Ukraine could close seven EU negotiating chapters next year against 25 for Moldova, the European Commission said on November 4, telling Kyiv to speed up rule of law reforms.

The timetable sits in indicative roadmaps annexed to the Commission’s 2026 enlargement communication, published with its annual report on Ukraine. Kyiv gets education and culture in the first half of 2027 and six more chapters in the second half: intellectual property, social policy, enterprise, science, external relations, and foreign and security policy. Moldova gets nine and then 16. Neither country has closed a chapter so far.

Ukraine has been racing to finish the process and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has called for Ukraine to join as soon as 2027 as in addition to the economic aid membership brings, the EU treaty also includes a collective security guarantee – Article 42/7 – that is very similar to Nato’s Article 5, that Ukraine needs to prevent a second invasion by Russia should the war stop. The idea was first suggested by US President Donald Trump as part of the 27-point peace plan (27PPP) agreed with the Kremlin at the Moscow meeting on December 3.

But it’s not going well. The government has been slow to pass several key reforms thanks to a simmering domestic political crisis and last year Ukraine was downgraded to a “B” in the annual EU accession progress report for backsliding, especially on anti-corruption reforms. This year has seen little progress and the EU has proposed to decouple Ukraine’s bid from that of Moldova, with which it had previously been twinned.

And Bankova has set a very ambitious schedule: close seven chapters by the end-2027 that would leave 26 of the 33 for the final 12 months before Ukraine’s own deadline – more than Moldova is scheduled to close next year –  and includes tough nuts like energy, agriculture and the rule of law chapters.

The Commission politely said it can’t be done. Moldova’s aim of closing talks by early 2028 is “ambitious but achievable, provided Moldova maintains the current pace of reforms”, the EC said. Ukraine got a sentence almost identical to the one in the 2025 communication: “The Ukrainian government has signalled its objective to close accession negotiations by the end of 2028. The Commission is committed to support this ambitious objective but considers that to meet it an acceleration of the pace of reforms is required.”

Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos called the same date “ambitious” but “possible” a year ago. Now even this optimistic formulation has disappeared. It speaks strongly of the unspoken disappointment in Ukraine’s willingness and political will to put through the deep and very sensitive reforms that are being demanded.

Moldova breaks ahead

Still, the EC communiqué still counts Ukraine among “the four frontrunners” with Moldova, Montenegro and Albania. Montenegro could close talks in December and Albania aims to finish by end-2027. Kos told the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee on November 4 that Montenegro is best placed to become the 28th member, Interfax-Ukraine reported.

EU countries have moved Kyiv and Chisinau in tandem since both applied in 2022, but that is set to end once the last two clusters open, the Kyiv Independent reported. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in June: “Each candidate country is responsible for itself.”

 Zelenskiy still resists a split. “Moldova and Ukraine are certainly stronger when we move forward on this track together,” he said after Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan visited Kyiv on October 26. “And it is important that we carry on together, because it is fair.”

Clusters to close

The Commission says Ukraine has met the conditions for cluster 4 (green agenda and connectivity) and cluster 5 (agriculture and cohesion) and urges member states to open them by the end of 2026.

Hungary withheld approval of the screening results on October 20, which also stopped Moldova. Budapest’s long quarrel over minority rights is with Kyiv rather than Chisinau, which gives Moldova’s backers their strongest practical argument for separating the bids. Foreign ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi said on October 30 that a Ukrainian-Hungarian intergovernmental commission would take up the block in November.

No chapter can close until the Council accepts the interim benchmark assessment report on the rule of law. Moldova launched a joint task force with the Commission in July, has made “very substantial progress” and is “well advanced”. Ukraine’s task force began only in October, with Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi chairing the Ukrainian side and about four months allowed for the work, according to the Kyiv Independent. The roadmap gives Kyiv until the first half of 2027.

Elephant in the room

The elephant in the room is the endemic corruption that has infected most of the government and stretches right into the presidential administration. In November, National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) began to release details of a $100mn kick back scheme as the Energoatom corruption scandal broke that has implicated most of Zelenskiy inner circle. Then Iryna Mudra, deputy head of the President’s Office, was arrested in August, charged with running a racketeering scheme from within the president’s office.

Zelenskiy has not been implicated, but the Ukrainian constitution bars Nabu from investigating a sitting president. However, he badly tarnished his war-hero image after he tried to gut Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms by ramming through a law last June that would put the anti-corruption organs under his direct control. The EU severely rebuked Bankova for this Law 21414, forcing Zelenskiy to backtrack rapidly.

The current EC report is politely scathing of the lack of progress made. It says ten priority reforms agreed on December 10, 2025 “remain mostly outstanding” and “limited progress” was made on the judiciary reforms. “Continued resistance” to internationally nominated experts in judge selection and vetting “is of concern”, and their role in choosing members of the bodies that select and discipline judges “needs to be urgently extended”. The procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, who is directly under the president’s control, must become “more transparent and merit-based”.

That last demand follows a scandal of September, when Ruslan Kravchenko resigned as prosecutor general during a National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) investigation, left the country and signed charges against the bureau’s director that his own office then revoked – yet another official in Zelenskiy immediate circle accused of corruption.

In stark contrast, all the Commission’s praise goes to the investigators at the twin anti-corruption bodies of Nabu, which is entirely independent from the whole government’s – at the IMF’s insistence when it was set up. It raised Ukraine’s anti-corruption grade from “some level of preparation” to between some and moderate, crediting NABU and the specialised prosecutor and the anti-corruption court.

The EC also pointed to the political crisis since the corruption scandals started where Zelenskiy is slowly losing control of his own Servant of the People (SOTP) party; the EC also said the slowdown in legislative decision-making “is a point of concern” and adds: “No laws were adopted to significantly advance the anti-corruption legal framework.”

Carthage case

NABU announced an end of the “Midas” pre-trial investigation, the nickname of the utilities scandal, but supplied fresh evidence on November 4, and announcing a new Operation Carthage case against an alleged criminal group that paid senior security, police and prosecution officials to protect scam call centres that operate out of Ukraine and generate an estimate $1bn a month.

The report also questions the UAH1.5bn ($33mn) of public money spent in 2026 on the wartime television telethon, “despite declining levels of public trust and outreach”, while public broadcaster Suspilne stays below its legal funding level.

Cash tied to reform progress

The written rebukes are mild but it’s a soft glove hiding a hard hand. The EC has tied continued funding of Ukraine’s budget to progress on reforms. Under the €90bn EU loan agreement approved in April, Bankova has received only about half of this year’s €45bn tranche. During his Ukraine independence speech Zelenskiy asked the EU for an addition $28bn to cover a budget short fall. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen immediately sent Ukraine €6.1bn to cover the gap, but said in a letter this years tranche would not be increased and if Bankova wanted more of that to be paid out, “do the reforms.”

Already desperately short of cash, budget money is tied to the same reforms. “It will be essential to further ensure sustained implementation in order to unlock available budget support,” the communication says, as only €19.8bn of the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan has been disbursed. Kyiv faces a $50bn-$55bn gap in external budget financing for 2027-2028 on IMF estimates, and EU leaders could discuss filling part of it at their November 26-27 summit.

Brussels will also open a “gradual integration dialogue” in the first quarter of 2027, with Ukraine’s priorities including the Single Euro Payments Area, which requires new anti-money-laundering law, and electricity market coupling. Kos told MEPs this would reinforce accession rather than replace it. Zelenskiy rejected “symbolic membership” at an EU summit in April.