Polish President Karol Nawrocki on Nov. 13 vetoed the second DSA bill, halting for now a system that would have forced Polish internet providers to remove a listed domain from their DNS servers within 48 hours of its entry in a state domain register. The veto matters to anyone who uses a Polish ISP, runs a site reached in Poland, or posts on a platform, because the bill’s blocking tool acts on a whole domain rather than a single page.

The Sejm needs a three-fifths majority to override, and the governing coalition has missed that mark before: on Sept. 17 it got 232 votes against 259 needed on a different vetoed law, falling 27 short. Poland Insight also covered it as a veto of an online content blocking law.

How the Vetoed Register Would Turn One Decision Into a DNS Blackout

Print 2693, the bill as introduced, would have let the president of the telecom regulator UKE keep a machine-readable register of domains. A domain could be listed only where no other effective means exist to enforce a blocking decision on illegal content. Operators would then have to remove the domain within 48 hours, free of charge, and redirect visitors to a UKE notice page. If the national media council KRRiT issued the decision, UKE would add the domain within three working days of notification.

The design resembles Poland’s existing register of illegal gambling domains, where providers must also disable access within 48 hours and redirect users to a Finance Ministry warning page under Gambling Act Art. 15f.

DNS blocking is blunt in two directions. It affects every page on a listed domain, and users can bypass it: in 2022 a VPN bypassed an ABW block that Polish tech press tested after the security agency ordered a DNS-level block.

Who Decides, How Fast, and Who Can Object

The print set deadlines of 7 days for a UKE decision after the uploader’s response window, 2 days where Police or a prosecutor applied, and 21 days in especially complex cases. Uploaders would have had 2 days to answer a notice. Affected parties would have had 14 days to file an objection, which goes to an ordinary court, with no appeal against the decision itself.

Immediate enforceability applied only to content under four Criminal Code provisions, Arts. 200 §3 and 5, 200a and 200b, which cover offenses involving minors.

Print 2693 Did Not Say Outright That an Objection Suspends a Block

The print’s text does not expressly state that an objection suspends enforcement. It says only that decisions are not immediately enforceable apart from the exceptions above. The consultation report refers to a suspension rule, Art. 11q ust. 5, that does not appear in this version of the print. The Senate amended the bill after the print was introduced, so the final text may differ from what is described here.

The European Court of Human Rights issued four 2020 judgments against Russia on June 23 (Kharitonov, OOO Flavus, Bulgakov and Engels). It described wholesale website blocking as an extreme measure comparable to banning a newspaper and said blocking by IP address extends beyond illegal content. Those cases concerned IP and website blocking, not DNS. Poland’s Ombudsman has also raised the issue: in August 2022 the office sent the prime minister the Ombudsman’s August 2022 letter on blocking of internet pages.

Why Nawrocki and the Government Read the Same Mechanism Differently

Nawrocki said, according to Reuters, that deciding whether content is a crime is “solely the role of independent courts.” His January veto of the first bill rested on a charge of administrative censorship. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said then that the veto blocked tools against online child abuse and Russian disinformation. Katarzyna Szymielewicz of the Panoptykon Foundation called the veto non-substantive.

Industry voices were not uniformly comfortable with the blocking design either. The Polish Information Processing Society (PTI), an IT professional body, rated the register highly invasive in its opinion on the draft and asked that the register and the 48-hour duty be limited to a last resort.

What Still Works After the Veto

The first implementing law, signed on Sept. 25, makes the UKE president Poland’s Digital Services Coordinator. The DSA itself has applied directly across the EU since Feb. 17, 2024, and DSA Article 9 lets judicial or administrative authorities order action against illegal content. The vetoed bill supplied the domestic procedure for those orders. Deputy Digital Affairs Minister Dariusz Standerski said the second law would add a rapid-response procedure and extra appeals.

Separately, the EU Terrorist Content Online Regulation already requires a one-hour removal rule for flagged terrorist content, a rule the print kept out of its scope through its Art. 11e exclusion.

Can the Sejm Override the Veto of the Second DSA Bill?

Under Constitution Article 122(5), an override needs three fifths of votes cast with at least half of deputies present. On Sept. 4 an override of the crypto-asset law veto drew 241 votes against 266 needed and fell 25 votes short, with PiS, Rozwój Plus and Konfederacja voting against. Reuters reported the president has now vetoed 48 government bills. The government can submit another text; Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said it will draft another bill.

Decision Summary for Readers Outside Poland

Poland has a regulator but no domestic procedure for DSA blocking orders. Operators face no new 48-hour DNS duty and domain owners face no register, while users lack the second law’s rapid-response procedure and extra appeal paths. If a version returns, check three things in its text: whether a domain-level block is a last resort, whether an objection suspends enforcement, and who can see the register.

Frequently Asked QuestionsWhat does Poland’s DSA veto mean for internet users?

Polish users get no new state domain-blocking register for now, and no second-law rapid-response route to challenge moderation decisions. The EU Digital Services Act still applies directly across the EU.

How would the vetoed DNS blocking have worked?

UKE would list a domain, and internet providers would have to stop resolving it within 48 hours and send visitors to a UKE notice. Users can bypass such blocks with a VPN, as a 2022 test showed.

Would an override restore a safeguard against wrongful blocks?

Not necessarily. The print does not expressly say an objection suspends enforcement, and its court objection within 14 days is the route it provides.

Can the Sejm still override the veto?

It needs three fifths of votes cast, and recent override attempts on other vetoed laws fell 27 votes short on Sept. 17 and 25 short on Sept. 4.