How the euro was saved

[Lettura consigliata.](https://www.ft.com/content/f6f4d6b4-ca2e-11e3-ac05-00144feabdc0)
Prima parte di una serie sulla ricostruzione, da parte del Financial Times, del picco della crisi dell’Eurozona.
Ci sono dei passaggi davvero particolari, che mettono in risalto il contrasto tra quella che era l’idea della leadership della Merkel e del suo ruolo all’interno dell’EU, e quelli che sono i reali lasciti della cancelliera tedesca.
Inoltre, se non fosse comunque qualcosa di noto, l’articolo mette in risalto l’incapacità cronica dell’Europa di avere una qualche sorta di leadership che le permetta di affrontare autonomamente determinate crisi, senza dover ricorrere ad una qualche forma di supporto da parte degli Stati Uniti.

Lascio qualche passaggio.
*<<To the astonishment of almost everyone in the room, Angela Merkel began to cry.*
*“Das ist nicht fair.” That is not fair, the German chancellor said angrily, tears welling in her eyes. “Ich bringe mich nicht selbst um.” I am not going to commit suicide. >>*

*<< Instead, a cornered Ms Merkel threw the French and American criticism back in their faces.*
*If Mr Sarkozy or Mr Obama did not like the way her government ran, they had only themselves to blame. After all, it was their allied militaries that had “imposed” the German constitution on a defeated wartime foe six decades earlier. >>*

*<< Yet when eurozone leaders were summoned again by Mr Sarkozy at 9.30pm that night in Cannes, several were surprised to find Mr Obama chairing the meeting. “It was strange,” said a member of the German delegation. “It was also a signal that Europe was not able to do that; it was a sign of weakness.” >>*

*<< In some quarters, the White House was suspected of playing politics. “The Americans had only one objective, which is fully understandable,” said one European who dealt directly with Mr Geithner. “The eurozone has to be saved because otherwise we’ll enter into a depression in Europe, and this will impact the economy of the US and my re-election.” US denials were not entirely believed in Europe.>>*

*<<“No. Germany has one-fourth of all \[eurozone\] SDR allocations,” Mr Obama objected. “If you have all the EU countries together but not Germany . . . it starts losing credibility.”*
*Then came Ms Merkel’s tearful breakdown. “That is not fair. I cannot decide in lieu of the Bundesbank. I cannot do that.” >>*

*<<It was as if the two men had not heard her. She made the point again: “I’m not going to take such a big risk without getting anything from Italy. I’m not going to commit suicide.”*
*And with that, the meeting ended. Leaving the late-night session, Mr Obama put his arm around Ms Merkel as if to comfort her – a scene captured by the White House’s official photographer. The image adorned the walls of the West Wing for months. >>*

L’articolo è piuttosto lungo, e ho evitato di riportare gli innumerevoli tratti nei quali si sottolineano quelli che erano gli enormi problemi di affidabilità e credibilità dell’Italia, probabilmente perché è qualcosa che trovo quasi scontato rispetto a quelle che furono le debolezze generali dell’Unione, e alle difficoltà di coordinazione di questa strana bestia a 27 teste.

by Theiiaa