With nearly 20 world leaders gathering in Manila for the 49th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits, United States (US) President Donald Trump may well be the biggest attraction in town, but the real spectacle will be whether anyone has the guts to grill him over the Iran war and its costly global fallout.
After suffering a political setback in the US midterm elections, will Trump now face a diplomatic drubbing in Manila, or will world leaders once again roll out the red carpet, exchange carefully choreographed handshakes, swallow their grievances, and mistake diplomatic niceties for political courage? Manila should deliver more than ceremonial fireworks and summit photo-ops; it is time for some uncomfortable questions, a few hard truths, and—hopefully—enough diplomatic backbone to make the summit venue hotter than the Middle East geopolitical crisis.
Notably, the US-Israel-Iran war has laid bare some ASEAN countries’ catastrophic exposure to geopolitical shocks, with the Philippines suffering one of the region’s harshest double blows: tightening oil supplies and skyrocketing prices.
If ASEAN leaders are serious about defending their people and economies, they must summon the courage to confront Trump over the devastating blowback of the Middle East crisis—from disrupted energy supplies to inflation that has been squeezing businesses and ordinary households across the region.
If these regional leaders choose silence over confrontation, they will only reinforce the dangerous notion that powerful nations can wage wars and redraw geopolitical fault lines at will, while smaller economies are left to bear the economic wreckage, absorb the energy shocks, and make their ordinary citizens pay for someone else’s military adventures.
Same old deals for a new world of troubles
As laid down by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), part of the summit agenda will center on energy, including calls to speed up ratification of the updated ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement (APSA), which likewise proposes the creation of a regional oil stockpile.
The Philippines is similarly pushing ahead with the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) initiative, which seeks to link member states’ electricity networks and enable cross-border power sharing.
The ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, in particular, is hardly a new initiative. It is a 40-year undertaking first signed in Manila on June 24, 1986, modernized in Thailand in March 2009 to replace the original pact, and brought into force in 2013.
That petroleum security pact was extended until 2025, and prior to its expiration last December, ASEAN members signed a new Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security in Malaysia in October last year.
After four decades of extensions, revisions, and renewed signatures, will ASEAN finally turn this petroleum agreement into a credible line of defense against the next oil supply crisis, or will energy security remain trapped in an endless cycle of promises?
Meanwhile, the ASEAN Power Grid is already nearly three decades old as an idea. First enshrined in the ASEAN Vision 2020 and adopted in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, its prolonged journey from vision to reality remains a lingering uncertainty.
It was in August 2007, under Singapore’s chairmanship, that ASEAN leaders formally cemented the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the APG, which took effect in 2009. When its original 15-year mandate expired in 2023, it was also extended until December 2025.
Then, at last year’s ASEAN Summit in Malaysia, leaders signed an enhanced version of the ASEAN Power Grid covenant, injecting fresh momentum into a roughly 30-year-old ambition.
As this year’s ASEAN chair and host, the Philippines must demonstrate it can do more than inherit Malaysia’s energy agenda, recycle its commitments, and pass the unfinished work on to Singapore as the next chair.
Grid connectivity hurdles
Nevertheless, the hard reality is that the ASEAN Power Grid faces formidable obstacles: billions of dollars in infrastructure costs, fragmented national regulations and technical standards, and competing domestic priorities that could push governments to hoard electricity rather than share it when shortages strike. In the truest sense, this exposes the gap between ASEAN’s rhetoric of regional solidarity and the political realities of energy security.
The financial burden alone is staggering, with the International Energy Agency (IEA) projecting roughly $27 billion in investments for the targeted power grid integration through 2040.
The toughest battle also goes beyond capital-raising. ASEAN governments must address politically thorny issues of pricing, ownership, and cost-sharing, because connecting power grids demands more than cables and billions; it requires the political courage to share the costs, distribute the benefits, and shoulder the risks.
Structurally, Laos stands to be a major winner of the ASEAN Power Grid, turning its vast hydropower resources into a lucrative export engine by supplying neighbors such as Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam—and essentially recasting its strategic position as a regional energy supplier.
The ASEAN Power Grid could similarly turn Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia into a tightly interconnected electricity market, allowing power to flow across borders through high-voltage lines and subsea cables and transforming national energy resources into a shared regional asset rather than isolated reserves.
Conversely, the Philippines faces an uphill battle in joining the ASEAN Power Grid. Its archipelagic geography requires connecting with regional neighbors via costly subsea cables, complex undersea infrastructure, and sophisticated transmission systems—making its goal of cross-border electricity trading not just an engineering challenge, but a potentially expensive exercise in overcoming geography itself.
Additionally, the Philippines risks turning regional power integration into a permanent lifeline for its own energy failures, relying on neighboring countries to constantly plug its recurring supply gaps.
In a neighborhood analogy, the Philippines risks becoming that perennial electricity beggar constantly knocking on other people’s doors for power while failing to properly manage its own resources, fix its dysfunctional household, and get its energy affairs in order. Eventually, even the most generous neighbors will question how long they should keep the lights on for an energy-insecure counterpart that refuses to fix the wiring at home.
The past Duterte administration already explored connecting the Philippines to the ASEAN Power Grid through Palawan, but the proposal faces a daunting combination of enormous financing requirements and formidable engineering obstacles. This puts critical concerns on the table: whether the billions poured into subsea connections and transmission infrastructure would ever generate returns commensurate with the massive capital investment, or simply become another expensive energy ambition crippled by geography and economics.
The recent gas dispute between Singapore and Indonesia also offers a sobering reality check. Indonesia’s decision to slash pipeline gas exports to Singapore—citing the need to prioritize domestic electricity demand—shows that when national energy security is threatened, even close ASEAN neighbors can turn off the tap and leave regional solidarity playing second fiddle to domestic survival.
That tension is not new. The Singapore-Indonesia gas relationship has long been held hostage to the shifting tides of Indonesian energy nationalism, where export commitments are repeatedly subordinated to domestic imperatives, volumes become bargaining chips, and even decades of contractual assurances offer little protection against the hardening calculus of national interest.
Therefore, ASEAN’s credibility regarding these targeted regional energy agreements will ultimately be judged not by the eloquence of its declarations or the ambition of its energy blueprints, but by whether it can enforce commitments, mobilize real financing, and accelerate collective action—especially when supply disruptions strike.
Regional oil stockpile: solidarity or strategic illusion?
The Philippines is keenly positioning itself as host to ASEAN’s proposed regional oil stockpile, but declaring its willingness may be the easy part. The real battle is convincing its neighbors that it has the strategic location, institutional credibility, energy infrastructure, and policy stability to safeguard a regional lifeline that every member may need, yet not everyone may trust it to manage.
Manila may be selling geography as its strongest strategic asset, but proximity to ASEAN capitals and promises of available tank-farm sites are no substitute for operational readiness.
Until the proposal moves beyond diplomatic pitches and preliminary studies into demonstrable infrastructure, institutional capacity, and credible execution, the Philippines is offering nothing more than strategically located sites dressed up as regional energy leadership.
For now, the Philippines is free to dream of becoming ASEAN’s oil security hub, but ambition alone cannot compensate for its own glaring vulnerabilities. Its response to the Middle East crisis exposed how menacingly close the country came to an oil supply crunch amid the US-Israel-Iran conflict—inherently raising serious doubts about its ability to safeguard regional reserves when it cannot even reliably secure its own energy supply artery.
It was at this year’s ASEAN Summit in Cebu where regional leaders restated goals for a regional petroleum safety net that can keep supplies flowing, reduce dependence on external sources, and shield member economies from sudden price spikes and supply disruptions.
However, turning a proposed regional stockpile into an effective emergency mechanism faces significant hurdles: assistance is voluntary and commercially negotiated, while most member states have limited surplus supplies to share when a crisis affects the entire region.
Compounding such dilemmas are conflicting national energy policies, unequal stockpiling capacities, financing constraints, and domestic political pressures—all of which could push governments to protect their own consumers and industries first rather than release precious fuel to neighbors.
Even this early, some regional energy experts question the Philippines’ suitability to host the ASEAN Regional Oil Stockpile, arguing that its own energy security vulnerabilities, geographic distance from several ASEAN neighbors, and record of shifting oil sector policies make it a questionable choice to serve as the region’s strategic petroleum guardian.
Policy flip-flops and shifting political priorities erode investor confidence, derail long-term infrastructure plans, and expose the grave risks of placing a regional energy anchor in the hands of a government whose commitments shift with every change in the political winds.
Aggravating that is the tendency to treat the Department of Energy (DOE) as a political reward system rather than a command center for technical expertise. That ignites considerable skepticism about institutional competence, because a strategic regional oil stockpile cannot be managed through political patronage, revolving-door appointments, and loyalty-driven leadership; it demands seasoned professionals, policy discipline, and institutional credibility that can withstand changes in government.
Taken together, these weaknesses make the Philippines’ bid a hard sell: it must first prove it can keep its own energy house from catching fire before volunteering to become ASEAN’s regional fire station, as no neighbor in its right mind would hand over the keys to its strategic oil reserves to a country still struggling to keep its own fuel tanks full.