This article was originally published in Vol. 6 No. 3 of our print edition.
After the 12 April election, the Hungarian right entered a state that can most accurately be described as an interregnum. Despite the historic defeat, Fidesz still commands a significant part of the Hungarian electorate, and Viktor Orbán remains its president; however, it has lost much of the political, institutional, and financial power that allowed it to hold the wider conservative network together around one organizing centre.
That is probably the most significant consequence of the vote, and it is clearly related to the scale of the defeat. In April, Tisza won 53.18 per cent of the national-list vote and 141 of the 199 seats in Parliament, after taking 96 of Hungary’s 106 single-member constituencies. The alliance of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Fidesz–KDNP) finished on 38.61 per cent and 52 seats, while hard-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) took 5.63 per cent and 6 mandates. The constitutional supermajority secured by Tisza left the former governing party in a similar parliamentary position to the one occupied by its opponents throughout much of the previous 16 years.1
For most of the 2010–2026 period, political representation, media, think tanks, foundations, movements, elite training, international networks, and much of the financial infrastructure available to the conservative public sphere gravitated around the same centre. Fidesz’s electoral dominance reinforced that institutional dominance, with the two becoming increasingly inseparable.
Then came the April defeat, which pulled the two apart. Fidesz remains by far the largest political force on the right, but it can no longer translate political authority into institutional dominance almost automatically through administrative power. Competitors are trying to occupy political space that barely existed when the party was in government, while conservative institutions are being forced to discover how much of their influence came from genuine public demand and how much depended on access to the old political centre.
Fidesz’s traditional Civic Picnic at Kötcse on 12 September, which used to kick off the autumn political season, was the first in opposition in 16 years, and answered one of the fundamental questions about the future trajectory of the Hungarian right. Throughout the summer, much of the discussion focused on whether Fidesz would continue with or without Orbán. After Kötcse, it became clear that the former prime minister had returned to frontline politics after spending much of the summer abroad, and appeared determined to preserve Fidesz’s position as the organizing political force of the wider right.2
That, nevertheless, does not resolve the broader problem created by the election. Fidesz may still want to organize the Hungarian right around itself, but it no longer possesses the same instruments with which to do so. The result is a genuinely interesting process of institutional fragmentation on the one hand and an increasingly clear attempt at political recentralization on the other.
From the Central Political Field to the Mosaic Right
The settling of Fidesz’s leadership question at Kötcse is relevant both symbolically and analytically. In September 2009, it was there that Orbán set out the political model that would shape the next decade and a half and form the conceptual background of four consecutive two-thirds supermajorities for Fidesz–KDNP.
Preparing for a landslide in the following year’s parliamentary election, somewhat smaller in scale but of similar historical significance to Fidesz’s April defeat, Orbán in 2009 described the possible disappearance of Hungary’s bipolar party system, organized around two centres on the left and right, and the emergence of a central political field. One large governing force, he argued, could occupy the centre while weaker opponents remained divided around it. He spoke of a political configuration that could last fifteen to twenty years.3
The philosophy behind the concept later provided the basis for the broad reconstruction of Hungary’s political system in the 2010s. Many of these changes, including a new Fundamental Law and electoral system, sought to create political strength through concentration: governing stability over coalition politics, with one dominant party setting the direction of the wider camp. The concept of the central political field ultimately took shape in what we knew as the System of National Cooperation (NER).
When discussing what went wrong in April, several assessments from conservative circles pointed precisely to that concentration and the damage it had left behind. Márton Békés, one of the leading intellectual figures of the Orbán-era right, argued that NER had subjected the Hungarian right to a form of ‘state takeover’, a concept reminiscent of the socialist era. He charged that too much of conservative intellectual and institutional life had lost its autonomy and been brought under centralized political control.4
His proposed alternative was the so-called ‘mosaic right’, an increasingly common concept in conservative discourse after the election. The concept rests on the autonomous cooperation of different parties, movements, media outlets, intellectual circles, and institutions where their interests overlap. That would allow different parts of the Hungarian right to reach different social and ideological segments of the electorate instead of being pushed into one catch-all, centralized structure.5
‘The result is a genuinely interesting process of institutional fragmentation on the one hand and an increasingly clear attempt at political recentralization on the other’
The summer suggested that questions about restructuring were not confined to intellectual circles. In August, Hungarian media reported on an internal questionnaire asking Fidesz members about the causes of the defeat, the condition of local organizations, the performance of senior Fidesz politicians, including Orbán, and even more radical possibilities such as a fundamental organizational overhaul, replacing Fidesz with a new conservative party or dissolving it. Communications Director Bertalan Havasi confirmed the survey and described the process as ‘honest self-reflection’.6 Parliamentary group leader János Bóka pushed the discussion further in an interview with Partizán. He said there was no guarantee that the strategy previously used by Fidesz would remain viable, adding that future conservative representation could take the form of ‘a coalition’, ‘a collection of associations’, or ‘several parties’.7
Kötcse has narrowed that discussion without ending it. Shortly before Orbán’s closed-door speech, Bóka said the former prime minister had ‘picked up the thread’ of political work again. Accounts from participants suggested that Orbán wanted the analysis of the defeat to end, public criticism to stop, and Fidesz to concentrate on confronting the Tisza government. Orbán presented a dual internal dynamic, with Bóka focusing more on day-to-day parliamentary ‘defence’ and Orbán on political attack.
A quite similar division of roles may be familiar from Poland, and worked pretty well for years for Law and Justice (PiS), between its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, and Mateusz Morawiecki, head of two consecutive PiS governments. Morawiecki managed immediate institutional procedures and conflicts, while Kaczyński represented an authority that extended beyond office and party politics.
There is currently no potential successor combining Orbán’s authority inside Fidesz with the same recognition among its voters. His staying in power is therefore a strategically understandable decision that prevents an immediate succession struggle while the party adjusts to opposition. It also goes directly against the ‘mosaic right’ concept, especially its perceived eventual goal.
Responding to the concept, Orbán said at Kötcse that the Hungarian right had ‘always been a mosaic’, but that the pieces by themselves are parts of a larger picture, fitting together in ‘disciplined order’.8 Békés’s interpretation argues that the strength of the mosaic comes partly from the autonomy of its individual parts. The practical difference will depend on how much independence Fidesz is willing to tolerate and how much emerging organizations, potentially including other right-wing parties or movements, are prepared to accept its attempt to cling to its former hegemonic position. The question after Kötcse is therefore not whether a mosaic will emerge, but what relationship develops between its parts and the political centre Orbán is trying to preserve.
The Right beyond Fidesz
One party already functioning outside the traditional central political field has a clear starting advantage compared with any new political project within the Hungarian right: the hard-right Mi Hazánk, led by László Toroczkai, the only parliamentary party outside Tisza and the Fidesz–KDNP alliance to have entered parliament on its own list. KDNP maintains a separate eight-member parliamentary group, but its MPs were elected on the joint Fidesz–KDNP list.
Mi Hazánk, which began as a radical faction that broke away from Jobbik in 2018, already has activists, an organization, a recognizable ideological profile, and voters who have repeatedly shown that they are willing to support it independently of Fidesz. Europion’s August survey put Mi Hazánk at 10 per cent of the total population, 12 per cent among party voters, and 10 per cent among certain voters with a party preference. More importantly, 14 per cent of those who said they had voted for Fidesz in April now supported Mi Hazánk, compared with 13 per cent who had become undecided and 8 per cent who had moved to Tisza.9
Toroczkai has already spoken about some form of coordinated cooperation across the opposition, acknowledging that there is demand for it from parts of the electorate. However, he has also made clear that the party does not intend to turn itself into a catch-all formation or simply dissolve its political identity into another project. That leaves Mi Hazánk with the most developed independent political structure from which to compete for voters dissatisfied with both Tisza and Fidesz, and it is already showing the potential to do so.
Results of the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election, showing the winning party by single-member constituency. A darker shade indicates a higher vote share. Results for the national proportional list are displayed in the top left, 13 April 2026.
Former Minister Tibor Navracsics and former Space Commissioner Orsolya Ferencz approached the same post-election space from almost the opposite direction when they launched Civic Democrats (PD) on 20 August. Navracsics presented it as a platform for political dialogue rather than a new party, but the initiative was widely seen as a possible basis for a moderate civic-conservative breakaway from Fidesz. The speculation became serious enough for Communications Director Havasi to publicly deny that the party faced the danger of a split.10
There is also measurable electoral space for such a project. Medián found that 5 per cent of respondents would almost certainly support a hypothetical moderate, civic-right party formed by politicians leaving Fidesz, and another 5 per cent probably would. Among current Fidesz voters, 18 per cent said they would definitely switch, and another 15 per cent could imagine doing so.11
Kötcse, at least for now, also changed the trajectory for PD. Navracsics attended the gathering, and three days later said that becoming a party was not on the agenda. Instead, he and Ferencz are considering transforming the initiative into an association; he also argued that Orbán could theoretically join, because Civic Democrats operate ‘on another plane’ from the party leader’s demand for political unity.12 Before Kötcse, he explicitly framed PD as an ‘Orbán-free’ space. Its significance as the possible basis for a split has therefore diminished considerably.
Fighting for Institutional Survival
Besides the party itself, Fidesz’s defeat had an even more crushing impact on the conservative institutional network built around it over the past decade. Media companies, publishers, think tanks, legal and policy institutes, scholarship programmes, elite training, international networks, conferences, and cultural organizations—all of the areas where conservatives traditionally lagged behind progressives—were expanded during the Orbán years within a financial environment that relied substantially on state grants and public funding.
SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons
One of the first measures of the Tisza government was to abolish the so-called public-interest asset-management foundation model outside higher education. According to the government, the liquidation of 16 such KEKVAs returned at least HUF 1.284 trillion (around USD 4 billion) in book-value assets to direct state control.13
At this point, it is crucial to note that receiving public funding is not proof of having no institutional value or of failing to do work that has a positive impact on society; in fact, that should be the number-one criterion for receiving such support. Organizations supported by the state can produce expertise, books, policy work, professional networks, and communities that remain useful after a government changes. The opposite is also true. What the funding shock is exposing is the difference between possessing institutional capital and having access to capital.
The effects were visible almost immediately. Mediaworks moved Magyar Nemzet and 12 county newspapers from daily to weekly publication from 1 August,14 while leading journalists left Mandiner and later formed Konfront.15 Smaller independent projects such as Különutas had already begun experimenting with models less directly connected to the old institutional structure.16 Hungarian Conservative also belongs to the institutional history being discussed here, making the same question apply to this magazine as to the rest of the conservative public sphere: how much institutional capital survives when access to capital changes? That fundamentally changes the approach to content itself: making readers engage more, come back, subscribe, and even donate; private patrons and international networks now matter much more than proximity to the central political field.
Orbán’s remarks at Kötcse indicate that Fidesz is also aware of this problem. He said the party presidency would examine what resources remained available and how they could be placed at the disposal of civilians, media outlets, influencers, and private individuals participating in what he calls the ‘national resistance’.
In practical terms, Fidesz appears to be looking for ways to replace at least part of the former role of state coordination with party coordination. It still has a vast network of activists and members, and remains the best at organizing networks and donors and generating direct political attention, although on a much smaller scale and with fewer resources than over the past 16 years.
In the upcoming period, organizations and outlets will probably shrink; some will survive, others may merge or close, and some might reappear in different forms. Even if Orbán succeeds in restoring a substantial degree of political unity behind himself, the institutional environment underneath it is therefore likely to remain considerably more decentralized.
The same distinction also applies to electoral politics. Fidesz may find it considerably easier to give space to separate associations, intellectual circles, publications, and movements than it can accommodate parties competing for the same voters and constituency mandates. Under the current system, several right-wing parties can weaken one another by dividing the vote in single-member constituencies, although Tisza has promised to introduce a more proportional electoral system during the current parliamentary term.17
Lessons from Poland
The emerging mosaic could therefore become much more institutionally plural without becoming equally electorally plural. How difficult it can be to maintain that distinction once independent organizations acquire their own political weight is already visible in Poland, where a remarkably similar debate has developed on the right after PiS lost government.
Morawiecki established the Rozwój Plus association while initially insisting that it should remain within the wider PiS camp. He described the model as a strategy of ‘two lungs’: separate political environments capable of reaching different groups of voters while continuing to cooperate within the same broader community. By July, Rozwój Plus already included 40 MPs, one senator, and three MEPs.
Kaczyński increasingly viewed the platform as a clear threat to his leadership and demanded that MPs declare that they did not belong to outside political associations under threat of exclusion from the party, a measure directed principally at Rozwój Plus. Morawiecki and his allies refused, arguing that organizational autonomy did not have to mean abandoning political cooperation. Around 40 MPs and one senator subsequently moved to establish a separate Rozwój Plus parliamentary caucus.18 Before the eventual split, Morawiecki summarized his interpretation of the new situation by arguing that ‘there is no hegemon on the Polish right’ and that its different forces therefore have to learn to cooperate.19
The Polish example illustrates the same unresolved tension behind Orbán’s interpretation of the mosaic. Different organizations can coexist around the same political centre relatively easily while continuing to accept its primacy. The relationship becomes much more difficult once autonomy breeds separate and often conflicting political interests.
After Kötcse, the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Hungarian right is no longer primarily about leadership: Orbán has returned to active politics and is trying to preserve Fidesz’s central position. The deeper uncertainty concerns the structure beneath him, as Fidesz retains hegemonic ambitions without the governmental power that previously sustained them. Whether Orbán can pick up the pieces of the old political order without the state power that once held them together will determine what eventually emerges from the current state of interregnum.
NOTES
1 Gergely Szakacs, ‘Magyar’s Parliamentary Majority in Hungary Increases after Final Count’, Reuters (18 April 2026), www.reuters.com/world/magyars-parliamentary-majority-hungary-increases-after-final-count-2026-04-18/.
2 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Orbán Stifles Renewal Debate, Tightens Grip on Fidesz as Risk of Split Grows’, Hungarian Conservative (13 September 2026), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/orban-fidesz-renewal-debate-power-split-hungary/.
3 ‘Megőrizni a létezés magyar minőségét—Orbán kötcsei beszéde szóról szóra’ (Preserving the Hungarian Quality of Existence—Orbán’s Kötcse Speech Word for Word), HírExtra (18 February 2010; speech delivered 5 September 2009), www.hirextra.hu/2010/02/18/megorizni-a-letezes-magyar-minoseget-orban-kotcsei-beszede-szorol-szora/.
4 C. Á., and K. H. A. [Áron Czopf, and Ákos Kánai H.], ‘Hogyan alkossunk „mozaikjobboldalt”?’ (How Do We Create a ‘Mosaic Right’?), Metapolitika (31 July 2026), https://metapolitika.substack.com/p/hogyan-alkossunk-mozaikjobboldalt.
5 C. Á., and K. H. A., ‘Hogyan alkossunk „mozaikjobboldalt”?’
6 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Fidesz Asks Members to Judge Orbán, Consider Dissolution in Internal Survey’, Hungarian Conservative (19 August 2026), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/orban-fidesz-internal-survey-self-reflection-assessment-hungary.
7 Tamás Pál, ‘Bóka János: Nem biztos, hogy a jövőben működőképes lesz a Fidesz eddigi stratégiája’ (János Bóka: It Is not Certain that Fidesz’s Strategy to Date Will Remain Viable in the Future), Telex (11 August 2026), https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/08/11/boka-janos-fidesz-frakciovezeto-partizan-interju-part-jovoje.
8 ‘Orbán Viktor szerint ráfért egy kis pihenés, Kötcsén reagált Magyar Péter kijelentésére is’ (According to Viktor Orbán, He Was Due a Little Rest; Speaking in Kötcse, He Also Responded to Péter Magyar’s Statement), Index (12 September 2026), https://index.hu/belfold/2026/09/12/orban-viktor-fidesz-kotcse-magyar-peter-kormany-ellenzek-mozaikjobboldal-v-janos/.
9 ‘2026 augusztusi pártpreferenciák’ (2026 August Party Preferences), Europion (12 August 2026), https://europion.hu/augusztusi-partpreferenciak/.
10 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Orbánism Squeezed from Within as Moderate Revolt Takes Shape, Old Rivalry Reignites’, Hungarian Conservative (24 August 2026), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/orban-fidesz-split-moderate-internal-revolt-navracsics-rival-lazar-hungary/.
11 ‘A fideszesek harmada szívesen szavazna egy, a pártból kiszakadó polgári ajánlatra’ (One Third of Fidesz Supporters Would Gladly Vote for a ‘Civic’ Alternative Breaking Away from the Party), Medián (7 September 2026), https://median.hu/2026/09/07/a-fideszesek-harmada-szivesen-szavazna-egy-a-partbol-kiszakado-polgari-ajanlatra/.
12 ‘Navracsics Tibor az Arénában: akár Orbán Viktor is beléphet a Polgári Demokraták közé’ (Tibor Navracsics on Aréna: Even Viktor Orbán Could Join the Civic Democrats), Infostart (16 September 2026), https://infostart.hu/belfold/2026/09/16/navracsics-tibor-az-arenaban-akar-orban-viktor-is-belephet-a-polgari-demokratak-koze.
13 ‘1 billió 284 milliárd forintnyi közvagyon kerül vissza az államhoz’ (Public Assets Worth 1.284 Trillion Forints Will Be Returned to the State), Kormany.hu (1 September 2026), https://kormany.hu/hirek/1-billio-284-milliard-forintnyi-kozvagyon-kerul-vissza-az-allamhoz.
14 ‘Rendkívüli közleményt adott ki a fideszes médiaholding a Magyar Nemzet és 12 megyei napilap hetilappá alakításáról’ (Fidesz-Aligned Media Holding Issues Special Announcement Regarding the Conversion of Magyar Nemzet and 12 County Daily Newspapers into Weeklies), Media1 (25 June 2026), https://media1.hu/2026/06/25/rendkivuli-kozlemenyt-adott-ki-a-fideszes-mediaholding/.
15 Gábor Baranyai, ‘Mandiner után jön a Konfront’ (After Mandiner Comes Konfront), Magyar Nemzet (4 September 2026), https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/2026/09/mandiner-konfront-kacsoh-tisza-magyar-peter-sajtoszabadsag-jobboldal.
16 ‘Új stúdióba költözik a Különutas’ (Különutas Moves to New Studio), Mandiner (9 August 2026), https://mandiner.hu/belfold/2026/08/uj-studioba-koltozik-a-kulonutas.
17 András Ősze, ‘Melléthei-Barna Márton: másfél-két éven belül új választási törvényt fogadunk el’ (Márton Melléthei-Barna: We Will Adopt a New Electoral Law Within One and a Half to Two Years’, 24.hu (16 July 2026), https://24.hu/belfold/2026/07/16/mellethei-barna-marton-valasztojogi-torveny-alaptorveny-modositas-tisza.
18 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Kaczyński’s PiS Crisis Reveals the Trap Awaiting Orbán and Fidesz’, Hungarian Conservative (27 July 2026), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/kaczynskis-pis-crisis-reveals-the-trap-awaiting-orban-and-fidesz.
19 Polska Agencja Prasowa, ‘“Nie ma hegemona na prawicy”. Morawiecki ostro o PiS: Amputowano zdrowe płuco’, Bankier.pl (25 July 2026), www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Nie-ma-hegemona-na-prawicy-Morawiecki-ostro-o-PiS-Amputowano-zdrowe-pluco-9173305.html.
Related articles:
At a time when public debate is increasingly polarized and superficial, Hungarian Conservative remains committed to depth, intellectual honesty, and independent conservative thought.
Producing high-quality journalism requires resources. Your contribution helps us expand our coverage, reach new audiences, and keep our content accessible.

Please consider supporting our mission.