U.S. Navy MQ-8 Firescout.
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Deven Leigh Ellis/Released
Questions for Future Examination
Even as the United States and other countries continue to employ UAS in new and innovative ways, the degree of international agreement about how, where, and the purpose for which they are used is being established in real time, often by local commanders. Identifying current and emerging challenges and beginning discussions of those issues now, before divergent understandings of appropriate behavior are played out at a tactical level, will require asking difficult questions and establishing boundaries in ways that may be constraining for states seeking to maximize their own military advantages.
Important questions for future examination that emerged from this research include:
How can norms and laws for unmanned aircraft be adopted by—or at least harmonized with—the much less well-developed body of work on unmanned maritime vessels?Should international law recognize a lower threshold for the employment of force against a UAS than a manned platform?What is a proportionate response if an adversary uses a UAS to conduct reconnaissance in another country’s sovereign airspace, to cause physical destruction of facilities with no loss of life, or to cause physical destruction and loss of life?What is a proportionate response to an attack on a UAS? Does it depend on the type of mission the UAS was conducting?It is currently relatively straightforward to identify whether a platform is manned or unmanned. What are the appropriate rules of engagement for optionally manned platforms?
Conclusion
The low cost, ease of use, and lower risk to operators suggests that the proliferation of UAS capabilities will continue. As additional actors employ UAS platforms with different objectives and risk tolerances, the role for UAS in managing escalation (whether to dominate or to de-escalate) will continue to evolve. Policymakers and military leaders in the United States and other governments do not yet have a shared understanding for how UAS employment affects crisis and conflict escalation. The possibility of a gap between the intended signal and interpretation of that signal leaves room for unintended consequences. However, short of greater U.S. leadership to establish and codify norms of employment, the gap is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.
Expert Vignettes
To assess these and other questions, this study developed four brief hypothetical vignettes to focus a discussion by experts on how UAS might be employed in conflict areas and how U.S. policymakers and military commanders make escalation and signaling decisions. Throughout the discussion, most participants began their comments by indicating that UAS and manned platforms would be operated and regarded in the same way—aligned with U.S. policy. However, as the discussion explored the questions in greater depth, distinctions became apparent both in how the participants believed UAS would be employed and in how U.S. commanders would be likely to respond to potentially threatening UAS approaches to U.S. facilities or platforms.
Vignette 1: Operating in foreign airspace with permission and potential hostiles are present (e.g. Afghanistan)
A U.S. aircraft is ordered to conduct a mission in a country, such as Afghanistan, where the United States has received explicit agreement to operate airborne ISR and strike platforms for ongoing missions. The aircraft departs from an airfield in a nearby country and enters Afghanistan’s airspace. The platform is being used to monitor potential targets and, if appropriate, to strike. The potential targets are aware they may be monitored or attacked and are taking precautions. It is also believed that they are seeking to develop or acquire counter-air measures such as man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to provide an increased level of defense.
Vignette 2: Entering foreign airspace without permission and without the foreign country’s capability to respond (e.g. Mali)
France has been involved in a weeks-long, ground-based, counterterrorist campaign in an African country at the invitation of the host government. France’s success in the first few days has receded to a much more complicated game of cat and mouse as the terrorist organization quickly recalibrated its tactics, techniques, and procedures to avoid being detected or engaging French forces. Instead, the adversary moved to traditional guerilla tactics, massing for attacks and quickly dispersing to limit the ability of French forces to engage. Earlier today, the commander of the French force called the U.S. AFRICOM Commander to request ISR and strike support for a unit pinned down by terrorists. The terrorist units have shot down two French helicopters sent in to extract the pinned-down unit. It is unclear whether the terrorists used small arms or anti-aircraft weapons to bring down the French helicopters. The AFRICOM Commander has manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft available and needs to present a recommendation to the secretary of defense as to whether and how to respond.
Vignette 3: Entering disputed international airspace near a foreign power with the capability and capacity to respond (e.g. East China Sea reconnaissance)
The United States continues to conduct regular surveillance and reconnaissance patrols throughout the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The United States maintains its position that under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea all waters and airspace beyond territorial waters (12 nm) are international waters. China asserts a position that all waters and airspace out to 200 nm are sovereign, aligning its position with the limits of exclusive economic zones. China’s establishment of military facilities on landing strips created in the South China Sea—and China’s expectation that it now has sovereignty over contiguous airspace and waters—expands the areas where a U.S.-China confrontation could occur. China is increasing patrols by its navy and air force along all of its claimed waters in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and the United States intends to continue conducting freedom of flight and freedom of navigation exercises in the area.
Vignette 4: Entering foreign airspace without permission and the foreign country has the capability to respond (e.g. Iran, Pakistan)
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has taken a turn for the worse. The United States has conducted strikes from unmanned platforms against terrorists in Pakistan for many years. While this has created tensions, the relationship was generally on an even course. Recently, however, a strike resulted in the deaths of over 25 people gathered for a wedding, including a cousin of Pakistan’s chief of the army staff. Media attention and public outcry were nearly instantaneous.
The prime minister announced that the United States’ violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty must stop, and that future attempts by the United States to strike individuals within Pakistan would be met with force. In a diplomatic note, Pakistan’s foreign ministry indicated that the United States could continue to use Pakistan’s airspace for transit to and from Afghanistan, but that any use of weapons on individuals within Pakistan would result in Pakistan targeting the U.S. platform and the suspension of overflight access.
The commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan has credible evidence that a group of terrorists is organizing in the border region, though deliberately on the Pakistan side of the border, to conduct attacks against U.S. bases in Afghanistan.
John Schaus is a fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kaitlyn Johnson is a research associate with the CSIS Aerospace Security Project.
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