Religious persecution is common in many countries around the globe. There is little evidence on its long-term effects. We collect data from all across Spain, using information from more than 67,000 trials held by the Spanish Inquisition between 1480 and 1820.
This comprehensive database allows us to demonstrate that municipalities of Spain with a history of a stronger inquisitorial presence show lower economic performance, educational attainment, and trust today.
The effects persist after controlling for historical indicators of religiosity and wealth, ruling out potential selection bias.
The same graphic again but with different topic. North VS South Spaniards
I actually feel like the (implied) causation is reversed.
Correlation doesn’t necessarily correspond with causation.
There are lots of reasons why Southern Spain is less developed than the North (which is not an accurate statement either), and the fact that new territories incorporated to the Christian Kingdoms during the Reconquista were repopulated and many of their original inhabitants converted to Christianity would explain why the Inquisition efforts were stronger in these areas.
Actually the South of Spain has always been wealthier and more developed. Several Roman emperors were from Southern Hispania, Cordoba was one of the largest cities in the World during the middle ages, Seville was the World’s most important international hub during the 16th century, etc.
Industrialisation had a lot to do with the current gap. The South regions economy was mostly based on agriculture, specifically latifundia, and took longer than other areas to develop a proper industry. This is probably the main factor that explains the differences in GDP and education .
The article fail to consider the historic evolution of gdp/richness in the different municipalities or regions (specially AFTER Inquisition max activity) and consequently draw ridiculous hypothesis and false causations. **The geographic distribution of wealth in Spain during last two centuries changed dramatically**. The Inquisition actions lasting effects in local or regional economies were minimal (or probably almost inexistent).
The way in which Ancient Regime ended and industrialization developed in the different zones had much more relevant and lasting impacts in current economic conditions of municipalities and autonomous comunities than this inquisition nonsense.
**After centuries of Inquisition activities some of the richest zones were precisely those with higher activity of that catholic tribunal.** For example Andalusia at early XIX century was one of the richest parts of Spain and southern Europe in general. In relative terms its economy was way over spanish average and very close to western european one at first decade of XIX century, but decreased greatly at 1810s-1840s and again, much more dramatically between 1880s and 1960s. Some specific data with the andalusian example:
– At 1752 (so way after the Inquisition “golden era”…) and according the *Catastro de Ensenada*, a protocensus, Andalusia economy was clearly dominated by secondary and tertiary sectors, with over 70% of the total. The highest relevance of non-primary sector activities in the entire Castile Crown was that of Andalusia.
– **Between 1807 and 1930 the andalusian share over total Spain’s GDP drecreased from 25.7% to 14.9%**, despite its population increased relatively from 18% to over 20% of the total.
– **Andalusia gdp per capita decreased from a higher than spanish average and close to western-nordic european** **at first years of XIX century** (the comparison it’s with EU-15 countries more exactly), **to a 90% of spanish and 70% of european average at 1860** (after the early XIX century crisis and a failed first industrialization), **to 75% of spanish and 45% of european at 1915** and finally, just before Second World War, during Spanish Civil War, andalusian gdp per capita was **just 65% of the spanish and 30% of western-nordic european at 1937-38**.
Sources:
– Bernal, A.M. y Parejo, A. *La economía andaluza: atraso y frágil vertebración*, en Germán, L.; Llopis, E.; Maluquer de Motes, J. y Zapata, S. (eds.) Historia económica regional de España siglos XIX y XX. Crítica, Barcelona, 2001
– Parejo Barranco, A. *Historia económica de Andalucía contemporánea*. Editorial Síntesis, Madrid, 2009.
In a similar way at local level the current economic condition of municipalities was mostly determined by XIX and XX century events and factors, not some dubious “inquisition sociologic-psicologic effects” four centuries after the decadence of that institution.
At this point it’s just militantism hiding behind scientific work
7 comments
Religious persecution is common in many countries around the globe. There is little evidence on its long-term effects. We collect data from all across Spain, using information from more than 67,000 trials held by the Spanish Inquisition between 1480 and 1820.
This comprehensive database allows us to demonstrate that municipalities of Spain with a history of a stronger inquisitorial presence show lower economic performance, educational attainment, and trust today.
The effects persist after controlling for historical indicators of religiosity and wealth, ruling out potential selection bias.
The same graphic again but with different topic. North VS South Spaniards
I actually feel like the (implied) causation is reversed.
Correlation doesn’t necessarily correspond with causation.
There are lots of reasons why Southern Spain is less developed than the North (which is not an accurate statement either), and the fact that new territories incorporated to the Christian Kingdoms during the Reconquista were repopulated and many of their original inhabitants converted to Christianity would explain why the Inquisition efforts were stronger in these areas.
Actually the South of Spain has always been wealthier and more developed. Several Roman emperors were from Southern Hispania, Cordoba was one of the largest cities in the World during the middle ages, Seville was the World’s most important international hub during the 16th century, etc.
Industrialisation had a lot to do with the current gap. The South regions economy was mostly based on agriculture, specifically latifundia, and took longer than other areas to develop a proper industry. This is probably the main factor that explains the differences in GDP and education .
The article fail to consider the historic evolution of gdp/richness in the different municipalities or regions (specially AFTER Inquisition max activity) and consequently draw ridiculous hypothesis and false causations. **The geographic distribution of wealth in Spain during last two centuries changed dramatically**. The Inquisition actions lasting effects in local or regional economies were minimal (or probably almost inexistent).
The way in which Ancient Regime ended and industrialization developed in the different zones had much more relevant and lasting impacts in current economic conditions of municipalities and autonomous comunities than this inquisition nonsense.
**After centuries of Inquisition activities some of the richest zones were precisely those with higher activity of that catholic tribunal.** For example Andalusia at early XIX century was one of the richest parts of Spain and southern Europe in general. In relative terms its economy was way over spanish average and very close to western european one at first decade of XIX century, but decreased greatly at 1810s-1840s and again, much more dramatically between 1880s and 1960s. Some specific data with the andalusian example:
– At 1752 (so way after the Inquisition “golden era”…) and according the *Catastro de Ensenada*, a protocensus, Andalusia economy was clearly dominated by secondary and tertiary sectors, with over 70% of the total. The highest relevance of non-primary sector activities in the entire Castile Crown was that of Andalusia.
– **Between 1807 and 1930 the andalusian share over total Spain’s GDP drecreased from 25.7% to 14.9%**, despite its population increased relatively from 18% to over 20% of the total.
– **Andalusia gdp per capita decreased from a higher than spanish average and close to western-nordic european** **at first years of XIX century** (the comparison it’s with EU-15 countries more exactly), **to a 90% of spanish and 70% of european average at 1860** (after the early XIX century crisis and a failed first industrialization), **to 75% of spanish and 45% of european at 1915** and finally, just before Second World War, during Spanish Civil War, andalusian gdp per capita was **just 65% of the spanish and 30% of western-nordic european at 1937-38**.
Sources:
– Bernal, A.M. y Parejo, A. *La economía andaluza: atraso y frágil vertebración*, en Germán, L.; Llopis, E.; Maluquer de Motes, J. y Zapata, S. (eds.) Historia económica regional de España siglos XIX y XX. Crítica, Barcelona, 2001
– Tafunell, X. (coords.). *Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX-XX*. *I.* Fundación BBVA, Bilbao, 2005.
– Parejo Barranco, A. *Historia económica de Andalucía contemporánea*. Editorial Síntesis, Madrid, 2009.
In a similar way at local level the current economic condition of municipalities was mostly determined by XIX and XX century events and factors, not some dubious “inquisition sociologic-psicologic effects” four centuries after the decadence of that institution.
At this point it’s just militantism hiding behind scientific work
I wouldve never expected this.