Introduction
Since 2010, the energy sector has operated in an increasingly volatile environment shaped by natural disasters, market dynamics, policy changes and geopolitical shocks. Over the past five years, this volatility has intensified during a period of sustained turbulence. From supply chain disruptions due to natural disasters and the pandemic to market, policy and regulatory upheaval to geopolitical strife, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the recent US intervention in Venezuela and ongoing Iran War, patterns of cyclical commodity volatility around investment boom-bust patterns have become more pronounced and unpredictable. These developments have altered the economic balance of risk under long-term supply agreements between producers and sellers on one hand and utilities, industrial buyers and traders on the other. In liquefied natural gas (LNG), gas and power markets, pricing has swung between historic highs and sharp corrections in response to these events, along with significant disruptions to supply logistics and project development timelines. This increased volatility has elevated the risk of disputes, particularly with respect to force majeure, breach of contract and price reviews.
Market disruptions and economic impacts
During the 2000s and early 2010s, the liberalisation of European gas markets began and intensified, and LNG markets became increasingly globalised. This process was accelerated by the rapid growth of destination-flexible LNG supply following the start of US LNG exports in 2016, which significantly increased market liquidity and flexibility, enabling trade flows and pricing to respond more rapidly to global supply and demand shocks. In this more interconnected and liquid market, where flexible LNG volumes increasingly trade into spot markets, geopolitical events, evolving market fundamentals, and changes in energy security and climate policy have generated more frequent and complex disruptions across gas and LNG markets. These shocks are reflected more rapidly in amplified price swings for European and Asian oil, gas and LNG price benchmarks and their cross-index spreads to US Henry Hub (HH) prices, creating incentives for opportunistic market behaviour that can give rise to contractual disputes.
Against this backdrop, since 2010, a series of natural disasters, policy shifts, technological changes and geopolitical conflicts has triggered supply and demand shocks and sharp swings in oil and LNG prices that have catalysed significant waves of arbitration disputes, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Major market disruptions, economic impacts and dispute trends


To understand these trends and their implications for arbitration disputes, it is useful to individually examine four primary groups of disruptions: natural and public health disasters, major market changes, policy and regulatory changes, and geopolitical strife.
Natural and public health disasters
Natural disasters such as the Great Japan Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear disaster and the covid-19 pandemic have had dramatic positive and negative effects on natural gas and LNG demand and prices, triggering force majeure claims and disputes over non-performance.
Fukushima nuclear disaster (March 2011): the earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan caused a nuclear meltdown, creating significant grid disruptions and a surge in LNG imports to meet shortfalls. Japanese buyers responded by signing numerous new LNG sales and purchase agreements (SPAs), which later resulted in a surplus of contracted volumes in Japan. Force majeure and contractual disputes arose as suppliers and buyers navigated unexpected shortages and price volatility.Covid‑19 pandemic (2020–2022): global lockdowns and economic disruptions caused sharp declines in energy demand, supply chain interruptions and production cutbacks, triggering a wave of force majeure notices and non-performance disputes.Major market changes
During recent years, shifts in supply–demand fundamentals have intensified both pricing volatility and contractual tensions in global gas and LNG markets.
China’s LNG demand growth deceleration (2025–2026): China experienced strong LNG demand growth through the early 2020s. However, despite continued growth in natural gas demand through 2025, LNG demand outlooks have weakened due to rising domestic production and expanding pipeline gas imports, as well as the slower industrial growth linked to the property-sector downturn and rapid displacement of gas-fired power by renewable energy. Trade tensions have also limited Chinese buyers’ access to US LNG supply, adding further uncertainty. Looking forward, China’s LNG demand is expected to recover but remain below prior peak levels in 2024, with lower-priced domestic and pipeline supplies prioritised and LNG serving as a flexible, marginal source.LNG supply expansion (2025–2026): new liquefaction capacity in the US Gulf Coast (USGC) and Qatar has created expectations of increasing global LNG supply and a potential LNG supply glut. In early March, the Qatari outages due to the initial impacts of the Iran War were expected to partially reduce this oversupply, with Morgan Stanley noting that a month-long disruption could erase much of the excess supply previously expected for 2026. Further, the Iranian attacks on Ras Laffan from March 18–19 reportedly damaged approximately 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity, representing roughly 12.8 million tonnes per annum (MMTPA), with repairs expected to take three to five years. This loss is more severe and sustained than the early disruptions, and ongoing military risks threaten further severe production and export disruptions. To date, the combined disruptions have effectively converted the mid-term market outlook from anticipated oversupply into a materially tighter supply environment. As at the time of writing, there is no clear resolution in sight. The longer the war and/or the Iranian and US naval blockades continue, the greater the risk that LNG supplies will be short, spot prices will be high, and natural gas demand destruction will become sustained and structural as governments and companies implement measures to shift energy consumption away from natural gas to mitigate the supply and price risks.Price divergence and volatility (2025–2026): recent market volatility, combined with expectations of LNG oversupply, has widened the gap between certain long‑term contract prices and prevailing market prices. Meanwhile, US LNG exports have expanded the share of HH-indexed pricing in the global LNG contract mix, which has largely been insulated from global shocks, as compared to other international benchmarks such as Brent, TTF and JKM, due to the formidable but already fully utilised LNG export capacity. Looking ahead to later this decade, emerging domestic demand drivers – particularly the rapid growth of US data centres which could increase gas demand for power generation – combined with strong LNG export demand are expected to impose upward pressure on HH. The stability of HH compared to global indices and the resulting price divergence have created incentives for counterparties to delay and/or breach performance obligations and renegotiate prices in price reviews, effectively increasing the number and value of contractual disputes.Policy and regulatory changes
Over the past several years, increasingly divergent policy trajectories in the United States and European Union (EU), coupled with escalating US–China trade tensions, have heightened regulatory and commercial uncertainty, affecting cross-border investment and long-term contracting for energy project developers.
Escalated US–China trade war (2024): the tariffs imposed by the United States and retaliatory measures by China have increased the cost and complexity of sourcing key industrial components widely used in energy infrastructure (eg, steel, electrical equipment, transformers and specialised manufactured parts), thereby raising the risk of construction delays and cost overruns.US energy policy (2025–2026): the US government has rolled back environmental regulations and programmes under the Clean Air Act and Inflation Reduction Act that had been aimed at promoting renewable energy and addressing climate change while accelerating permitting for upstream drilling and LNG export infrastructure development. The implementation of these measures continues to be contested in court, and the substantial policy changes are generating disputes over construction delay and investment recoverability.EU decarbonisation policies (2023–2026): in contrast to the United States, the EU has strengthened decarbonisation policies such as the “Fit for 55” package and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), expanded Emissions Trading System, stricter methane regulations for imported gas and more aggressive renewable targets. Collectively, these measures have materially altered the economics of long-term contracts, and regulatory ambiguities – such as regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions tracking and verification – may create uncertainty that could trigger disputes between EU importers and their suppliers.Geopolitical strife
Major geopolitical developments have materially altered energy trade flows and pricing dynamics, causing sustained supply interruptions, extreme price blowouts and volatility, and performance uncertainties that have triggered disputes over contract deliveries, pricing and other terms.
Russo–Ukrainian War (February 2022, ongoing): Russian pipeline gas supply tensions began prior to 2022 and escalated significantly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to 2022, Russian pipeline gas accounted for roughly 40% of the EU’s pipeline gas imports, this declined sharply to approximately 6% by 2025 due to disrupted flows, sanctions and other EU policy responses. The significant supply shortages led to massive LNG imports and caused European and global gas and LNG price spikes that led to disputes regarding failure to supply, force majeure claims and hardship claims in long‑term contracts.US intervention in Venezuela (January 2026): the US military operation and regime change in Venezuela introduced short‑term uncertainty over Venezuelan oil output and contributed to volatility in crude markets, even though oil prices did not rise in the immediate aftermath due to the existing oversupply. In the aftermath of the intervention, midterm outlooks envisioned potential downward pressure on global oil prices following increased Venezuelan political stability and production improvements. On 18 March, the US eased sanctions on Venezuelan oil and allowed limited trade and investment to boost oil supply during the Iran War.Iran War (February 2026, ongoing): the war has led to a mix of energy infrastructure bombings and security shutdowns of energy infrastructure, oil and gas production shut-ins and a virtual blockage of all energy shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, due to the Iranian closure of the waterway and the more recent US naval blockade of Iranian ports and shipments. These developments have resulted in a sustained global supply disruption that is already considered the most severe in modern energy market history, causing oil and gas shortages and price blowouts. Brent has surged 63% from US$72.48/bbl to US$118.35/bbl, TTF by 96% from €31.61/MWh to €61.85/MWh, and JKM 138% from US$10.70/MMBtu to US$25.41/MMBtu from pre-war levels to each of their individual peaks. This has also led to a differential between prompt month Brent and Dated Brent prices that is “as wide as it has ever been”, indicating heightened uncertainty over the trajectory of oil prices. Additionally the loss of approximately 12.8 MMTPA of Qatari LNG export capacity on top of the other regional infrastructure shutdowns and production shut-ins has already triggered widespread force majeure declarations from Middle Eastern suppliers, intensifying buyer concerns with supply security. These disruptions are also likely to lead to future supply breach, hardship and pricing-related disputes.
Collectively, these disruptions have subjected energy markets to overlapping supply, demand and pricing risks. The evolving market fundamentals, trade tensions, regulatory and policy changes, and geopolitical conflicts have complex and sometimes countervailing effects on pricing, supply and offtake obligations, and the economic incentives of buyers and sellers. While the expansion of flexible US LNG supplies was expected to enhance global market integration, these overlapping disruptions are driving renewed market fragmentation. The resulting uncertainty has increased the frequency and complexity of commercial disputes as counterparties navigate shifting market conditions, arguably unforeseen policy developments, and often massive pricing changes and yawning global price differentials.
Recent energy arbitrations and expert issues
The overlapping sources of risk outlined above have increased the frequency, complexity and economic stakes of disputes under long-term gas and LNG contracts. While the fundamental categories of disputes remain consistent, recent developments have made them analytically more complex and have amplified their financial impact. For example, the value of new International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) disputes reached a record US$102 billion in 2024 due to a wave of energy-sector and construction and engineering disputes related to the Russo–Ukrainian War. Several high-profile gas and LNG contract disputes involve claimed damages in the multibillion-dollar range. These disputes can be grouped into the following three main categories:
force majeure;breach of contract (failure to supply or take); andpricing and price review
Each category has presented complex economic challenges relevant to expert evidence.
Force majeure disputes
Force majeure disputes typically arise when unforeseen, contractually stipulated events prevent a party from performing its contractual obligations. For example, major natural disasters, health crises, policy shifts or geopolitical events can interrupt production, transportation, delivery or receipt of energy commodities. Such disruptions frequently trigger force majeure declarations and often lead to disputes over whether the force majeure declaration was valid and whether the affected party was indeed unable to perform and exercised reasonable diligence in preventing or mitigating the disruption. Under energy contracts, force majeure disputes often arise from disagreements as to whether an unforeseen disruption genuinely rendered performance under the contracts impossible or impracticable or whether full or possible performance remained feasible but had become economically disadvantageous due to market or pricing changes not associated with the alleged force majeure, which may not qualify as force majeure under a contract.
The increasing frequency and scale of events including disasters, policy changes, trade sanctions and geopolitical conflicts has amplified the volume and economic stakes of force majeure disputes. While natural disasters and pandemics have historically generated numerous force majeure claims in energy contracts, recent disputes have been increasingly driven by geopolitical events and sanctions.
Since the Russo–Ukrainian War, force majeure claims have risen sharply. After Gazprom began significantly cutting pipeline gas supplies via Nord Stream to Europe in June 2022, it declared force majeure to its major customers retroactively in July 2022. Following the rejection of these force majeure claims by EU buyers, 20 of them filed arbitrations claiming that Gazprom breached their supply contracts by failing to deliver gas and seeking damages for undelivered gas and, in some cases, the termination of long-term contracts. For example:
Uniper won a landmark arbitration against Gazprom Export for failure to deliver contracted gas volumes and was awarded damages of €13 billion as well as the right to terminate its long-term Russian gas supply contracts.Similar arbitration claims lodged against Gazprom by RWE, Engie, Eni, SEFE, PGNiG and others have claimed extensive damages for non-delivery of gas supplies and compensation for the costs incurred to find alternative supplies on the spot market.Naftogaz won its ICC claim against Gazprom for Gazprom’s failure to comply with the “ship or pay” provision of its gas transportation agreement for natural gas flows through Ukraine, leading to US$1.37 billion in awarded damages.
Western sanctions restricting Russian entities’ access to global financial systems, along with targeted sanctions on individual companies, have caused a knock-on domino effect of force majeure claims across the energy sector. Energy market participants, including gas and LNG sellers with long-term contracts, shipping operators, insurers and construction companies, have sought contractual relief when compliance with sanctions renders performance commercially impracticable. For example:
ArcelorMittal lodged a Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) arbitration against GAIL regarding damages from replacement cargoes following GAIL’s force majeure claim of LNG cargoes following one of GAIL’s LNG suppliers claiming force majeure due to Russian sanctions.Samsung Heavy Industries lodged a Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) arbitration against a sanctioned Russian shipyard owner that terminated their supply contracts for icebreaker vessels and demanded the return of US$800 million in advance payments following Samsung’s force majeure claims due to sanctions imposed on the shipyard owner.Russian company Power Machines lodged an SIAC arbitration against Petrovietnam regarding a terminated engineering, procurement and construction contract for a powerplant in Vietnam. Power Machines suspended work due to US sanctions placed upon itself to which Petrovietnam halted payments. Power Machines then terminated the contract based on claim of force majeure and on non-payment of due amounts by Petrovietnam.
These cases illustrate the complex analytical issues that arise in such disputes. Expert analysis focuses on a causal link between the alleged force majeure event and contractual non-performance; counterfactual scenarios to determine what delivery, revenues or costs would have occurred absent the alleged event; and the quantum of losses due to replacement procurement costs or increased logistic costs, lost revenues and/or performance penalties. Experts also evaluate whether the affected parties took reasonable mitigation measures, assess the availability and commercial feasibility of alternative supply or operational options, and distinguish losses directly attributable to the force majeure event from those arising from independent market or operational factors.
Breach of contract
Other market disruptions have caused extreme disruptions in supply and/or demand that have incentivised parties to allegedly breach contractual performance obligations. Extreme market prices, whether far above or below contract prices, can motivate sellers to delay or direct deliveries; or buyers to defer, reduce or cancel offtake.
Failure to supply
When market spot prices far exceed contract prices, sellers may be motivated to delay or redirect deliveries to higher-priced markets, leaving buyers without access to the low-cost, high-value contract cargoes they allegedly had expected under their SPAs. In recent years, disputes about failure to supply have become more frequent and damage claims have increased.
A prominent example involves disputes against Venture Global concerning LNG SPAs linked to its Calcasieu Pass LNG project, where several long-term LNG buyers initiated arbitration alleging that Venture Global failed to timely commence contractual deliveries under the long-term SPAs. Three buyers have concluded their cases: Venture Global succeeded against Repsol and Shell and lost against BP. Within the partial final award of BP’s arbitration, the tribunal found that “Venture Global breached its obligations to declare COD of the Calcasieu Project in a timely manner and act as a ‘Reasonable and Prudent Operator’”, resulting in non-delivery under long-term LNG SPAs originally expected to commence in late 2022.
Other examples of failure to supply include:
A Cyprus-registered commodities trader lodged an ICC arbitration against Nigerian state entity Sopamin regarding the termination of a uranium supply contract following failure to supply by Sopamin due to the high market price following the Russo–Ukrainian War, stating it could not begin performing the contract because it would go bankrupt if it supplied at the agreed price.Engie lodged an ICC arbitration against TotalEnergies regarding the breach of a long-term LNG contract due to failure to supply four LNG cargoes in 2023 and one cargo in 2024. Engie won the case and was awarded over US$100 million.
In our experience, seller-driven market actions have given rise to disputes, particularly where contracts allow flexibility in deliveries or early termination. For example, some long-term LNG contracts permit sellers to adjust shipment sizes or delivered volumes. In practice, sellers have sometimes reduced deliveries when contract prices were below prevailing spot prices, or increased volumes when prices exceeded spot levels. Even when contractually permissible, such actions have, in our experience, prompted disputes where buyers questioned whether adjustments were commercially motivated rather than operationally justified. Similarly, sellers have exercised early termination rights when market prices made the existing contracts economically unfavourable. Even when a contract allows for termination, disputes can arise if buyers challenge the legitimacy of the action and/or the interpretation of contractual termination provisions.
Failure to take
Conversely, when market prices fall far below long-term contract prices, “failure to take” disputes may arise where buyers do not lift contracted volumes under contracts with minimum annual quantity or take-or-pay obligations. In such circumstances, buyers may rely on force majeure or hardship clauses, citing factors such as disruptions to their own operations, downstream demand destruction or constraints, and/or logistical and storage disruptions; whereas sellers may contend that performance remained feasible and/or that the alleged force majeure or hardship did not actually impede or prevent performance.
These disputes typically turn on whether the alleged constraints genuinely prevented performance or whether the buyer retained the operational and commercial ability to perform but chose not to do so in light of prevailing market conditions. The assessment often involves examining the factual circumstances surrounding non-performance, including operational capabilities, available alternatives and the extent to which market conditions influenced the decision not to take volumes.
Price and price review disputes
The rapid expansion of global LNG supply, particularly in the USGC, combined with the growing role of HH-indexed LNG pricing, has increased market flexibility and liquidity and has contributed to a misalignment between oil-indexed long-term contract prices and prevailing LNG market conditions. These changes have incentivised buyers to trigger price reviews and/or renegotiate contractual delivery quantities and flexibility terms.
Price reviews typically focus on adjusting the parameters of existing pricing formulae, such as for the slope of oil-linked prices. In recent years, parties increasingly trade price concessions for enhanced “commercial currencies” such as volume and destination flexibilities, diversion rights and seasonal-weighted deliveries. Since 2020, heightened price volatility has exposed the limitations of inflexible legacy contracts, encouraging parties to discuss commercial term adjustments alongside price renegotiations.
When negotiations fail, price reviews can often proceed to arbitration. Gas price and price review arbitrations are highly common in the EU as the market has matured away from traditional pricing models. For example:
In 2020, an ICC tribunal in Stockholm ruled in favour of Greece’s state-owned gas company DEPA in a long-standing price review dispute against BOTAS over a 2003 natural gas supply contract. The tribunal found the contract’s oil-indexed pricing formula had diverged from competitive market conditions as the Greek market shifted towards hub-based pricing and granted a retroactive price reduction, resulting in a payment from BOTAS to DEPA exceeding €200 million in June 2020.In 2025, DEPA reached an out-of-court settlement with Gazprom Export following a dispute over gas pricing and take-or-pay obligations, arguing that Gazprom’s contract prices had become uncompetitive relative to LNG spot and European hub prices. The July 2025 settlement secured more competitive pricing for the 2025–2026 period and included a partial write-off of the disputed debt.
In Asia, formal price review arbitration has historically been limited. Many Asian LNG contracts were long-term, oil-linked and designed for stability, where parties valued delivery certainty and often prioritised maintaining amicable long-term commercial relationships. Although price review clauses became more common in Asian LNG contracts from the 1990s onwards, price reviews were usually resolved through bilateral negotiation rather than international arbitration, even when the contracts included a formal dispute resolution mechanism. This trend began to change in recent years, with several high-profile cases signalling that parties are increasingly using formal dispute resolution to resolve pricing disagreements:
In 2018, Korea Gas Corp (KOGAS) initiated arbitration against the North West Shelf Project joint venture (operated by Woodside Petroleum) over a midterm LNG supply contract. The dispute centred on whether the contract price reflected prevailing market conditions and required adjustment under the price review clause.In 2019, Osaka Gas Company initiated arbitral proceedings against ExxonMobil regarding the PNG LNG project in Papua New Guinea. The dispute focused on the pricing terms of the LNG supply contract, which could not be resolved through standard commercial negotiation.
In Asian price reviews, experts typically analyse comparable benchmark contracts to determine whether the contract price remains aligned with the prevailing market conditions evident in the benchmark contracts. The analytical approach follows the specific wording of the price review clause, which defines the relevant review period and the criteria for determining whether the contract price has diverged from market conditions. In our experience, two contractual approaches are commonly applied:
New contract approach uses new contracts signed or price reviewed during a defined historical review period to construct benchmark datasets and update contract prices based on recent contract prices agreed in the market. This approach generally prioritises analysis of new price agreements over the ongoing pricing of legacy contracts, but it may involve a more limited group of benchmark contracts; andCurrent or future delivery approach uses the prices of contracts with current and/or expected future deliveries during a defined recent and/or future price application period. This approach typically analyses a larger number of benchmark contracts and places more weight on legacy contracts and prices relative to new contract prices and/or recent price reviews.
Each approach leads to debates about whether the price review analysis should focus on the historical review period or the future application period, which can impact the analysis and outcomes. Legal counsel and experts typically consider the implications for analysis of prevailing market conditions in the context of specific contractual guidance as well as any limitations in the available data.
Outlook for energy arbitration
Looking ahead, the massive global LNG and oil supply shock, force majeure risk and commodity market uncertainty borne of the Iran War – including the dual Iranian and US blockades in and around the Strait of Hormuz and Qatar’s loss of 12.8 MMTPA of LNG production and export capacity – dominate the near horizon for energy disputes. The severe supply and pricing shock follows and builds upon several significant market, policy and geopolitical developments over recent years that make the global market environment extraordinarily complex. We expect a high volume of large value disputes over the coming years involving oil and gas force majeure, breach of contract and pricing disputes. We offer observations on the primary drivers and expert challenges for each category in the final sections below.
Force majeure disputes
The latest EU sanctions and Iran War may generate new waves of force majeure disputes in the oil and gas sector, albeit through different mechanisms. In the LNG industry, they both constrain supply and will have compound effects on trade and pricing.
Regulatory measures such as the EU’s 19th sanctions package, adopted in January 2026, require EU buyers to cease Russian LNG imports under long-term contracts by January 2027 and Russian pipeline gas by late 2027. These measures may place EU buyers in potential conflict with their contractual obligations to take gas from their Russian suppliers, with buyers potentially invoking force majeure to justify termination. This situation is the reverse of the prior arbitrations that followed the Russo–Ukrainian War and imposition of EU sanctions, where EU buyers typically alleged Gazprom’s breach of supply obligations, while Gazprom invoked force majeure citing technical constraints resulting from sanctions to justify its failure to supply. This illustrates how policy changes and related market disruptions can reverse the parties’ contractual positions over time.
Meanwhile, the Iran War and related attacks on energy infrastructure and disruption of oil and gas shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have affected a critical transit corridor for global LNG and oil shipments, which accounts for approximately 27% of global oil exports, about 20% of global LNG exports and roughly 20% to 30% of global traded fertiliser. This has prevented cargo loading or delivery for producers and traders reliant on Middle East export routes, causing producers to maximise regional storage and shut-in production once storage is full. Following the collapse of a brief conditional reopening on 18 April 2026, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has returned to a near-standstill due to the US naval blockade of Iranian shipments and ongoing Iranian restrictions on passage. Such disruptions have triggered force majeure declarations across the Middle East, and further declarations may follow if disruptions persist.
These disruptions are producing shortages and high prices that require demand responses from buyers in key importing regions and countries, such as increased short-term reliance on alternative energy sources such as coal, the deferral or cancellation of LNG import projects, and restored or redoubled policy support for renewable energy and battery storage. These responses represent significant economic and policy change shifts that are likely to increase the risk of supply breach, hardship and pricing-related disputes.
From an expert perspective, these disputes raise complex issues of causation, duty to mitigate and minimise harm, and the attribution of responsibility for loss. When multiple disruptions, such as armed conflict, sanctions, shipping constraints and consequent price volatility, occur simultaneously it can be challenging to determine whether a party’s contractual non-performance was caused by the alleged force majeure event or by commercial decisions taken in response to market conditions. Experts are therefore often required to disentangle these overlapping drivers and assess the extent to which the alleged force majeure event caused the non-performance.
Industry experts may be asked to evaluate whether the party invoking force majeure fulfilled a reasonable or industry standard duty to mitigate, including whether alternative delivery routes, substitute supply arrangements or other mitigation measures were commercially feasible. Experts may also be requested to quantify the consequences of non-performance by comparing the contractual “but-for” scenario with the actual outcome, taking into account how each party could reasonably have mitigated the losses.
Breach of contract disputes
Similarly, where force majeure is contested or rejected, disruptions such as Iran-related shipping delays or sanctions-driven constraints may result in claims for breach of contract. Buyers of Middle Eastern oil and gas supplies may claim damages for non-delivery of contracted volumes or failure to meet take-or-pay obligations, while Russian suppliers may argue that the EU importers are breaching their take-or-pay obligations by failing to take contracted volumes.
In these disputes, expert analysis typically focuses on quantifying the economic consequences of the alleged breach. This may include assessing the cost of replacement supply, lost resale opportunities, or additional transportation and procurement costs incurred due to disrupted deliveries. Establishing causation can be particularly challenging in periods of market turbulence. For example, energy price movements during geopolitical crises may reflect broader market reactions rather than the specific contractual breach at issue. Experts may therefore be required to distinguish losses directly attributable to the alleged breach from those arising from wider market volatility affecting the sector as a whole.
Pricing and price review disputes
Disruptions to oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz or shifts in global supply patterns following sanctions on Russian exports can tighten global LNG and oil markets and contribute to sharp price movements. Such volatility may increase the likelihood that parties will seek price adjustments or trigger price review mechanisms under long-term supply agreements.
In price review disputes, the central analytical issue is typically whether the contract price has diverged from prevailing market conditions under the terms of the price review clause. Periods of geopolitical and policy disruptions can complicate this assessment. When price review periods coincide with supply shocks or extreme volatility, experts may need to distinguish between temporary spot market price spikes caused by market disruptions and longer-term structural changes in supply, demand and market liquidity as expressed in benchmark contracts.
The growing use of gas-linked and hybrid pricing structures (eg, combining oil- and gas-linked benchmarks within a single formula) in long-term SPAs adds further analytical complexity to such disputes. Experts may need to evaluate how movements in multiple indices interact, how their weighting has evolved, and whether the hybrid formula continues to reflect the commercial bargain and risk allocation agreed by the parties. In volatile market conditions, this analysis often requires detailed quantitative modelling and careful judgement to help the tribunal understand whether the resulting price continues to reflect the commercial bargain originally intended by the parties.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the scope, complexity and value of energy disputes will continue to expand. As geopolitical strife, policy changes and evolving market structures interact to produce significant changes in energy trade and pricing, claimants, respondents and tribunals will need to contend with increasingly complex, multivariable causation problems involved in evaluating the sources of harm and losses across breach of contract, force majeure and pricing disputes. Decarbonisation initiatives, carbon pricing and broader energy transition policies introduce an additional layer of complexity and can materially alter the economics and feasibility of long-term supply contracts and influence market behaviour. This will require careful expert analysis not only to quantify loss, but also to disentangle causation and construct robust counterfactuals in increasingly complex and volatile energy markets.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Rebecca Yim, a Managing Consultant at BRG, and Nicholas Fiori, a Consultant at BRG, for their research and analysis assistance on this chapter.
Endnotes