>*China is and will remain an important partner. But if China changes, our dealings with the country must also change. What is needed is a sense of proportion and pragmatism. A guest article by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.*
>
>It has been almost three years since my predecessor last visited China. Three years in which the challenges and risks have increased – here in Europe, in East Asia and, of course, in German-Chinese relations. Three years in which the world has changed profoundly. On the one hand because of the Corona pandemic, on the other because of Russia’s war against Ukraine with its serious consequences for the international order, for energy and food supplies, for the economy and prices worldwide. It is precisely because business as usual is not an option in this situation that I am traveling to Beijing. For a long time, such meetings were not possible due to the Covid 19 pandemic and Beijing’s strict Corona policy. That makes direct talks all the more important now.
>
>Five thoughts accompany me on this journey.
>
>**1** The China of today is not the same as it was five or ten years ago. The results of the recently concluded Party Congress of the Communist Party of China speak a clear language: Commitments to Marxism-Leninism take up much more space than in earlier Party Congress resolutions. The pursuit of national security, synonymous with the stability of the communist system, and national autonomy will be given greater importance in the future. It is clear that if China changes, our dealings with China must also change.
>
>**2** Not only China, but also the world has changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine brutally challenges the international peace and security order. President Vladimir Putin no longer even hesitates to threaten nuclear weapons. In doing so, he threatens to cross a red line that all of humanity has drawn. As recently as the beginning of the year, China, along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, took a clear position against the use or even the threat of nuclear weapons. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has a special responsibility. Clear words from Beijing to Moscow are important – to uphold the United Nations Charter and its principles.
>
>These include the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. No country is the “backyard” of another. What is true in Europe with regard to Ukraine is also true in Asia, in Africa or in Latin America. New power centers of a multipolar world are emerging there, and we want to enter into and expand partnerships with them. In recent months, we have coordinated intensively at the international level – with close partners such as Japan and Korea, with emerging Asian powers such as India and Indonesia, and also with countries in Africa and Latin America. At the end of next week, I will travel to Southeast Asia and to the G-20 summit. Parallel to my visit to China, the German President will be visiting Japan and Korea.
>
>Germany in particular, which experienced the division during the Cold War in a particularly painful way, has no interest in a new bloc formation in the world. The new U.S. National Security Strategy also rightly affirms the goal of preventing a new bloc confrontation. With regard to China, this means: Of course, this country with its 1.4 billion inhabitants and its economic strength will play an important role on the world stage in the future – as, incidentally, it has done throughout much of world history. But this does not justify the call by some for China to be isolated, nor does it imply a claim to hegemonic dominance by China or even a sinocentric world order.
>
>**3** China remains an important economic and trading partner for Germany and Europe, even under changed circumstances. We do not want “decoupling” from China. But what does China want? China’s economic strategy of two cycles is aimed at strengthening the domestic Chinese market and reducing dependencies on other countries. In a speech in late 2020, President Xi Jinping also talked about using Chinese technologies to “tighten the dependence of international production chains on China.” We take such statements seriously.
>
>We will therefore reduce one-sided dependencies, in the spirit of smart diversification. This requires a sense of proportion and pragmatism. Much of the trade between Germany and China involves products for which there is neither a lack of alternative sources of supply nor the threat of dangerous monopolies. On the contrary, China, Germany and Europe benefit equally. However, where risky dependencies have arisen – for example in the case of important raw materials, some rare earths or certain future technologies – our companies are now rightly broadening their supply chains. We are supporting them in this, for example through new raw material partnerships.
>
>We also differentiate between Chinese investments in Germany according to whether such a transaction creates or reinforces risky dependencies. Incidentally, this was also the standard applied by the German government in the case of the minority stake held by the Chinese shipping company Cosco in a terminal at the Port of Hamburg. Thanks to clear conditions, full control of the terminal remains with the city of Hamburg and the port company. Diversification and strengthening our own resilience instead of protectionism and retreating to our own market – that is our attitude, in Germany and in the European Union.
>
>We are far, too far away from reciprocity, from mutuality in the relations between China and Germany, for example with regard to market access for companies, licenses, the protection of intellectual property or questions of legal security and equal treatment of our nationals. We will continue to demand reciprocity. Where China does not allow this reciprocity, however, this cannot remain without consequences. Such a differentiated approach to China is in line with the long-term, strategic interests of Germany and Europe.
>
>**4** President Xi said in Davos earlier this year: “The world develops through the movement of contradictions – without contradiction, nothing would exist.” That means also allowing and enduring contradiction. It means not leaving out difficult issues in our exchanges with each other. These include respect for civil and political liberties and the rights of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang province, for example.
>
>The tense situation around Taiwan is worrying. Like the U.S. and many other countries, we are pursuing a one-China policy. But this means that any change in the status quo must be peaceful and by mutual agreement. Our policy is aimed at preserving the rules-based order, resolving conflicts peacefully, protecting human and minority rights, and ensuring free, fair world trade.
>
>**5** When I travel to Beijing as German Chancellor, I do so as a European. Not to speak on behalf of the whole of Europe, that would be wrong and presumptuous. But because Germany’s China policy can only be successful if it is embedded in a European China policy. In the run-up to my trip, we therefore coordinated closely with our European partners, including President Macron, and also with our transatlantic friends. The European Union has correctly described China with the triad “partner, competitor, rival,” although elements of rivalry and competition have undoubtedly increased in recent years.
>
>We must deal with this by embracing competition and by taking the consequences of system rivalry seriously and taking them into account in our policies. At the same time, we need to explore where cooperation continues to be in the mutual interest. After all, the world needs China – for example, in the fight against global pandemics such as Covid-19.
>
>China also plays a crucial role when it comes to ending the global food crisis, supporting heavily indebted countries and achieving the UN’s development goals. Without decisive action on emissions reductions in China, we cannot win the fight against climate change. That’s why it’s good that Beijing has set itself ambitious targets for the expansion of renewable energies, and I’m campaigning for China to join us in taking even greater responsibility for climate protection, particularly at international level.
>
>We are aware that we are also in competition when it comes to climate-friendly technologies – for the most efficient products, the smartest ideas, the most successful implementation of the respective plans. But this presupposes that China does not close its market to our climate-friendly technologies. This is the competition we face. Less competition always means less innovation. The loser would be climate protection – and therefore all of us.
>
>All this is plenty of material for an inaugural visit to Beijing. We are looking for cooperation where it is in the interests of both sides. We will not ignore controversies. That is part of an open exchange between Germany and China.
It’s about bending over.
Very unpopular opinion but
The EU needs China and shouldn’t let Taiwan or the US interests in the Pacific distort our policy towards China
It’s a well written article.
I have been wondering about what future interactions with China may look like in the present climate.
I think this visit is necessary.
Time will tell whether it will bring positive change.
Clown
Scholz will be to China what Merkel and Schröder were to Putin: enablers of ruthless dictators. The error in their thinking is that because they are rational sane people they assume that their authoritarian counterparts are as well. The war in Ukraine showed us already the fundamental flaw in that thinking. Sooner or later we will all pay the price.
6 comments
>*China is and will remain an important partner. But if China changes, our dealings with the country must also change. What is needed is a sense of proportion and pragmatism. A guest article by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.*
>
>It has been almost three years since my predecessor last visited China. Three years in which the challenges and risks have increased – here in Europe, in East Asia and, of course, in German-Chinese relations. Three years in which the world has changed profoundly. On the one hand because of the Corona pandemic, on the other because of Russia’s war against Ukraine with its serious consequences for the international order, for energy and food supplies, for the economy and prices worldwide. It is precisely because business as usual is not an option in this situation that I am traveling to Beijing. For a long time, such meetings were not possible due to the Covid 19 pandemic and Beijing’s strict Corona policy. That makes direct talks all the more important now.
>
>Five thoughts accompany me on this journey.
>
>**1** The China of today is not the same as it was five or ten years ago. The results of the recently concluded Party Congress of the Communist Party of China speak a clear language: Commitments to Marxism-Leninism take up much more space than in earlier Party Congress resolutions. The pursuit of national security, synonymous with the stability of the communist system, and national autonomy will be given greater importance in the future. It is clear that if China changes, our dealings with China must also change.
>
>**2** Not only China, but also the world has changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine brutally challenges the international peace and security order. President Vladimir Putin no longer even hesitates to threaten nuclear weapons. In doing so, he threatens to cross a red line that all of humanity has drawn. As recently as the beginning of the year, China, along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, took a clear position against the use or even the threat of nuclear weapons. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has a special responsibility. Clear words from Beijing to Moscow are important – to uphold the United Nations Charter and its principles.
>
>These include the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. No country is the “backyard” of another. What is true in Europe with regard to Ukraine is also true in Asia, in Africa or in Latin America. New power centers of a multipolar world are emerging there, and we want to enter into and expand partnerships with them. In recent months, we have coordinated intensively at the international level – with close partners such as Japan and Korea, with emerging Asian powers such as India and Indonesia, and also with countries in Africa and Latin America. At the end of next week, I will travel to Southeast Asia and to the G-20 summit. Parallel to my visit to China, the German President will be visiting Japan and Korea.
>
>Germany in particular, which experienced the division during the Cold War in a particularly painful way, has no interest in a new bloc formation in the world. The new U.S. National Security Strategy also rightly affirms the goal of preventing a new bloc confrontation. With regard to China, this means: Of course, this country with its 1.4 billion inhabitants and its economic strength will play an important role on the world stage in the future – as, incidentally, it has done throughout much of world history. But this does not justify the call by some for China to be isolated, nor does it imply a claim to hegemonic dominance by China or even a sinocentric world order.
>
>**3** China remains an important economic and trading partner for Germany and Europe, even under changed circumstances. We do not want “decoupling” from China. But what does China want? China’s economic strategy of two cycles is aimed at strengthening the domestic Chinese market and reducing dependencies on other countries. In a speech in late 2020, President Xi Jinping also talked about using Chinese technologies to “tighten the dependence of international production chains on China.” We take such statements seriously.
>
>We will therefore reduce one-sided dependencies, in the spirit of smart diversification. This requires a sense of proportion and pragmatism. Much of the trade between Germany and China involves products for which there is neither a lack of alternative sources of supply nor the threat of dangerous monopolies. On the contrary, China, Germany and Europe benefit equally. However, where risky dependencies have arisen – for example in the case of important raw materials, some rare earths or certain future technologies – our companies are now rightly broadening their supply chains. We are supporting them in this, for example through new raw material partnerships.
>
>We also differentiate between Chinese investments in Germany according to whether such a transaction creates or reinforces risky dependencies. Incidentally, this was also the standard applied by the German government in the case of the minority stake held by the Chinese shipping company Cosco in a terminal at the Port of Hamburg. Thanks to clear conditions, full control of the terminal remains with the city of Hamburg and the port company. Diversification and strengthening our own resilience instead of protectionism and retreating to our own market – that is our attitude, in Germany and in the European Union.
>
>We are far, too far away from reciprocity, from mutuality in the relations between China and Germany, for example with regard to market access for companies, licenses, the protection of intellectual property or questions of legal security and equal treatment of our nationals. We will continue to demand reciprocity. Where China does not allow this reciprocity, however, this cannot remain without consequences. Such a differentiated approach to China is in line with the long-term, strategic interests of Germany and Europe.
>
>**4** President Xi said in Davos earlier this year: “The world develops through the movement of contradictions – without contradiction, nothing would exist.” That means also allowing and enduring contradiction. It means not leaving out difficult issues in our exchanges with each other. These include respect for civil and political liberties and the rights of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang province, for example.
>
>The tense situation around Taiwan is worrying. Like the U.S. and many other countries, we are pursuing a one-China policy. But this means that any change in the status quo must be peaceful and by mutual agreement. Our policy is aimed at preserving the rules-based order, resolving conflicts peacefully, protecting human and minority rights, and ensuring free, fair world trade.
>
>**5** When I travel to Beijing as German Chancellor, I do so as a European. Not to speak on behalf of the whole of Europe, that would be wrong and presumptuous. But because Germany’s China policy can only be successful if it is embedded in a European China policy. In the run-up to my trip, we therefore coordinated closely with our European partners, including President Macron, and also with our transatlantic friends. The European Union has correctly described China with the triad “partner, competitor, rival,” although elements of rivalry and competition have undoubtedly increased in recent years.
>
>We must deal with this by embracing competition and by taking the consequences of system rivalry seriously and taking them into account in our policies. At the same time, we need to explore where cooperation continues to be in the mutual interest. After all, the world needs China – for example, in the fight against global pandemics such as Covid-19.
>
>China also plays a crucial role when it comes to ending the global food crisis, supporting heavily indebted countries and achieving the UN’s development goals. Without decisive action on emissions reductions in China, we cannot win the fight against climate change. That’s why it’s good that Beijing has set itself ambitious targets for the expansion of renewable energies, and I’m campaigning for China to join us in taking even greater responsibility for climate protection, particularly at international level.
>
>We are aware that we are also in competition when it comes to climate-friendly technologies – for the most efficient products, the smartest ideas, the most successful implementation of the respective plans. But this presupposes that China does not close its market to our climate-friendly technologies. This is the competition we face. Less competition always means less innovation. The loser would be climate protection – and therefore all of us.
>
>All this is plenty of material for an inaugural visit to Beijing. We are looking for cooperation where it is in the interests of both sides. We will not ignore controversies. That is part of an open exchange between Germany and China.
It’s about bending over.
Very unpopular opinion but
The EU needs China and shouldn’t let Taiwan or the US interests in the Pacific distort our policy towards China
It’s a well written article.
I have been wondering about what future interactions with China may look like in the present climate.
I think this visit is necessary.
Time will tell whether it will bring positive change.
Clown
Scholz will be to China what Merkel and Schröder were to Putin: enablers of ruthless dictators. The error in their thinking is that because they are rational sane people they assume that their authoritarian counterparts are as well. The war in Ukraine showed us already the fundamental flaw in that thinking. Sooner or later we will all pay the price.