An organization that fights in one country, reorganizes in another and finances its operations through economic activities spanning both territories poses a challenge that no defense ministry could address on its own. This is essentially the situation of the National Liberation Army (ELN) along the roughly 2,200-kilometer Colombian-Venezuelan border, where guerrilla groups, dissident factions, fragmented state authorities and highly profitable illicit markets converge, according to the International Crisis Group.

The offensive launched in Catatumbo in January 2025 provides an unavoidable starting point. On March 20 of that year, United Nations experts warned that clashes between the ELN and Frente 33 had displaced more than 56,000 people and left another 27,000 confined to their communities. They also reported allegations of executions, disappearances, sexual violence and child recruitment. Human Rights Watch documented that more than 56,500 people—14% of the subregion’s population—had been displaced, making it the largest episode recorded since official statistics began in 1997. Reuters reported similar figures and confirmed that the escalation coincided with the suspension of peace negotiations between Gustavo Petro’s government and the ELN.

These events describe a symptom. The underlying question is different and more uncomfortable: how can a state contain or negotiate with an organization whose territorial reach, mobility and financing no longer depend exclusively on its own territory?

What kind of organization is the ELN?

The ELN does not operate like a drug cartel or a conventional mafia concerned solely with maximizing illicit profits. It retains an insurgent identity, declared political objectives, hierarchical military structures and mechanisms of social control over the communities where it operates, while also maintaining varying degrees of involvement in criminal economies, according to InSight Crime.

Its involvement in drug trafficking, illegal mining and extortion has not erased its political dimension. The two layers have overlapped and reinforced one another to varying degrees, depending on the front and the territory, making it necessary to avoid treating the group as a homogeneous entity. The ELN also operates in a relatively decentralized manner: its fronts retain considerable autonomy, with direct practical consequences for any negotiation process. An agreement signed by the national leadership does not automatically guarantee compliance on the ground.

In this context, the ELN’s expansion into Venezuelan territory can be understood through three converging processes. The first is the historical movement of the group’s structures into border areas, which predates even the 2016 peace agreement. The second involves the territorial opportunities that emerged after the FARC’s demobilization, when large areas of rural territory were left partially without armed control. The third is the gradual consolidation of corridors, a presence and relationships with local actors inside Venezuela, particularly in the states of Apure and Amazonas.

The ELN’s presence in Venezuela is nothing new. What truly matters for public policy design is the specific role that Venezuelan territory plays in the group’s organizational model. International Crisis Group details these functions: mobility, refuge and reorganization, connections between economic enclaves, access to illicit markets, evasion of Colombian military operations and direct ties with Venezuelan communities and local authorities.

The group’s relationship with the Venezuelan state does not follow a single pattern. In some territories, there appears to be cooperation or, at the very least, tolerance. In others, confrontation has been direct. Apure demonstrated this in 2021, when Venezuela launched a military operation against a FARC dissident faction, ultimately driving hundreds of families into Colombian territory. Once again, the border proved far less predictable than any map might suggest.

The economies sustaining the expansion

The ELN does not need to monopolize an illicit economy to profit from it. It is enough to regulate corridors, charge fees for the movement of goods or people, or insert itself into specific links in a broader value chain. This logic explains its simultaneous involvement in collecting revenue from cocaine supply chains, illegal gold mining, extortion, fuel smuggling and the selective control of border crossings.

In the Venezuelan state of Amazonas, for example, the group developed mechanisms to control economic activities and entire communities, combining extortion, mining regulation and forms of social authority. In some areas, residents came to perceive this control as a reduction in ordinary crime, even though it was enforced through coercive methods.

Armed governance and its impact on the population

When an armed group imposes rules on freedom of movement, recruits people through coercion, punishes alleged collaboration with its adversaries and takes over basic state functions, it creates a form of parallel governance that can survive successive cycles of political negotiation. Catatumbo offers recent evidence of this. Human Rights Watch documented that Frente 33 had imposed movement restrictions, forced labor and reeducation mechanisms before its dispute with the ELN erupted. The latter then responded with a campaign of killings and disappearances targeting people accused of collaborating with its rival faction.

The violence recorded in the region therefore serves as a deliberate instrument for reshaping local governance, going beyond a straightforward confrontation between armed organizations. More than 46,900 children were unable to attend school for weeks and hundreds of teachers abandoned their posts. This further increased the population’s vulnerability to the forced recruitment of minors, one of the most serious issues documented by the United Nations.

At the heart of the problem lies a blind spot in the state’s strategy. Colombia is simultaneously trying to negotiate with and confront militarily an organization whose territorial reach, financial resources and mobility do not depend exclusively on the capabilities of the Colombian state. So can a peace process move forward without addressing the Venezuelan dimension? This is a question that can no longer be answered only in part.

A ceasefire negotiated with the ELN’s national leadership has limited significance when its fronts retain considerable operational autonomy on the ground. Verifying compliance with such commitments is extraordinarily difficult along a border where coordinated state presence on both sides is limited. Military pressure applied exclusively within Colombian territory, meanwhile, risks simply pushing the group’s structures across the border into Venezuela without dismantling its organizational capacity. Capturing leaders or temporarily regaining control of a municipality is no way to dismantle an organization capable of operating along a 2,200-kilometer border.

Sovereignty as a contested resource

The institutional response should therefore rest on several strategic pillars. Incorporating the cross-border dimension into any strategy for negotiation or containment is essential. This requires verification mechanisms that extend beyond Colombian jurisdiction and account for the fragmented nature of state authority in Venezuela’s border regions.

Likewise, civilian institutional presence must be strengthened in Catatumbo and similar territories, prioritizing justice, the protection of social leaders, land formalization and continuity in education rather than treating military deployment as the sole measure of success. This is consistent with what academic research suggests about state capacity and territorial control.

Finally, governance indicators should be developed to measure the effective protection of civilians, access to services and community trust, rather than focusing solely on the number of casualties or arrests. The ICRC confirmed the limitations of that approach, documenting 176,730 people confined to their communities and 87,069 affected by mass displacement in 2025 alone.

Colombia and Venezuela face a challenge that no unilateral strategy can resolve sustainably. A long-term roadmap requires verifiable bilateral cooperation, the strengthening of permanent civilian institutional capacities and a definition of security that puts the protection of human life ahead of the tally of successful operations.

PhD in Public Policy from IEXE University (Mexico). Master’s degree in Public Security. Academic researcher. Organizational advisor to Mexican police forces and consultant in public and private security.