Ukraine has telegraphed its big counteroffensive for months. So where is it?

23 comments
  1. Non-credible hot take: the big offensive is actually just the UAF sieging Kherson, letting the Russians concentrate men and matériel there at the expense of other theatres, blowing up the bridges behind them and then patiently waiting some more for the enemy to expend whatever supplies they have accrued while GMRLS-ing supply dumps.

    Perhaps the Ukes will use this opportunity to attack somewhere else entirely. Or maybe not. The HoI3 player in me thinks it’s unlikely that they’d bleed themselves white trying contest the city block by block, let alone attempt to flatten it in the process (not least because the city is reportedly still choke-full of their own civilians).

  2. Got decimated during staging phase by long range missiles strikes and artillery. And with Russia sending reinforcements increasing number of BTGs to 15, Ukrainian offensive is now “just a feint” according to propaganda.

  3. Michael Kofman has had a recent podcast or two that I summarized on here where he sounded kind of doubtful that doing a counteroffensive this soon was a good idea — both sides saw depletion of their best-trained forces during the initial fighting, and having trained forces is more-important for the offensive. I don’t know how long the Ukrainian training process is for infantry, but I checked the British process, and that’s apparently normally six months, with specialized stuff on top of that. The conflict’s only been going on for about six months, and I am pretty sure that a lot of the people mobilized in that time have been doing stuff relevant to actually defending Ukraine, like fortifying area, not off training. Ukraine does have mandatory military service, so that may shorten it, but even so.

    The article says that the training that the British volunteered to do is only three weeks, so it has to be some kind of very abbreviated or refresher course relative to the infantry training the British normally do.

    > The U.K. has taken the lead in training thousands of Ukrainian infantry soldiers in recent weeks in southeast England, and a handful of countries — including Canada, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand — have said they’ll soon join the effort.
    >
    > But that pipeline provides only about three weeks’ worth of basic infantry training on movements and tactics, just enough for recruits to have some cursory knowledge of the harrowing realities they’ll face, but not much more.

    I’m assuming that if that’s the case, Ukraine is trying to get people into the field quickly, but I don’t see how they can be extensively trained unless their prior mandatory military service pulls a lot of the weight.

    It did sound like he thought that since Ukraine had been saying that they were doing an offensive in Kherson, that they must be doing it, and part of one podcast was him listing possible reasons for why they’d make an early move; I remember that one, for example, might be trying to take advantage of a perception of a shift in the balance due to the Russian offensive grinding to a halt.

    It sounded like he was skeptical that it was easy to just slap people together and do combined arms offensives without having practiced — like, he was commenting on the fact that a lot of the artillery fire done by Ukrainian artillery, though successful, was it operating on its own, handling its own targeting using drones, not having infantry be directing the strikes.

    He did mention the both sides have seen this depletion — Russia is also going to be using less-well-trained people — but that training was more-important for offensives than defense.

  4. our attack on Kherson is not a swift attack, but a series of actions so that the enemy cannot shoot back and waste Sealy. The Russians transferred Sili from the Donbass and we were able to start a counter offensive in the area of ​​the city of izym. Russia gradually transported equipment and shells to Kherson, and as a result, at some point, we just started blowing it all up, as a result, from otaks using equipment and artillery. Russia went to the infantry, because they are running out of fuel and shells. tactics, Army strength, morale, numbers are nothing without logistics. in the most occupied territories, there are sabotage detachments, which also help. you can observe their activity recently in the Crimea.

  5. As long as the Russians think it‘s coming, it‘s just as effective as actually attacking. So: big offensive coming!

  6. I find it unlikely to be coming. Ukraine needed propoganda wins for domestic moral, and the proposed counteroffensives were that win. Now it is the HIMARS strikes.

    For now Russia still controls the actions and pace of the war. Ukraines dependence on foreign equipment will keep them on the backfoot as it’s not a reliable source of equipment, nor does the logistical chain come easy with so much random stuff.

  7. well recently there seem to be some bridges, who seem to have problems. and in the krim, there seem to be quite some exploding to happen …. so maybe … soon? 😀

  8. This isn’t Hollywood, they’re not doing it to entertain audiences and effectiveness is more important than **big, flashy** and **right** **now**.

  9. For what it’s worth, today’s Jomini’s thread seems to be quite bullish on Ukraine in Kherson:

    > Ukrainian actions/activity in the Zaporizhzhia & Odesa-Kherson ODs are shaping conditions to conduct a counteroffensive in the most vulnerable VSRF Operational Direction to decisively seize the strategic initiative away from the Russians & throughout the fall & winter.

    https://nitter.net/JominiW/status/1559710651865497602#m

  10. the offensive already started, but Ukraine is waging war by NATO standards, not Russian WWII re-enactment.

    They are currently working on Russian logistics and supply and once this phase is done they will move on the next strategic goal.

  11. There has been a big offensive towards krim for a month counting. Just turns out that attacking is really hard.

  12. Ukraine doesnt have an aircraft left
    We see all this videos of drones dropping grenades
    but nothing to compare with russain MIGs and stuff

  13. > These lofty expectations will be hard to meet. HIMARS attacks have softened Russian defences, including by stopping artillery getting to the front lines. On August 13th Ukraine said it had destroyed a bridge over the Nova Kakhovka dam, tightening the noose around the city. But only infantry can capture territory. Conventional wisdom holds that attacking forces need three times as many troops as there are defenders to capture a well-defended position; more in urban areas. If Ukraine ever had such an advantage, it no longer does.
    >
    > In recent weeks Russia, anticipating a southern offensive, has withdrawn forces from Izyum on the eastern front and reinforced Kherson and its environs. Refugees who recently left the city say they have seen scores of new Russian army vehicles and troops, especially near Nova Kakhovka. Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, a firm which tracks the war, thinks there were 13 Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the province in late July (a BTG usually has several hundred troops, though most are depleted these days). Now there may be 25 to 30. “We now believe that this window of opportunity has passed”, says Mr Muzyka. “Ukrainians do not possess enough manpower to match Russian numbers.”
    >
    > Though Ukraine does have a large pool of troops, most of them are conscripts with days of training. The most demanding fighting has been done by just five brigades of Ukraine’s most experienced and skilled soldiers, notes Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank. These units are exhausted and have taken heavy casualties. Training new brigades and equipping them for an offensive will take time.
    >
    > Attacking usually requires more ammunition than defending. Attacking forces tend to take more casualties. “Since 1992, in our field exercises, we did not study offensive actions”, lamented Sergiy Grabskyi, a reserve colonel in Ukraine’s army, speaking on the “Geopolitics Decanted” podcast on August 3rd. “After eight years of war, Ukrainian forces are brilliant in defensive actions, but they have very limited or almost zero experience of conducting large-scale offensive actions.” Ukrainian counter-attacks around Kharkiv in May, though successful, were small and resulted in many casualties.
    >
    > Russia’s army has had time to prepare. For months they have been digging trenches in Kherson, and trucking in fortifications. They may already have artillery trained on the roads that Ukraine would use to advance. “If the Ukrainian assault looks like Russia’s attack on Severodonetsk, it’s probably a dead end,” says Chris Dougherty, a former Pentagon planner, referring to a city that Russia captured in June using crude tactics and intense bombardment from artillery. “It will cost Ukraine dearly in scarce manpower and materiel, and would likely be the last major Ukrainian operation of 2022.”

    https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08/14/a-ukrainian-counter-offensive-in-kherson-faces-steep-odds

  14. Our Ukraine officials stated in late spring that we are ready to begin offensive if we receive enough western weapons.
    So I guess they have not arrived yet =(

  15. It was pretty clearly a propaganda attempt to deflate Russia’s Donbas offensive by forcing them to shift troops to the south, where their supply lines are overextended – and it seems to be working.

  16. Are u a Russian Troll who dont find his way back to Mordor, or are u living under a stone? The explosions on Crim are not because Ivan was smoking! It was a “HIMARS UP UR ARSE” special Operation.

  17. Russia doubled the number of troops in Kherson region and tripled in southern Ukraine. This is why the assault on eastern Ukraine stopped. Not enough reserves. Russians are concerned about the southern flank. If the plan was to ease up the eastern flak, it did work well.

    The most logical plan is to disrupt logistics long enough to force the enemy into withdrawal. In the same fashian as “Kyiv feint”. There are only two bridges across the Dnipro river, dnipro is very wide. No bridges = no supplies. Already moving heavy equipment using these two bridges is dangerous. You can patch up the bridge, but it won`t fix the problem.

    Instead of big counteroffensive, long and boring strangulation. Lets wait and see.

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