N-VA wil parlement ‘activistische’ rechters laten terugfluiten

25 comments
  1. > Het parlement kan dan met een tweederdemeerderheid een uitspraak van het Grondwettelijk Hof naast zich neerleggen.

    > alleen wanneer het Hof zogenaamde sociale grondrechten – zoals het recht op sociale zekerheid en het recht op huisvesting – inroept om wetgeving te vernietigen.

    > Bij Europese verdragen wil N-VA dat ons land voortaan aangeeft welke delen van het verdrag we niet zullen uitvoeren.

    I know it’s just a brain fart of NVA, but the purpose of these proposals is never to be feasible, rather erode support for the judicial branch.

    N-VA took a good look at Poland and Hungary and decided they wanted that too.

  2. The powers should remain strictly separated. NVA really is planning to become our local Fidesz or Pis. Very dangerous!

  3. Openly suggesting to abolish the separation of powers.

    This should legitimately be an enormous scandal.

    Surely even the most loyal N-VA voters will denounce this?

  4. I get it, they’ve been embarrassed by the judicial branch for not being able to follow their own rules.

    But god damn, if this isn’t scary (and it’s coming straight from Elchardus’ ideological work)

  5. You don’t have a democracy without separation of powers. Screw this, NVA is growing more extremist by the day

  6. Ik stel voor dat politiekers gewoon geen shitwetten maken waar de interpretatie per rechter te bespreken valt?

  7. If they bothered to do their jobs, they can already make judges all kinds of things. Cause the judges uphold the laws politicians create.

    What they are actually trying to do, is get rid of the checks on misinterpretations of the law. Like when lawmakers come up with some law that can cause huge privacy violations or some law that will allow corporations to avoid paying taxes, politicians will always say “no, the law obviously won’t be used for that, only to [protect children / fight the drug war / stop terrorists]. Today, judges sometimes stop the “misuse” of laws. But the NVA would love to just make laws that can be exploited by their patrons….

  8. Scary thing is that hatespeech will no longer be an offence. Probably cuz “well, you can’t say anything anymore these days” way of thinking…

  9. >“Wie beslist? Verkozen vertegenwoordigers of rechters?”

    Rechters. Volgende vraag.

  10. I majored in public law so this proposal is near and dear to my heart.

    There’s a lot of ‘a strict seperation of powers is holy’ in this thread. While true in theory, in practice every constitutional parliamentary system has evolved into a system of ‘checks and balances’ between the three powers instead of a strict split. Parliament still has power over the executive, the constitutional court can destroy unconstitutional laws, we have the alarm bell procedure, etc… So introducing a new measure in and of itself is not necessarily eroding our democracy.

    However, this is different. N-VA wants to have final say over most verdicts of the judiciary. In practice, only the verdicts based on the most fundamental rights would be untouchable. The absolutely weird thing about this ridiculous proposal, however, **is that parliament already has this power**. All parliament has to do, in order to make sure the judiciary cannot reach the same verdict ever again, is amend the law they based their verdict on. And they can do it with a simple majority (50% + 1) instead of the 2/3 majority proposed. “Who decides, activist judges or the elected representatives?” is their catchphrase for this proposal. But… the elected representatives already have the power to decide.

    For the millionth fucking time since BDW first showed his face on tv, he is intentionally lying about how our system actually works to sneak in measures to **actually nullify a judge’s verdict**. Now, I have zero faith that they have any intention to actually push this through.

    They have a members congress coming up. My bet: Zuhal Demir has been taking the spotlight so much and BDW feels like they’ve been too soft and green in the past months. Complaining about these activist judges again (like they did in the government Michel I) is meant to soothe their extreme right wing flank. Pathetic.

  11. I know I will be downvoted, but I think the issue is much more complicated than “oh no, separation of powers!” or even “oh no, dictatorship!”.

    First, the question raised by N-VA is nothing new. It’s been discussed for decades, and it’s called the “[counter-majoritarian difficulty](https://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-73-number-2/the-history-of-the-countermajoritarian-difficulty-part-one-the-road-to-judicial-supremacy/)”. Basically unlike parliament members, judges are not elected by the people, so there are theorists who oppose judicial review because of the lack of democratic legitimacy. Even more so when judges apply an ‘activist’ outlook and interpret the constitution in an ‘evolutive’ manner, irrespective of the original intent of the constituent power. There is a concern that the judge can amend the constitution “informally” through their interpretation without resorting to the people.

    [A famous critic of judicial review by unelected judges is Jeremy Waldron](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455656):

    >The Essay criticizes judicial review on two main grounds. First, it argues that there is no reason to suppose that rights are better protected by this practice than they would be by democratic legislatures. Second, it argues that, quite apart from the outcomes it generates, judicial review is democratically illegitimate.
    >
    >(…)
    >
    >[Judicial review] does not, as is often claimed, provide a way for a society to focus clearly on the real issues at stake when citizens disagree about rights; on the contrary, it distracts them with side-issues about precedent, texts, and interpretation. And it is politically illegitimate, so far as democratic values are concerned: By privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges, it disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights.

    Second,[there is no such thing as ‘strict’ separation of power; it is accompanied with “checks and balances”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25652657):

    >As Neustadt has argued, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 did not create a government of strictly separated powers; it created a government of separate institutions that share powers. The separation of powers was not meant to be enforced exactingly. It was instead understood to permit a certain measure of overlap among the branches. This pragmatic approach reflects how government functions in practice because it is not feasible to demand and police a strict separation of powers. The Supreme Court of the United States has itself recognized that the Constitution does not require such a strict separation.
    >
    >In this spirit, the branches were given intersecting powers, exemplified by the national legislative and executive branches both being granted a role in the legislative process. The Framers freely acknowledged that this was a deviationfrom the principle of separated powers. It followed from the theory of the “partial intermixture” of powers that the Framers preferred over strict separation.

    Giving parliament the final word is also not such an alien idea. [This is called “weak-form judicial review”](https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/16/1/54/4995553):

    >First identified by Mark Tushnet, it is the idea that judicial review may be relatively broad and robust in scope but ultimately subject to equally broad override by legislatures—exercising ordinary legislative powers, or similar special powers of override subject to ordinary majority voting requirements. Judicial review of this kind aims to promote more vibrant responsive democracy, by helping counter relevant blockages in the political process. But equally, as Stephen Gardbaum has noted, it aims to answer democracy-based objections to stronger forms of judicial review, by allowing scope for majority-based decision-making procedures to play a role in the resolution of constitutional questions open to reasonable disagreement.

    Of course the independence of the judiciary still has to be maintained to prevent the concentration of power. But I don’t see how the proposal would lead to that. I think Belgium should only be alarmed if a party tries to pack the court with its members, but [even that is very unlikely given the very fragmented landscape of Belgian politics](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvqlxg5-wxw).

  12. He, ik heb een beter idee. Politiekers persoonlijk aansprakelijk stellen voor hun beleid, en rechters misleiding en valse verklaringen laten bestraffen.

  13. It should be obvious at this point why this is an extremely, extremely dangerous party. That’s coming from someone who used to vote for them, so no voter shaming from my end.

    Just be careful and don’t do it again in 2024.

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