Countries build their military strategies around several changing factors, including their domestic capabilities and the challenges posed by their strategic environment. They must constantly assess both to prepare for unexpected developments that could threaten their security and interests. These assessments, whether public or confidential, gradually shape foreign policy and introduce new priorities and strategic features.

Changing a country’s overall strategic direction is difficult and costly. States make such a shift only when circumstances leave them little choice. Egypt, for example, needed the defeat of 1967, the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the arrival of Anwar Sadat before abandoning its pan-Arab, anti-Israel orientation and signing the Camp David Accords. Iran, too, needed a major revolution to break away from its dependence on the Western bloc and adopt neutrality under the slogan “Neither East nor West,” which still adorns the entrance to its Foreign Ministry.

Such transformations do not take place within strategic circles alone. They also require public acceptance, or at least an absence of opposition, as society comes to understand the reasons behind the change.

The wars against Iran in June 2025 and February 2026 can be seen as major turning points, creating pressure for a change in the country’s strategic direction and military doctrine. For decades, Tehran adhered to a defensive doctrine based on retaliation and deterrence, seeking to avoid an all-out war. This approach led it to develop military capabilities designed to deter its adversaries.

The doctrine emerged from Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq and the strategic debates that followed. Two principles shaped Iranian foreign policy for the next four decades. First, Iran had to avoid a large-scale war by every possible means. Second, to achieve that goal, it had to develop its weapons domestically to ensure effective deterrence.

Iran repeatedly avoided escalation after attacks targeted its leaders in Iraq and Syria and its scientists at home. But this policy gradually eroded its deterrence. Its adversaries interpreted every Iranian retreat as an opportunity to advance, eventually launching two wars against the country.

Iran therefore faced the very scenario its military doctrine had sought to prevent. Yet the gradual escalation by Israel and the US gave Tehran time to address weaknesses and prepare for a costly confrontation for its adversaries during the 40-day war.

It eventually crossed a major red line by directly targeting US forces and military capabilities. In doing so, Israel and the US inadvertently helped Iran and its strategic establishment break free from a military doctrine that had confined the country to defense and retaliation, leaving little room for initiative.

The attacks also gave Iran’s new leadership a clearer incentive and greater room to develop a new military doctrine. This may prove to be the most significant outcome of the 40-day war.

Tehran had done everything possible, in line with its military doctrine and economic priorities, to prevent war. This effort shaped public perceptions of the conflict. Iranians watched their leaders pursue negotiations until the last moment in an effort to avoid confrontation. Yet war came anyway.

One consequence was a rallying around the national flag, despite reservations about the government’s economic policies. This public cohesion is essential in wartime. Had Iranian society fractured, as Israel and the US had hoped, the country’s combat readiness would have suffered and a significant part of its defensive capabilities would have been diverted. The aggressors openly spoke of bringing the battle to the streets as part of their war strategy.

Public solidarity helped Iran withstand the fighting. It also provided legitimacy for a shift away from its defensive doctrine. This transformation has become a subject of public debate and a central issue in strategic discussions. The domestic conditions for change were therefore in place as soon as the war began. Despite continuing economic concerns, the public increasingly accepted a change in foreign policy and military doctrine as a priority.

Tehran has now begun taking steps toward a new military doctrine, one that requires a different approach to its adversaries and their regional presence. Its emerging strategy can be summed up in three areas, namely the Strait of Hormuz, its missile and other defense programs, and its nuclear program.

In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has intensified efforts to block passage it has not authorized. Environmental and security concerns that previously constrained its responses have become less important, while attacks designed to disrupt shipping have increased. Ships operating under the protection of the US Central Command now face the risk of being put out of service for months. Such escalation would have been unlikely had Washington not abandoned its commitments and attempted to impose a new reality. Instead of accepting that reality, Iran is seeking to impose one on its adversaries.

This emerging doctrine indicates a broader change in foreign policy. Any direct or indirect action against Iran and its allies, including facilitating or supporting attacks against them, will carry a strategic cost.

On the missile front, Iran held military exercises for weeks in October and November. Tehran then announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the 2,000-kilometer range limit on its missiles. Major General Mohsen Rezaei warned that US bases outside the region would become targets if Iran faced another attack.

Iranian military discussions have also repeatedly singled out certain European countries for their role in the previous war, including their decision to open bases and provide logistical support to US aircraft. Tehran’s announcement means that participation in an attack on Iran will carry consequences, regardless of geographical distance.

On the nuclear front, Iran has refused to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities. It has maintained the ambiguity surrounding its program since Israel and the US attacked it in June 2025. Tehran argues that no inspection protocol exists for nuclear facilities that have been bombed, particularly while the threat of further attacks remains.

The issue has become increasingly difficult for Washington as calls for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons gain support among both the public and the country’s elite. The latest example came from the Assembly of Experts, which recommended changing Iran’s military doctrine and withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In these circumstances, Tehran refuses to discuss its nuclear program until Washington meets its conditions. Iran regards these demands as conditions for surrender, which it sees as a prerequisite for any subsequent “negotiations” over its nuclear activities.

Taking into consideration the military preparations that have continued since April, Iran’s Supreme Leader has now given the switch in military doctrine a clearer framework, calling for a transition from retaliation to initiative. He has instructed officials to end the state of neither war nor peace between Iran and the US.

The central objective is to end the blockade imposed on Iran. When this directive is considered alongside Tehran’s insistence on its seven conditions, and Washington’s difficulty in accepting them, it points to an Iranian initiative to break the military blockade.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has reportedly said that breaking the US blockade is worth fighting an all-out war for. General Mohsen Rezaei has described the blockade as an act of war that Tehran will break by force.

This reflects a new military doctrine and a different approach to confrontation. For decades, Iran endured sanctions without taking direct action against Washington. Now it has closed the Strait of Hormuz and contributed to Trump’s electoral defeat, despite the risk of war. Before that, it had drawn a red line around Beirut’s southern suburbs, which it is likely to extend to South Lebanon in future fighting. It also responded with missile strikes to an Israeli attack despite the possibility of renewed war.

Today, Iran has identified the blockade as a military objective. Its Supreme Leader is telling the country’s military commanders that they must “achieve their objectives” in the next war, rather than simply retaliate as Tehran has traditionally done.

This emerging doctrine indicates a broader change in foreign policy. Any direct or indirect action against Iran and its allies, including facilitating or supporting attacks against them, will carry a strategic cost. The aim is to weaken adversaries while strengthening the capabilities of resistance forces across the region.

The shift has gained public acceptance at home, while Iranian political and military elites are calling for a more carefully defined doctrine backed by greater capabilities.

This is an edited translation of an article originally published in Arabic.