> **Can you give an example of coercive practices?**
> There are many types of coercive practices.
> For example, an EU trading partner may be seeking to shape future legislative initiatives of the EU or dissuade the EU from introducing a measure altogether by, for example, introducing (or threatening to introduce) extra, discriminatory import duties, intentional delays or refusing (or threatening to refuse) authorisations needed to do business. They might also impose discriminatory selective border or safety checks on goods from a given EU country, or organise state-sponsored boycotts against the goods or investors of that country.
> […]
> **Why is the ACI the right way to deal with economic coercion?**
> The EU needs to be able to respond to cases of economic coercion in a structured and uniform manner. A dedicated legislative framework ensures predictability and transparency; it underlines the EU’s adherence to a rules-based approach, also internationally.
> Predictability and transparency play a role for the deterrent function of the instrument as well.
> Procedurally, a legislative framework under the common commercial policy offers possibilities for swift and efficient action where necessary.
> A legislative framework also serves well the purposes of a platform for international cooperation on the issue of economic coercion.
> **Does the ACI target a particular country?**
> No, the ACI would not be targeting any particular country. It is treating the problem of coercion, wherever it may come from.
> It is designed as a horizontal instrument, applicable to any country using economic coercion against the EU or its Member States.
Weak and disappointing. This method rewards coercion with negotiation and gives ample warnings before any consequences. A better approach would be immediate sanctions. Then we could negotiate their removal AFTER the coercion has ended.
In this case coercion just seems to be the EU not liking other countries taking policies they dislike in response to EU policies the other country dislikes.
3 comments
More information can be found in the corresponding [Q&A]( https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_6643):
> **Can you give an example of coercive practices?**
> There are many types of coercive practices.
> For example, an EU trading partner may be seeking to shape future legislative initiatives of the EU or dissuade the EU from introducing a measure altogether by, for example, introducing (or threatening to introduce) extra, discriminatory import duties, intentional delays or refusing (or threatening to refuse) authorisations needed to do business. They might also impose discriminatory selective border or safety checks on goods from a given EU country, or organise state-sponsored boycotts against the goods or investors of that country.
> […]
> **Why is the ACI the right way to deal with economic coercion?**
> The EU needs to be able to respond to cases of economic coercion in a structured and uniform manner. A dedicated legislative framework ensures predictability and transparency; it underlines the EU’s adherence to a rules-based approach, also internationally.
> Predictability and transparency play a role for the deterrent function of the instrument as well.
> Procedurally, a legislative framework under the common commercial policy offers possibilities for swift and efficient action where necessary.
> A legislative framework also serves well the purposes of a platform for international cooperation on the issue of economic coercion.
> **Does the ACI target a particular country?**
> No, the ACI would not be targeting any particular country. It is treating the problem of coercion, wherever it may come from.
> It is designed as a horizontal instrument, applicable to any country using economic coercion against the EU or its Member States.
(Image source: [European Commission](https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/159962.htm)).
Weak and disappointing. This method rewards coercion with negotiation and gives ample warnings before any consequences. A better approach would be immediate sanctions. Then we could negotiate their removal AFTER the coercion has ended.
In this case coercion just seems to be the EU not liking other countries taking policies they dislike in response to EU policies the other country dislikes.