their ballots, Washington was conveying a blunt message to the Arab Gulf states: prepare for a short but devastating bombing campaign against Iran once the American midterms have passed. According to these accounts, the proposed targets are not confined to nuclear facilities.
They are said to include Iran’s leadership, its military capacity, its oil refineries, its power plants and key elements of its civilian infrastructure. The stated objective is to cripple the regime and compel Tehran to return to the negotiating table. American preparations have been visible: additional Patriot missile defences have been deployed to Israel, carrier strike groups have been repositioned, and munitions stocks have been replenished.
The midterms introduce a further critical variable. President Trump has explicitly stated that the United States will not attack Iran before 3 November, a declaration that implicitly acknowledges the damage the conflict has done to Republican electoral prospects. Opposition to the war and anger over elevated fuel prices have become salient issues in closely contested races, such as in Iowa and Ohio, where more than seven in ten voters believed Trump’s policies had raised the cost of living.
Pew Research reported that 74 per cent of all Americans were concerned about petrol and energy prices, up from 43 per cent before the war. The president therefore faces a narrow window. He cannot escalate before the vote without jeopardising his party’s fortunes, yet he has left open the possibility of resuming hostilities immediately afterwards. Consider the two plausible outcomes.
If Tuesday’s midterms produce a divided Congress, with Democrats capturing at least one chamber, Donald Trump may face intensified pressure to assert his authority as commanderin-chief and to demonstrate resolve. A Republican victory, by contrast, could embolden him to proceed with the campaign he is reportedly inclined to pursue. Either result removes the electoral constraint that currently restrains him, and both point towards a heightened risk of military action in the days following 3 November.
For Benjamin Netanyahu, this convergence is opportune in the most cynical sense. A decisive victory in last week’s elections would have given him a mandate; a decisive defeat would have ended his career. The resulting stalemate leaves him in office, unencumbered by a stable coalition and free to pursue policies that might rally the nation around the flag and reshape the political landscape in his favour.
It is also noteworthy that, according to reports, he had originally planned a strike on Iran in early October. The intended targets were said to have included nuclear facilities, government institutions and civilian infrastructure. He was dissuaded only by Trump’s insistence on waiting until after the US midterms. The implication is clear. The military option remains on the table, and the electoral timetable, rather than strategic logic, has been the principal constraint upon it. The consequences of such a campaign would extend far beyond Iran and Israel.
Tehran has warned repeatedly that it would retaliate in kind, targeting Gulf oil states and American bases across the region. Its missile arsenal remains substantial, and it has used the pause in hostilities to strengthen its defences and devise new retaliatory plans. A strike on Iranian energy and civilian infrastructure would almost certainly further disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, driving global oil prices sharply even higher and imposing severe costs on an already fragile world economy.
Households that are struggling with the cost of living, in the United States and well beyond it, would bear the burden first. The Gulf states would be among the most exposed. They have invested heavily in economic diversification and regional stability, and have worked deliberately to avoid entanglement in great power confrontation. Yet they would find themselves on the front line of a conflict they have sought desperately to prevent, with their energy installations, ports and cities within range of Iranian retaliation.
Their quiet diplomacy, which has been among the few restraining forces in the region, would be tested as never before. There is, moreover, a deeper strategic problem. A short, devastating bombing campaign is easier to announce than to conclude. Military action intended to force a negotiated settlement may instead harden the positions of those it targets, accelerate the very programmes it seeks to halt, and draw in actors who had hitherto remained on the sidelines.
History offers little reassurance that limited air campaigns against determined adversaries deliver limited results. The promise of a quick and decisive outcome has preceded many of the region’s most prolonged and costly conflicts. The Israeli public, by and large, is weary of war. The high turnout demonstrated that citizens still believe in the democratic process, but their preferences have been overwhelmed by a system that has yet again proved unable to produce a government.
The danger is that this democratic expression will be superseded by the calculations of a caretaker prime minister and an American president, each with his own electoral reasons for tolerating, or even welcoming, a war. The responsibility now falls on those with influence over both leaders. Gulf governments, European allies and members of the American Congress should press publicly for restraint and for a renewed diplomatic track, and they should make clear that political convenience is not a legitimate basis for military action.
The Israeli electorate voted for change. It would be a grave failure of both democracy and statecraft if it received a war instead.
* John Dobson is a former British diplomat who also worked in UK Prime Minister John Major’s office between 1995 and 1998. He is currently a visiting fellow at the University of Plymouth.