From Merz’s Indo-Pacific proposal to Beijing’s response: industrial interests, economic security, negotiations and scenarios.
Abstract
China’s response on 28 October 2026 to Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s proposal to expand reciprocal market access between the European Union and the Indo-Pacific highlights a structural problem in European economic policy: how to reduce concentrated dependencies without undermining the system of trade on which industry, employment and competitiveness rely. Beijing urged Berlin and Brussels to take an “objective and rational” approach, stressing the stability of global value chains. Speaking in Singapore on 27 October, Merz ruled out a complete decoupling from China but called for a reduction in “unhealthy and one-sided” dependencies. The two positions diverge more over the conditions of economic security than over the value of interdependence itself.
The data show a relationship that remains pivotal but is becoming increasingly asymmetric. In 2025 the EU imported €559.4 billion in goods from China and exported €199.6 billion. Germany, whose figures are included in the EU total, imported €170.6 billion and exported €81.3 billion. Bilateral trade negotiations have nonetheless continued: on 8–9 October, the EU and China reached sector-specific understandings concerning hybrid vehicles, licensing and market access. This assessment adopts a non-partisan approach: European diversification is not inherently hostile, just as China’s defence of continued trade is not inherently coercive. Strategic risk depends on the actual concentration of supply chains, the substitutability of critical nodes and the costs of adaptation.
Methodological Note
This dossier is current as of 28 October 2026 and distinguishes four categories of information. Documented facts draw on government statements, Eurostat and Destatis statistics, official agreements and IEA reports. Parties’ positions are attributed to those expressing them and are not treated as neutral assertions. Analytical inferences are based on comparisons between data and industrial interests. Speculative hypotheses are explicitly separated from the main analysis and should not be read as certain forecasts. Unless otherwise indicated, monetary figures refer to trade in goods: a trade deficit is not a direct measure of national welfare, nor does it automatically establish unfair practices.
Eurostat’s April 2026 series records an EU goods deficit of €359.8 billion for 2025; other EU tables updated in September show slightly different figures because of dataset extractions and revisions. The charts in this dossier consistently use Eurostat’s 10 April 2026 series for the EU and Destatis’s release of 20 February 2026 for Germany. GTAI estimates for 2026 are explicitly identified as projections. Charts depict data, not photographs. The dated photographs are archival documents whose evidentiary value is limited to what can actually be observed; they do not establish numerical figures or unobservable intentions.
Introduction
The Current Structure of EU–China Economic Relations
The relationship between the European Union and China is the product of more than three decades of commercial and industrial integration. China has developed dense manufacturing capacity and supplier ecosystems, from electronic components to the processing of strategic materials. European companies have benefited from large-scale production, competitive costs and, in several industries, the Chinese market as a final destination for sales and investment. This relationship has produced tangible gains, but also increased sensitivity to disruptions, export restrictions and differing regulatory frameworks.
In 2025, EU imports from China totalled €559.4 billion, up 6.4% year on year, while EU exports to China stood at €199.6 billion, down 6.5%. The €359.8 billion goods deficit is largely concentrated in manufacturing, although it includes both finished products and intermediate goods. China was the EU’s largest country of origin for imported goods. At the same time, the European Commission reports an EU surplus in services trade with China, underscoring why the relationship cannot be assessed solely through the goods balance.
EXHIBIT 01 — Container Terminal in HamburgSource: Fruchthandel; photograph of the Burchardkai terminal; date: 2026 (source published in March). What it shows: Shows German port infrastructure and logistics capacity. What it does not establish: Does not establish the origin, destination or value of the containers shown. Confidence: High for the visible subject; none for bilateral trade flows View archival photo at the original source
Figure 1. EU–China and Germany–China trade in goods in 2025. Official Eurostat and Destatis data; Germany is included in the EU total.
German Interdependence and the Changing Industrial Model
Germany occupies a particular position within the EU. In 2025 China again became Germany’s largest trading partner when exports and imports of goods are combined, with total bilateral trade of €251.8 billion. German imports from China reached €170.6 billion, up 8.8%, compared with German exports of €81.3 billion, down 9.7%. The bilateral deficit rose to €89.3 billion. These developments suggest a change in the composition of the relationship, rather than an end to its importance. The Chinese market remains critical for many companies, but local Chinese manufacturers have become stronger competitors in machinery and automotive production.
German exports to China do not capture every activity of German companies inside China: a group may manufacture and sell locally without those operations being recorded as exports from Germany. Consequently, falling exports do not necessarily imply a proportional decline in all German industrial activity on Chinese territory. Likewise, greater imports of components can lower costs for some German businesses while placing competing domestic producers under pressure.
EXHIBIT 06 — Volkswagen Production Line in ShanghaiSource: WirtschaftsWoche; report on the Volkswagen plant in Shanghai; date: Photograph predating 2026. What it shows: Documents German automotive production activity in China. What it does not establish: Does not establish Volkswagen sales performance in 2026. Confidence: Medium–high; exact capture date unspecified View archival photo at the original source
Analytical Core
The Trigger: Merz in Singapore and the Chinese Response
On 27 October, speaking at the 49th Singapore Lecture, Merz called on Europe and the Indo-Pacific’s middle powers to deepen cooperation on trade, technology and security. His proposal included an interregional agreement with the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and, over the medium to long term, progress towards a trade agreement with ASEAN. The chancellor rejected complete decoupling from China and advocated reducing excessively concentrated dependencies. On 28 October, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun called on Germany and the EU to remain “objective and rational”, acknowledge existing interdependence and resolve differences through consultations.
Although critical, China’s statement did not constitute a new sanctions measure or announce a diplomatic rupture. Equally, the German proposal is not a treaty already in force: EU trade agreements are negotiated at Union level and must follow their own procedures. Distinguishing a political orientation from a negotiating mandate and a legally concluded agreement is essential to assessing the significance of these developments.
The Concrete Pillar: The Germany–Singapore Partnership
In Singapore, Merz and Prime Minister Lawrence Wong presented a new bilateral work plan for 2027–2028. It covers security, trade and investment, digital technologies and artificial intelligence, research and innovation, and the energy transition. It envisages cooperation to advance EU–CPTPP relations and a possible EU–ASEAN trade agreement, rather than Germany’s immediate entry into an anti-China bloc. Wong noted that more than 2,900 German companies operate in Singapore, demonstrating the two economies’ shared interest in stronger industrial and logistical links.
EXHIBIT 08 — Singapore Port: Tuas TerminalSource: The Business Times; photograph of PSA terminals; date: Photograph published by 2026. What it shows: Shows a logistics hub relevant to trade diversification across ASEAN. What it does not establish: Does not establish that cargo transiting through the terminal is independent of Chinese components. Confidence: Medium–high for location and infrastructure type View archival photo at the original source
Brussels’ Position: Competition, Reciprocity and Safeguards
The European Commission regards rebalancing its trade relationship with Beijing as a priority while continuing negotiations. At the second round of EU–China trade and investment consultations in Beijing on 8–9 October 2026, Maroš Šefčovič and Wang Wentao agreed on a package of understandings relating to hybrid vehicles, tariff issues, critical-material licensing and other market-access questions. The Commission argued that the hybrid-vehicle arrangement could reduce projected exports to the EU by more than half over a four-year horizon compared with a no-intervention scenario. That baseline is a projection, not the previous actual volume. Interpretations of the arrangement’s effects differ partly because the parties use different comparison points.
On 23 October, European trade ministers discussed tools to respond to growing imports in exposed sectors, including chemicals, machinery and potentially PET plastics. A safeguard investigation is distinct from the automatic imposition of tariffs; any measures require defined criteria, procedures and compatibility with WTO obligations. The European position is not monolithic: sectors competing with Chinese goods may favour greater protection, while those importing intermediate inputs may fear higher costs.
EXHIBIT 02 — Šefčovič and Wang Wentao at EU–China Trade TalksSource: European Commission (photograph reproduced by EU Perspectives); date: June 2026. What it shows: Documents an institutional meeting between EU and Chinese trade counterparts. What it does not establish: Does not establish full implementation of agreements or a measurable change in trade flows. Confidence: High for the event and participants View archival photo at the original source
EXHIBIT 03 — EU–China Trade Delegations at the Negotiating TableSource: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China; date: 29 June 2026. What it shows: Documents the multilateral and negotiating dimension of the trade relationship. What it does not establish: A photograph of a meeting does not establish its legal or economic outcome. Confidence: High; institutional source, date according to caption View archival photo at the original source
Beijing’s Position: Supply-Chain Stability and Market Access
Chinese diplomacy emphasises economic complementarity with Europe and the importance of predictable supply chains. In this account, diversification based exclusively on geopolitical categories could hinder efficiency and cooperation. That is an economically understandable position for a country hosting major manufacturing and processing capacity, but it does not establish that every Western criticism lacks merit. Conversely, export curbs, market-access obstacles and potentially distortive subsidies should be assessed against specific evidence rather than being attributed indiscriminately to all Chinese products.
A second point merits attention: China has an interest in more than simply selling finished goods abroad. Integration with European companies and technologies can provide expertise, investment and complementary markets while supporting the stability of its own production. Brussels’ efforts to reduce vulnerabilities can therefore create negotiating pressure on Beijing even when they are not intended to sever the relationship.
EXHIBIT 09 — EU–China Summit in BeijingSource: Press reproduction of an official summit photograph; date: 24 July 2025. What it shows: Documents the maintenance of high-level EU–China diplomatic channels. What it does not establish: Does not imply substantive agreement on trade policy. Confidence: High for the event; archival photograph View archival photo at the original source
Concentration in Strategic Materials
The supply chain for rare earth elements used in permanent magnets is one of the most pronounced industrial vulnerabilities. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2024 China accounted for 60% of global mining of rare earths used in magnets, 91% of their refined output and 94% of sintered magnet manufacturing. This progression demonstrates that bottlenecks may lie even more in processing and technical expertise than in the initial geological availability of resources. Opening a new mine does not automatically establish refining, metal-making or magnet-production capabilities.
Figure 2. China’s share of the three stages of the global rare-earth magnet supply chain in 2024. Source: IEA (2026).
EXHIBIT 05 — Rare-Earth Processing Facility in ChinaSource: National Geographic; photo report on the rare-earth supply chain; date: 2012 (photo-series publication). What it shows: Illustrates one industrial stage in rare-earth processing. What it does not establish: Does not measure the global refining share or describe plant conditions in 2026. Confidence: Medium–high for the process; historical photograph View archival photo at the original source
The ability to supply magnets, alloys, machinery and know-how creates bargaining leverage, yet interrupting exports may also harm a supplier’s reputation and accelerate rival projects. For Europe, the answer goes beyond identifying new mines: it requires intermediate processing plants, industrial demand, long-term offtake contracts, recycling and policies to overcome technical barriers. The environmental costs of additional mining and processing must also enter the calculation.
Automotive and Machinery: Competition and Integration
The German automotive industry exemplifies the dual character of this relationship. China is at once a major export market, a destination for production investment and the home of rapidly expanding competitors, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries. Weaker German exports may reflect local competition, changing consumer preferences, costs and differing rates of innovation; the role of subsidies and support measures must be established sector by sector. The machinery industry presents similar complexities: localised production and China’s technological upgrading affect demand for German equipment.
For 2026, a Germany Trade & Invest report cited by Reuters estimates German exports to 29 Asia-Pacific economies at €185.3 billion and imports at €330.9 billion, implying a deficit of nearly €146 billion. Excluding China, the projected regional deficit would be below €35 billion. These are forecasts for 2026, not final outcomes, and principally illustrate how strongly the region’s overall trade balance depends on commerce with China.
Figure 3. GTAI forecast for German trade with 29 Asia-Pacific economies in 2026, as reported by Reuters on 28 October.
ASEAN and the CPTPP: Opportunities and Limits of Diversification
Merz’s approach seeks to widen the range of strategic options. The CPTPP offers an established interregional trade framework and includes advanced partners such as Japan, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, alongside emerging economies. ASEAN members differ considerably in size, industrial specialisation and ties with China, the United States, Japan and Europe. Trade agreements with these partners could facilitate investment and exchange, but would not automatically turn them into suppliers independent of China.
Final assembly provides a typical example: a product entering the EU from a third country may contain Chinese magnets, semiconductors, materials or machinery. Geographical diversification at the last stage of production is not the same as diversification farther upstream. The measurable goal should therefore be the substitutability of critical supply-chain nodes, not merely a change in the declared country of origin.
Figure 4. Original IARI analytical diagram: direct versus indirect dependence in global value chains. This is not a quantitative trade-flow chart.
EXHIBIT 04 — Shanghai Container TerminalSource: Official Shanghai Municipal Government portal; date: 20 June 2025 (source publication). What it shows: Shows the scale and organisation of Shanghai’s port infrastructure. What it does not establish: Does not establish traffic volumes bound for Germany or the EU. Confidence: High for location as reported by the source View archival photo at the original source
The Middle-Power Dilemma and Great-Power Competition
The proposed Euro-Asian cooperation also matters to countries seeking to avoid exclusive alignment with a single great power. Economic security may stem from more predictable trade rules, diversified markets and technological resilience; however, the same instruments can be perceived as discriminatory when they favour politically aligned networks. The question is therefore one of institutional design: to what extent does a partnership preserve open competition, and to what extent does it create preferential barriers? US trade measures and the fragmentation of global commerce are additional external variables. Reducing the dispute to an EU–China confrontation alone would overlook other incentives driving Berlin’s diversification strategy.
EXHIBIT 07 — EU Flags outside the Berlaymont BuildingSource: Euronews; photograph of the European Commission headquarters; date: 11 September 2023 (source publication). What it shows: Visually identifies the Commission headquarters, whose institution oversees EU trade policy. What it does not establish: Does not establish adoption or approval of any new trade measure. Confidence: High for location; illustrative image View archival photo at the original source
Speculative Hypothesis
From Trade Liberalisation to Selective Management of Dependencies
The working hypothesis is that a model of managed interdependence could emerge between late 2026 and 2027. Under this arrangement, the EU and China would continue trading at high volumes while applying negotiated conditions and more differentiated sector-specific protections. Such an outcome would be consistent with the understandings reached on 8–9 October, China’s stated commitment to dialogue and Europe’s search for alternative partners. It is not guaranteed, however: geopolitical deterioration, new restrictions on strategic materials or reciprocal trade crises could produce much sharper fragmentation.
A second scenario involves controlled commercial competition: the EU expands investigations and defensive instruments, China responds with regulatory and industrial tools, but both sides preserve sectors where a rupture would be too expensive. A third scenario, less consistent with continuing negotiations but more destabilising, involves accelerated industrial separation, higher costs, forced reallocation of investment and greater uncertainty for firms. These three configurations are not mutually exclusive and may coexist across different products.
The managed-interdependence hypothesis would be weakened if announced negotiation channels ceased operating, if the October agreement were not implemented or if reciprocal restrictions became broad rather than narrowly targeted. It would be strengthened if the trade talks planned for January and March 2027 yielded workable compromises and alternative supply chains expanded without a major collapse in overall trade.
So What — Hypotheses, Impacts and Strategies
Working Hypothesis for Europe
De-risking is sustainable when it identifies genuine critical concentrations, sets sector-specific priorities and measures the costs of intervention. A strategy based solely on reducing Chinese imports would fail to distinguish easily substitutable goods from essential inputs. The EU could therefore develop dependency matrices combining the leading supplier’s market share, substitution times, the availability of alternative facilities, the exposure of small and medium-sized enterprises, and each product’s importance to national and economic security.
Economic and Industrial Impacts
For Germany, new partnerships would spread risks and create opportunities to participate in Asian markets beyond China. Possible costs include duplicated investment, more expensive logistics and lower efficiency in some networks. For China, overseas customers’ greater diversification could gradually erode some advantages associated with concentration, but losses would not be automatic: Chinese companies can enter new chains through investment, components and partnerships with third countries. For Italy, the effects would vary: machinery producers and industries competing with Chinese suppliers might gain opportunities, while companies dependent on imported materials and components could face higher prices.
Strategies and Practical Options
The first course of action is to distinguish disruption risk from competitive pressure, because they call for different tools. Disruption risk can be addressed through strategic inventories, qualified alternative suppliers, traceability and industrial agreements; competitive pressure through innovation, training, investment, enforcement of anti-dumping rules and, where warranted, trade measures consistent with international obligations. The second priority is to use partnerships with ASEAN and CPTPP members to build technological capability, rather than merely new transit routes. The third is to maintain stable negotiations with Beijing and reduce regulatory uncertainty that can harm all parties.
From an analytical standpoint, there is no predetermined best solution. Each intervention should be justified by specific evidence, its distributional effects, industrial time horizons and realistic alternatives. This approach makes it possible to recognise both the legitimacy of European concerns and China’s interest in predictable trade, without elevating either national position into a universal normative judgement.
Conclusions
Competition Shifts from Trade Volume to Strategic Quality
China’s statement on 28 October 2026 primarily reflects a diplomatic disagreement over how to manage economic interdependence. It does not terminate trade agreements, nor does Merz’s proposal already establish a new free-trade area. Statistics show a still extensive relationship marked by growing asymmetries, while the 8–9 October negotiations demonstrate that incentives and channels for sector-specific compromises remain in place. Europe’s capacity to diversify will depend less on announcing new agreements than on investing in the production stages that are currently concentrated. China’s capacity to retain stable partners will also depend on predictable market access and supply conditions.
Variables to Monitor
The main variables to monitor are the verifiable implementation of EU–China understandings on hybrid vehicles; actual licensing times for rare earths and magnets; any new EU safeguard investigations involving chemical and plastic products; trends in German machinery and automotive exports; changes in investment flows towards ASEAN and Japan; and whether EU–CPTPP dialogue develops into formal negotiating initiatives. Subject to change, further consultations scheduled between January and March 2027 are particularly relevant.
On the evidence currently available, the non-partisan assessment is that targeted, verifiable diversification could strengthen resilience without requiring generalised confrontation. The issue remains empirical rather than ideological: timing, costs and the actual structure of supply chains will determine whether the gains in economic security exceed the burdens of reorganisation.