South Africa’s impending exclusion from the African Growth & Opportunity Act (Agoa) has produced a familiar combination of diplomatic anxiety, alarming employment figures and speculation about which international partner might offer an alternative.
Last month’s Russia–Africa summit in Moscow supplied another occasion to discuss a changing world order. Both debates deserve attention, but neither should displace the central economic question: how does South Africa expand production, secure customers and translate its international relationships into investment and employment?
Agoa matters, particularly to businesses whose margins and customer relationships depend on preferential access. Losing it would damage some exporters and the communities around them. But the programme’s significance needs to be measured accurately.
According to the department of trade, industry & competition, about 10% of South African exports to the US entered under Agoa in 2025, compared with 28% in 2024. About 89% entered under ordinary trading terms, meaning Agoa exports represented about 1% of South Africa’s total worldwide exports.
These figures do not justify complacency. A relatively small national exposure can conceal acute local vulnerability. A packing facility or food processor cannot pay its workers with reassuring macroeconomic averages. Yet, the figures establish something essential: losing Agoa preferences would affect a particular, relatively small segment of trade. It would not terminate South Africa’s commercial relationship with the US, and it should not become the organising principle of the country’s entire economic diplomacy.
The broader trading picture deserves considerably more attention. South Africa recorded a merchandise trade surplus of R169bn in the first nine months of 2026, against R117.5bn in the corresponding period last year, an increase of about 44%, calculated from the South African Revenue Service totals. That is growth in the surplus, not in exports, and it does not establish that every productive sector is prospering.
However, it does challenge the impression that an economy’s external fortunes depend overwhelmingly on Washington’s preferences. In September alone exports to Africa reached R49.5bn, those to Asia R57.7bn and those to Europe R46bn, with all three increasing from August.
Monthly movements should not be inflated into claims about sustained annual expansion. Yet the scale of these markets illustrates the breadth of South Africa’s commercial relationships. The challenge is to deepen them, diversify the export basket and strengthen the infrastructure that allows firms to serve customers reliably.
Public discussion also needs to distinguish Agoa preferences from the separate tariffs the US imposes. Cars historically benefited substantially from Agoa. Now, the industry faces a separate 25% automotive tariff, a problem that cannot be reduced to Agoa eligibility. Meanwhile, major precious metal and mineral exports already enter duty-free under ordinary arrangements. Their treatment cannot simply be inferred from headlines announcing the withdrawal of African preferences.
For affected agricultural and manufactured products the relevant calculation is specific: what additional duty becomes payable, how much preference is being lost, and how readily can buyers substitute another supplier? Existing commercial relationships, seasonal supply patterns and product quality all matter. So do competing exporters’ tariff treatment and the ability of firms along the supply chain to absorb costs. These questions produce a more useful assessment than treating all exports as equally exposed.
Employment claims require similar discipline. The widely reported figure of about 47,000 jobs supported by Western Cape exports to the US describes employment associated with that trade, not potential job losses as some in the media are making believe. It does not mean a licence to forecast that those jobs will disappear after Agoa’s withdrawal.
Likewise, the citrus industry’s estimate of 35,000 farm-level jobs sustained by American sales measures exposure. It is speculative to claim that all those jobs are being threatened; the industry itself said it is too early to estimate actual losses.
Trade union federation Cosatu’s reported assessment of 3,000 likely losses, with 10,000 at the upper end, is a different kind of claim again. These numbers should neither be added together nor circulated as interchangeable predictions. Their assumptions need examination. The reported 41% decline in Western Cape exports to the US covers the rolling year to July 2026, before the withdrawal scheduled for January 2027. It demonstrates existing pressure; it cannot establish the additional effect of a measure that has yet to take effect.
None of this diminishes the importance of protecting workers. It makes accurate diagnosis more urgent. Assistance should target firms with demonstrable exposure, viable orders and a credible route to retaining customers or finding new ones. Logistics, certification, trade finance and market development deserve attention. Generalised alarm is a poor guide to allocating scarce public resources.
Tariffs themselves do not automatically extinguish trade. American importers pay the duty at the border, and research on the 2025 tariffs finds that American importers and consumers bear almost all of the cost. South African exporters may still face demands for discounts, narrower margins or reduced orders. Buyers can switch suppliers. But established demand can also sustain trade at higher prices. Predictions of disappearing exports overlook the costs that Washington imposes on its own economy.
The Democratic gains in the US midterm elections offer a diplomatic opening. They create opportunities for South Africa to seek a more sympathetic congressional hearing and make a commercial case for repairing relations. They do not automatically reverse presidential decisions.
Congress created Agoa while delegating country eligibility decisions to the executive. Nor does a change in congressional control immediately eliminate the other tariff barriers South African businesses face.
South Africa should therefore engage Washington persistently, presenting the relationship through mutual economic interests. American firms, industrial supply chains and buyers also benefit from South African production. More predictable arrangements are worth pursuing, though negotiating a reciprocal agreement would require time and concessions. Diplomacy should seek workable terms while businesses continue expanding their options elsewhere.
Russia belongs within that broader search for partners. However, its ambitions should be assessed against its economic weight. Moscow puts its trade with Africa at about $27bn in 2025. China’s trade with the continent reached $348bn that year, roughly 13 times the Russian figure. Russia also remained below the $40bn target announced in 2019. Claims that it is positioning itself as Africa’s premier trading partner far outstrip its demonstrated performance.
Russia does offer substantial grain and fertiliser supplies, alongside energy technology, mining investment and security co-operation. Dismissing those activities would weaken any serious critique. The question is whether Moscow can provide the breadth of finance, investment, technology and market access required to support African economic transformation. Its record gives ample grounds for scepticism.
Yet, the summit serves political purposes. Moscow demonstrates that it retains international partners; African governments cultivate alternatives and bargaining room. Those governments have their own interests and calculations. Attending a summit can be an exercise of agency. Its economic value depends on what follows.
South Africa should judge every partnership by the same practical standards: financing committed, projects implemented, local suppliers contracted, skills transferred and export opportunities secured. That requires following agreements beyond the photograph and publishing evidence of delivery.
Diplomatic autonomy becomes more durable when firms can choose among customers, workers have productive employment and the state can negotiate from a stronger economic base. Expanding that base should command more attention than either the anxiety surrounding Agoa or the promises accompanying another summit.
• Lopes, a former executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, is an honorary professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town.
Business Day