Without any doubt, what is a pure gesture is the foreign and defense policy of the EU.
>The same applies to Russia’s ability to bring Ukraine to its knees with a strategic air offensive. Although air defense is the Ukrainian army’s Achilles’ heel – aircraft and anti-aircraft guided missiles are all Soviet production, Russia could locate, disrupt and combat these systems well – the list of possible goals is long: first the air force and air defense must be eliminated, then the strategic one Command infrastructure, important movement lines and logistical facilities (depots, etc.) are destroyed, only then can one devote oneself to smashing the army from the air. There is no doubt that the Russian Air Force, supported by attacks with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, that could. But they need time for that.
>The time factor becomes a problem above all when a reaction by the USA and NATO cannot be ruled out. In order to prevent this, in the event of an invasion, for example, possible deployment rooms in western Ukraine would have to be occupied by paratroopers at an early stage. These would then have to hold out for days or weeks without connection to other Russian units, deep in hostile territory surrounded by Ukrainian garrison sites. In the event of a strategic bombing war, this would have to be extended to the entire civil transport infrastructure in the west, and thus in turn distract from the actual goal of smashing the Ukrainian leadership and the military.
>It is therefore more likely that Moscow will begin military aggression with limited goals: an offensive by the “separatists” would not yet mean formal Russian participation in the war. However, since Ukraine would have to hold back its reserves due to the acute threat across the border in order to protect its own depths, it would not be able to respond adequately to such an escalation. Even a limited Russian “victory” in the Donbas would destabilize Ukraine domestically and shatter confidence in the army and political leadership. Moscow could then also see whether the West could be expected or not. Should Ukraine then fail to meet Russian conditions and the West back down, one of the two options above can still be implemented.
While the author is correct that in the phases of the conflict, the center of gravity of Russian air operations and long range fire strikes would be Ukrainian infrastructure, logistics, command and communication rather than the Ukrainian maneuver units, I don’t think Russians will have to operate with any particular time constraints, and the danger of NATO intervention is non existent.
If they decide to start small in Donbass and then build up, it would be if they find such an approach sufficient, but considering that it failed to bring the desired results last time, I don’t think so.
Russia just keeping doing bad decisions after bad decisions.
Do you know the definition of insanity?
Google Translate to English:
>#The Russian deployment is more than just a threatening gesture
>
>Gustav Gressel
>
>#The Russian troop movements in and around Ukraine dominate the headlines of many media. Experts argue whether this deployment is only a threat, or at least serious preparation for war, and if the latter, how a possible war can be averted. In the latter case, Europe has not exactly covered itself with glory.
>
>#By Gustav Gressel
>
.First to the military: The Russian plans of attack circulated by the “ Washington Post ” and the “ Bild” newspaper coincide with the troop deployment observed in Russia and occupied parts of Ukraine. In Jelnja in the Smolensk Oblast, parts of the 41st Army are gathering, which could advance either through Homel in Belarus or through Bryansk in the direction of Kiyyv. The 20th Army, already stationed on the northeastern border of Ukraine, is in full combat readiness. It is reinforced by units of the first Guards Armored Army, which are gathering at the Pogonowo military training area on the Ukrainian border. Units from the Western Military District have been sighted in the area around Kursk. The 8th Army in the Rostov-on-Don region is in full combat readiness, and in the past few weeks the relocation of Russian troops and ammunition to the Donbas – where the armed forces of the so-called separatists of the 8th Army are under the control of the 8th Army – has intensified.
>
>Troops from the North Caucasus and Krasnodar are also gathering in the Crimea. The 4th Air Army in the southern military district and the 6th Air Army in the western military district are in increased operational readiness, the latter was able to put the newly renovated and expanded Voronezh-Baltimor base into operation on November 21st.
>
>##Deployment with more disguise
>
>Compared to spring, the Russian military is trying to hide the deployment and, above all, details of it from observation – troops are being relocated at night, short-term maneuvers are supposed to conceal the relocations and large parts of the border area with Ukraine have been declared a restricted area, western journalists are no longer are allowed to enter.
>
>Therefore, many details are difficult to assess. Ammunition and fuel convoys have been sighted, but the exact extent of the logistical preparation is difficult to assess. A relocation of National Guard units – a paramilitary organization that would be responsible for establishing the occupation regime in the event of an invasion – has so far only been observed in the Donbas. If a more extensive conquest and permanent occupation are planned, further units would have to be relocated.
>
>Nevertheless, the force gathered on the Ukrainian border and the occupied territories is not insignificant. On Russian territory alone there are 45 tactical battalion combat groups (BTG), plus other combat support troops (artillery, rocket artillery, pioneers, anti-aircraft) and the Russian forces in the Donbas (again more than 20 BTG, but some with less combat strength than regular Russian units) . Three airborne divisions (the 56th in Krasnodar, the 96th and 104th in the Moscow area) could also be relocated at relatively short notice.
>
>##There is already danger at Christmas
>
>This means that the Russian army would already be in a position to attack the Ukraine successfully – even if not to occupy it permanently. The time around Christmas, when decisions take a little longer in the West – could already be dangerous. If a long-term occupation is sought, further forces, in particular the National Guard and special forces to fight guerrilla forces, would have to be brought in, which for the attack date from January-February 2022 cited in the “Washington Post” and “Bild” with far more forces (75-100 BTG to Einmarsch, 50-100 BTG for occupation tasks) speaks.
>
>The Russian preparations for war are therefore to be regarded as serious. However, the preparation and preparation of possible military scenarios are also part of the duties of an army, so that does not automatically mean that President Vladimir Putin will also order an operation. What could stop him?
>
>First of all, unfortunately, one has to assume that Moscow sees Ukraine’s will to resist – even beyond a Russian victory – as less than it should. Even relatively liberal circles refer to Ukrainians who are willing to resist as “nationalists” and do not take the possibility of an independent Ukrainian reaction – regardless of decisions by the West – very seriously. This is of course Moscow wishful thinking, but has internalized itself through decades of propaganda in such a way that it is taken for facts.
>
>Furthermore, massive repression in connection with strict surveillance of digital communication based on the Chinese model has already successfully contributed to the suppression of opposition movements in Belarus and Russia. The Kremlin might consider this problem solvable. In the meantime, public opinion in Russia seems to support a war, the only question is how long and at what price it would continue to do so once the “common people” bubble burst bloodily.
>
>##Air defense is Ukraine’s Achilles’ heel
>
>The time factor is problematic, at least from Putin’s world view. The Ukrainian army has not been in the desolate state of 2014 when it was expected that Russia would march through to the Romanian border in three to four days. Seven battle-tested airmobile brigades of professional soldiers, four armored and nine mechanized brigades form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense. Despite all of Russia’s material superiority, it will take time to wrestle this down. In 1939, Poland held out the Wehrmacht for five weeks in a similarly hopeless situation, the 2020 Karabakh War was also decided early, but lasted a week longer despite the smaller geographical area.
>
>The same applies to Russia’s ability to bring Ukraine to its knees with a strategic air offensive. Air defense is the Ukrainian army’s Achilles’ heel – aircraft and anti-aircraft guided missiles are all Soviet production, Russia could locate, disrupt and combat these systems well – but the list of possible goals is long: first the air force and air defense would have to be eliminated, then the strategic one Command infrastructure, important movement lines and logistical facilities (depots, etc.) are destroyed, only then can one devote oneself to smashing the army from the air. There is no doubt that the Russian Air Force,supported by attacks with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, that could. But they need time for that.
>
>The time factor becomes a problem above all when a reaction by the USA and NATO cannot be ruled out. In order to prevent this, in the event of an invasion, for example, possible deployment rooms in western Ukraine would have to be occupied by paratroopers at an early stage. These would then have to hold out for days or weeks without connection to other Russian units, deep in hostile territory surrounded by Ukrainian garrison sites. In the event of a strategic bombing war, this would have to be extended to the entire civil transport infrastructure in the west, and thus in turn distract from the actual goal of smashing the Ukrainian leadership and the military.
>
>It is therefore more likely that Moscow will begin military aggression with limited goals: an offensive by the “separatists” would not yet mean formal Russian participation in the war. However, since Ukraine would have to hold back its reserves due to the acute threat across the border in order to protect its own depths, it would not be able to respond adequately to such an escalation. Even a limited Russian “victory” in the Donbas would destabilize Ukraine domestically and shatter confidence in the army and political leadership. Moscow could then also see whether the West could be expected or not. Should Ukraine then fail to meet Russian conditions and the West back down, one of the two options above can still be implemented.If the costs are rated as disproportionately high, Putin can still reset without jeopardizing domestic political credibility.
[see child comment for remainder due to length limitations]
It’s pretty clear that this buildup is different both quantitatively and qualitatively from the buildup that happened this spring. It’s costing Putin millions every day to keep all the artillery and soldiers there… and with catholic Christmas Eve being tomorrow I wonder if he’s planning to start something while the rest of the west is looking the other way.
This is propaganda. Why are articles like this even allowed?
I’ve been listening to a ww2 podcast about the münich crisis, and damn is this situation familiar.
Once everyone is convinced war is already here, you can say “ok one more chance to sort this out peacefully”, and you can get concessions you couldn’t before.
7 comments
Without any doubt, what is a pure gesture is the foreign and defense policy of the EU.
>The same applies to Russia’s ability to bring Ukraine to its knees with a strategic air offensive. Although air defense is the Ukrainian army’s Achilles’ heel – aircraft and anti-aircraft guided missiles are all Soviet production, Russia could locate, disrupt and combat these systems well – the list of possible goals is long: first the air force and air defense must be eliminated, then the strategic one Command infrastructure, important movement lines and logistical facilities (depots, etc.) are destroyed, only then can one devote oneself to smashing the army from the air. There is no doubt that the Russian Air Force, supported by attacks with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, that could. But they need time for that.
>The time factor becomes a problem above all when a reaction by the USA and NATO cannot be ruled out. In order to prevent this, in the event of an invasion, for example, possible deployment rooms in western Ukraine would have to be occupied by paratroopers at an early stage. These would then have to hold out for days or weeks without connection to other Russian units, deep in hostile territory surrounded by Ukrainian garrison sites. In the event of a strategic bombing war, this would have to be extended to the entire civil transport infrastructure in the west, and thus in turn distract from the actual goal of smashing the Ukrainian leadership and the military.
>It is therefore more likely that Moscow will begin military aggression with limited goals: an offensive by the “separatists” would not yet mean formal Russian participation in the war. However, since Ukraine would have to hold back its reserves due to the acute threat across the border in order to protect its own depths, it would not be able to respond adequately to such an escalation. Even a limited Russian “victory” in the Donbas would destabilize Ukraine domestically and shatter confidence in the army and political leadership. Moscow could then also see whether the West could be expected or not. Should Ukraine then fail to meet Russian conditions and the West back down, one of the two options above can still be implemented.
While the author is correct that in the phases of the conflict, the center of gravity of Russian air operations and long range fire strikes would be Ukrainian infrastructure, logistics, command and communication rather than the Ukrainian maneuver units, I don’t think Russians will have to operate with any particular time constraints, and the danger of NATO intervention is non existent.
If they decide to start small in Donbass and then build up, it would be if they find such an approach sufficient, but considering that it failed to bring the desired results last time, I don’t think so.
Russia just keeping doing bad decisions after bad decisions.
Do you know the definition of insanity?
Google Translate to English:
>#The Russian deployment is more than just a threatening gesture
>
>Gustav Gressel
>
>#The Russian troop movements in and around Ukraine dominate the headlines of many media. Experts argue whether this deployment is only a threat, or at least serious preparation for war, and if the latter, how a possible war can be averted. In the latter case, Europe has not exactly covered itself with glory.
>
>#By Gustav Gressel
>
.First to the military: The Russian plans of attack circulated by the “ Washington Post ” and the “ Bild” newspaper coincide with the troop deployment observed in Russia and occupied parts of Ukraine. In Jelnja in the Smolensk Oblast, parts of the 41st Army are gathering, which could advance either through Homel in Belarus or through Bryansk in the direction of Kiyyv. The 20th Army, already stationed on the northeastern border of Ukraine, is in full combat readiness. It is reinforced by units of the first Guards Armored Army, which are gathering at the Pogonowo military training area on the Ukrainian border. Units from the Western Military District have been sighted in the area around Kursk. The 8th Army in the Rostov-on-Don region is in full combat readiness, and in the past few weeks the relocation of Russian troops and ammunition to the Donbas – where the armed forces of the so-called separatists of the 8th Army are under the control of the 8th Army – has intensified.
>
>Troops from the North Caucasus and Krasnodar are also gathering in the Crimea. The 4th Air Army in the southern military district and the 6th Air Army in the western military district are in increased operational readiness, the latter was able to put the newly renovated and expanded Voronezh-Baltimor base into operation on November 21st.
>
>##Deployment with more disguise
>
>Compared to spring, the Russian military is trying to hide the deployment and, above all, details of it from observation – troops are being relocated at night, short-term maneuvers are supposed to conceal the relocations and large parts of the border area with Ukraine have been declared a restricted area, western journalists are no longer are allowed to enter.
>
>Therefore, many details are difficult to assess. Ammunition and fuel convoys have been sighted, but the exact extent of the logistical preparation is difficult to assess. A relocation of National Guard units – a paramilitary organization that would be responsible for establishing the occupation regime in the event of an invasion – has so far only been observed in the Donbas. If a more extensive conquest and permanent occupation are planned, further units would have to be relocated.
>
>Nevertheless, the force gathered on the Ukrainian border and the occupied territories is not insignificant. On Russian territory alone there are 45 tactical battalion combat groups (BTG), plus other combat support troops (artillery, rocket artillery, pioneers, anti-aircraft) and the Russian forces in the Donbas (again more than 20 BTG, but some with less combat strength than regular Russian units) . Three airborne divisions (the 56th in Krasnodar, the 96th and 104th in the Moscow area) could also be relocated at relatively short notice.
>
>##There is already danger at Christmas
>
>This means that the Russian army would already be in a position to attack the Ukraine successfully – even if not to occupy it permanently. The time around Christmas, when decisions take a little longer in the West – could already be dangerous. If a long-term occupation is sought, further forces, in particular the National Guard and special forces to fight guerrilla forces, would have to be brought in, which for the attack date from January-February 2022 cited in the “Washington Post” and “Bild” with far more forces (75-100 BTG to Einmarsch, 50-100 BTG for occupation tasks) speaks.
>
>The Russian preparations for war are therefore to be regarded as serious. However, the preparation and preparation of possible military scenarios are also part of the duties of an army, so that does not automatically mean that President Vladimir Putin will also order an operation. What could stop him?
>
>First of all, unfortunately, one has to assume that Moscow sees Ukraine’s will to resist – even beyond a Russian victory – as less than it should. Even relatively liberal circles refer to Ukrainians who are willing to resist as “nationalists” and do not take the possibility of an independent Ukrainian reaction – regardless of decisions by the West – very seriously. This is of course Moscow wishful thinking, but has internalized itself through decades of propaganda in such a way that it is taken for facts.
>
>Furthermore, massive repression in connection with strict surveillance of digital communication based on the Chinese model has already successfully contributed to the suppression of opposition movements in Belarus and Russia. The Kremlin might consider this problem solvable. In the meantime, public opinion in Russia seems to support a war, the only question is how long and at what price it would continue to do so once the “common people” bubble burst bloodily.
>
>##Air defense is Ukraine’s Achilles’ heel
>
>The time factor is problematic, at least from Putin’s world view. The Ukrainian army has not been in the desolate state of 2014 when it was expected that Russia would march through to the Romanian border in three to four days. Seven battle-tested airmobile brigades of professional soldiers, four armored and nine mechanized brigades form the backbone of the Ukrainian defense. Despite all of Russia’s material superiority, it will take time to wrestle this down. In 1939, Poland held out the Wehrmacht for five weeks in a similarly hopeless situation, the 2020 Karabakh War was also decided early, but lasted a week longer despite the smaller geographical area.
>
>The same applies to Russia’s ability to bring Ukraine to its knees with a strategic air offensive. Air defense is the Ukrainian army’s Achilles’ heel – aircraft and anti-aircraft guided missiles are all Soviet production, Russia could locate, disrupt and combat these systems well – but the list of possible goals is long: first the air force and air defense would have to be eliminated, then the strategic one Command infrastructure, important movement lines and logistical facilities (depots, etc.) are destroyed, only then can one devote oneself to smashing the army from the air. There is no doubt that the Russian Air Force,supported by attacks with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, that could. But they need time for that.
>
>The time factor becomes a problem above all when a reaction by the USA and NATO cannot be ruled out. In order to prevent this, in the event of an invasion, for example, possible deployment rooms in western Ukraine would have to be occupied by paratroopers at an early stage. These would then have to hold out for days or weeks without connection to other Russian units, deep in hostile territory surrounded by Ukrainian garrison sites. In the event of a strategic bombing war, this would have to be extended to the entire civil transport infrastructure in the west, and thus in turn distract from the actual goal of smashing the Ukrainian leadership and the military.
>
>It is therefore more likely that Moscow will begin military aggression with limited goals: an offensive by the “separatists” would not yet mean formal Russian participation in the war. However, since Ukraine would have to hold back its reserves due to the acute threat across the border in order to protect its own depths, it would not be able to respond adequately to such an escalation. Even a limited Russian “victory” in the Donbas would destabilize Ukraine domestically and shatter confidence in the army and political leadership. Moscow could then also see whether the West could be expected or not. Should Ukraine then fail to meet Russian conditions and the West back down, one of the two options above can still be implemented.If the costs are rated as disproportionately high, Putin can still reset without jeopardizing domestic political credibility.
[see child comment for remainder due to length limitations]
It’s pretty clear that this buildup is different both quantitatively and qualitatively from the buildup that happened this spring. It’s costing Putin millions every day to keep all the artillery and soldiers there… and with catholic Christmas Eve being tomorrow I wonder if he’s planning to start something while the rest of the west is looking the other way.
This is propaganda. Why are articles like this even allowed?
I’ve been listening to a ww2 podcast about the münich crisis, and damn is this situation familiar.
Once everyone is convinced war is already here, you can say “ok one more chance to sort this out peacefully”, and you can get concessions you couldn’t before.