Is that why nato is gearing up around the balkins?
A fairly balanced take on all the possible outcomes, but I’m not sure what the author actually suggests.
>But Ukraine’s submission to Russian rule is not a foregone conclusion. To prevent this, the West will need to alter Putin’s calculations about the costs and benefits of direct military action: maintaining the status quo would have to be preferable to the anticipated consequences of such action. These consequences should not be limited to sanctions – even if the measures were harsh, Moscow would likely have priced them in. And, if Russia were to attack, NATO would need to make major alterations to its military posture on its eastern flank. These moves would be more credible if NATO forces deployed to Poland, Slovakia, or Romania, as they would underscore the alliance’s ability to react to any development. Putin, who is playing the long game, would prefer that these troops moved away again following such a deployment.
How does a NATO deployment to Slovakia alters Putin’s calculations about an operation in Ukraine?
Is he arguing that NATO should signal that it is ready to intervene in Ukraine itself or something like that?
There is no indication that Russia doesn’t take NATO commitments to its members seriously, but the very credibility of NATO’s Article 5 is based on the distinction between members and non-members.
Drawing some sort of equivalence between Poland and Ukraine would either serve to reinforce Kremlin’s fears of Ukraine becoming a de-facto NATO member, or undermine the credibility of NATO’s commitment to its actual members by suggesting Russia could treat them equally as non-members.
I think Eastern European NATO members have less to fear from the voices inside the alliance calling for restraint and bargaining in regards to Ukraine than those yelling about appeasement and asking if Poland will be next.
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Is that why nato is gearing up around the balkins?
A fairly balanced take on all the possible outcomes, but I’m not sure what the author actually suggests.
>But Ukraine’s submission to Russian rule is not a foregone conclusion. To prevent this, the West will need to alter Putin’s calculations about the costs and benefits of direct military action: maintaining the status quo would have to be preferable to the anticipated consequences of such action. These consequences should not be limited to sanctions – even if the measures were harsh, Moscow would likely have priced them in. And, if Russia were to attack, NATO would need to make major alterations to its military posture on its eastern flank. These moves would be more credible if NATO forces deployed to Poland, Slovakia, or Romania, as they would underscore the alliance’s ability to react to any development. Putin, who is playing the long game, would prefer that these troops moved away again following such a deployment.
How does a NATO deployment to Slovakia alters Putin’s calculations about an operation in Ukraine?
Is he arguing that NATO should signal that it is ready to intervene in Ukraine itself or something like that?
There is no indication that Russia doesn’t take NATO commitments to its members seriously, but the very credibility of NATO’s Article 5 is based on the distinction between members and non-members.
Drawing some sort of equivalence between Poland and Ukraine would either serve to reinforce Kremlin’s fears of Ukraine becoming a de-facto NATO member, or undermine the credibility of NATO’s commitment to its actual members by suggesting Russia could treat them equally as non-members.
I think Eastern European NATO members have less to fear from the voices inside the alliance calling for restraint and bargaining in regards to Ukraine than those yelling about appeasement and asking if Poland will be next.
Eastern of Ukraine some residents are Russian