Europe is investing in the green industries of tomorrow while people protest over the cost of living, jobs and inequality today. In recent weeks, hundreds of thousands of protesters across France brought grievances over public services, wages and rising inequality onto the streets. Meanwhile in Germany, Volkswagen workers have threatened strikes from January 2027 over cancelled wage agreements amid proposed job cuts and plant closures. Taken by themselves, these are separate movements. But they point to a common problem: people are being asked to trust economic transformation without confidence that its costs will be shared fairly.

The European Union’s Clean Industrial Deal promises to turn decarbonisation into a source of competitiveness. Its 2025 state-aid framework gives governments more room for investment, including in clean manufacturing and energy-intensive industries. This intervention is necessary. But mobilising public money to create new industries is only one part of the equation. Another question is who is ultimately responsible for the people – the workers, suppliers or communities – that lose out in the transition?

This is not a secondary question of welfare, but the central political test of industrial policy. Public support should come with enforceable commitments to retraining, supplier development and regional investment. And the people bearing the costs of transformation should have a say in how its benefits are shared.

The unequal bargain

Industrial transformation has never been without cost. A new plant can create skilled jobs while an older facility closes; a competitive producer can grow while its suppliers disappear. The injustice is not that every existing job cannot be preserved. It is that the state deliberately shares the risks of creating winners but leaves many losses to be absorbed privately, by households, municipalities and workers with the least bargaining power.

The car industry offers a good example of what is at stake. The shift towards electric vehicles is reshaping production, while European manufacturers face fierce international competition and high energy costs. Corporate decisions about where to invest, which plants to close and how to organise production also shape where jobs are lost and which communities bear the costs.

When a factory closes, the consequences extend far beyond its workforce. Suppliers lose contracts, local businesses lose customers and municipalities lose tax revenue. Apprenticeships disappear, skills go unused and young people have fewer reasons to stay. Smaller suppliers may struggle to finance the upgrades needed to join new value chains. A region can lose the economic foundations on which its future depends. These costs are often concentrated in particular places, while the benefits of industrial investment are spread across the economy.

Governments cannot expect people to embrace policies on the strength of projected economic gains alone.

The point is not to preserve every existing job. Industrial change inevitably reshapes production. The problem is that governments share the risks of investment with companies without demanding enough in return for the workers and places bearing the costs. Firms receive support to build the industries of the future; the people affected by restructuring are left to navigate the consequences through separate employment schemes, retraining programmes and regional funds.

That is an incomplete industrial strategy.

Farmers protesting against the EU-Mercosur trade agreement raise a related concern. Their objections to import competition, production standards and the future of their livelihoods cannot simply be dismissed as resistance to reform. Nor do all their demands warrant acceptance. But governments cannot expect people to embrace policies on the strength of projected economic gains alone.

Protests are therefore neither proof that reform is wrong nor noise to be managed until investment resumes. They reveal where official accounts of progress collide with lived experience. They also show why those affected by major decisions need a voice before the decisions are made. Workers understand how production works, suppliers know where local capabilities are lacking, and municipalities can identify the infrastructure needed to attract new industries. Governments and investors miss crucial information when they consult these groups only after announcing a closure or subsidy agreement.

Participation should therefore be part of industrial policy from the beginning. It is a way to improve decisions and negotiate the distribution of costs, not a right to block every investment.

Public money should carry public obligations

Europe already has transition funds, employment programmes and commitments to quality jobs. The weakness is structural: these measures too often operate alongside the core bargain between the state and the subsidised firm, rather than forming part of the deal itself. A separate retraining programme cannot compensate for an industrial agreement that gives the recipient little responsibility for local adjustment.

The organising principle should be straightforward: public industrial support must carry enforceable social obligations. Before receiving substantial subsidies, companies should publish negotiated transition plans identifying retraining opportunities, pathways into new jobs, support for suppliers and commitments to regional investment.

Worker representatives, local authorities and relevant suppliers should help design these plans before major restructuring decisions are finalised, not simply be briefed afterwards. The obligations should be proportionate to the scale of public support and the risks involved. Not every project can guarantee employment indefinitely. But firms can be required to disclose restructuring risks, fund transferable skills, provide meaningful consultation, support suppliers in upgrading their production and report against agreed milestones. Payments could be staged against delivery, with clawbacks for serious breaches. Where a closure cannot be avoided, negotiated transition agreements should begin before the last production line stops.

Governments that can mobilise investment but cannot negotiate its social consequences will struggle to sustain reform.

This is participatory industrial policy, not an invitation to veto every investment. It also recognises that companies do not operate in isolation: they depend on publicly funded infrastructure, skilled workers, local suppliers and communities that sustain industrial production. Participation improves policy design precisely because it exposes costs that investors and central ministries may otherwise overlook.

The challenge extends beyond the green transition. Artificial intelligence is reorganising work while climate shocks threaten homes, agriculture and infrastructure. These forces do not automatically produce unrest; they magnify inequalities and institutional weaknesses already present. Governments that can mobilise investment but cannot negotiate its social consequences will struggle to sustain reform.

Europe does not need to promise a transition without losers. It needs to stop treating the people who lose out as an afterthought. Industrial policy should include the ability to anticipate loss, distribute adjustment costs, hear dissent and correct decisions. Call this social repair: not compensation after damage is done, but the institutional work of keeping people economically and politically included during transformation.

If Europe wants society to underwrite the industries of tomorrow, it must give workers and communities a stake in building them.