A well thought out and considered comment on a resurgent Russia. It’s easy to get caught up in the rhetoric of potential Russian aggression, but Russia does not present an existential threat like perhaps China does. Nato still possesses the ability to contain Russia.
This is based on author’s poorly argumented opinion that this is all some sort of a bluff rather than an actual prelude to use of force.
Edit:
I’m starting to suspect that agents of Russian malign influence are trying to downvote and hide messages saying that use of force is likely.
This could be a part of a maskirovka on social networks, trying to downplay the threat and achieve the element of surprise.
Wasn’t it the west who was claiming there would be agression, without any proof until now?
Is it?
1. Russia bulies and terorises it’s neighbors.
2. Neighbors seek safety in Nato
3. Russia surprisedpicachu.jpg
Maybe if you’d stop fucking with your neighbors they wouldn’t want to join Nato in the first place.
Well, Putin is not great at smart decisions. Otherwise, he wouldn’t fuck up the internal politics in Russia that much either.
I did not realize just how violently my comment criticizing this as wishful thinking was downvoted. People like to read nice things and delude themselves I guess. How nice it would be if this problem just solved itself?
Anyway, here’s a comment on this article from Rob Lee, an actual expert. Enjoy.
>A better explanation is that Russia realizes that Ukraine will be a long-term hostile neighbor, is determined to retake the Donbas, is arming itself for that purpose, and it is better to act now before Kyiv has greater conventional deterrence (can target Russian cities/bases)
>Ukraine is a national security threat that pins down much of the Russian Ground Forces needed to defend the Donbas. Either Russia will try to force changes to Ukraine’s constitution/political orientation or force NATO to stop strengthening its military to “solve” that threat. 2/
>A Russian military operation would be much more costly if Ukraine has cruise and ballistic missiles that could target important Russian bases and cities, and future Russian coercion efforts would be weaker if Ukraine had those kind of capabilities. 3/
>I think Moscow believes that Kyiv won’t make any concessions unless they are forced to by Washington or by Russian military force. Putin is currently trying with the former (and not attempting negotiations with Kyiv) and will likely attempt the latter if it fails. 4/
>Russia has broader security concerns with NATO and is using this as an opportunity to try to solve some of those with the threat of force against Ukraine. But the events in Ukraine are the more pressing concern for Moscow (and NATO membership isn’t the proximate cause). 5/
>Russia’s current actions are not routine. They have given:
>1) specific demands
>2) tied to a short timeline
>3) promising a “military and military-technical” response
>4) with substantial military capabilities capable of an escalation including an invasion on short notice. 6/
>They are deliberately backing themselves into a corner where their credibility will be questioned if they don’t achieve concessions or use military force. These are classic elements of a compellence strategy, which usually requires force if the target doesn’t change its behavior.
>There are different tiers of force that can be used as part of compellence, so a large-scale invasion isn’t the only possible option. Russia could shoot down TB2, target Ukrainian artillery/MLRS used in the Donbas, or unleash its long-range fires on the Ukrainian military. 8/
>The key questions:
>-how ambitious are Russia’s objectives?
>-how much force does Moscow believe it has to use to force Kyiv to make those concessions?
>I’m not sure, but Russia is making it clear it considers the current events unacceptable and worthy of using force to stop them.
>The spring buildup failed to achieves Russia’s aims at deterring these steps, and the HMS Defender incident, Ukrainian TB2 strike in the Donbas (the footage was released publicly), and NATO bomber flights over Ukraine/Black Sea, etc. are public embarrassments for Moscow. 10/
>I think there are restraints for Moscow about what kind of military force is possible (i.e. I think killing civilians or damaging Ukrainian cities would be very unpopular among Russians), but Russia can inflict serious pain on the Ukrainian military without a larger invasion. 11/
>So when we try to assess Moscow’s cost-benefit analysis of using force against Ukraine we need to not just assess the costs of an escalation for Russia, but also their perceived costs of *not* “solving” this issue now, which they likely think is greater.
>We shouldn’t forget about the Karabakh example for Moscow and Kyiv. Azerbaijan was determined to retake those regions, spent decades of heavy defense spending and arms imports to prepare, and then attacked when the balance of power shifted with the support of a NATO member. 12/
>I don’t know what Putin is thinking, but Russia’s rhetoric and actions are in line with an attempt at compellence and there will be a credibility cost if they don’t act or achieve concessions. Since the latter is unlikely, I think a military escalation is more likely than not.13/
Our threat assessment over the past months has changed when it comes to Ukraine. We now perceive and urgent need to nip the Ukraine issue in the bud now than having to absorb a more costly conflict in the future. Ukraine is embolden by military support from the West and under the auspices of train and assist support from NATO, they are arming themselves with inventory that will put us towards a far more costly confrontation.
We are now engaging their masters in Washington to reign in their dogs. This includes a security guarantee to stop supplying offensive capabilities to Ukraine because sooner or later, they’ll feel confident enough to make an attempt on the Donbas. Diplomacy is being given one last throw of the dice and I believe even the U.S is taking this seriously because their intelligence intercepts would have confirmed to them that if they don’t contain Ukraine, stop the supply of armaments, they will very well be giving us the nod to do what we feel necessary.
We don’t plan to invade Ukraine but we will certainly inflict pain with precision strikes and overwhelming force that will roll back their military capability for decades to come and empower the Donbas forces as a sort of ‘free Ukrainian army’ to use as a pain point to keep the country unstable for a long time.
Guys, we need russia for their oil, what if we make friends with them and the US? Make them all friendlier? one less “strategic challenger” always helps? Reach out now, make friends, putin is in his 60’s, he might stay in power for at least another 10 or 15 after that, we make friends with the new guy?
Is it? All these articles on Russia and Ukraine feel like they will be completely irrelevant in 1 month, 1 year, 10 years.
10 comments
A well thought out and considered comment on a resurgent Russia. It’s easy to get caught up in the rhetoric of potential Russian aggression, but Russia does not present an existential threat like perhaps China does. Nato still possesses the ability to contain Russia.
This is based on author’s poorly argumented opinion that this is all some sort of a bluff rather than an actual prelude to use of force.
Edit:
I’m starting to suspect that agents of Russian malign influence are trying to downvote and hide messages saying that use of force is likely.
This could be a part of a maskirovka on social networks, trying to downplay the threat and achieve the element of surprise.
Wasn’t it the west who was claiming there would be agression, without any proof until now?
Is it?
1. Russia bulies and terorises it’s neighbors.
2. Neighbors seek safety in Nato
3. Russia surprisedpicachu.jpg
Maybe if you’d stop fucking with your neighbors they wouldn’t want to join Nato in the first place.
Well, Putin is not great at smart decisions. Otherwise, he wouldn’t fuck up the internal politics in Russia that much either.
I did not realize just how violently my comment criticizing this as wishful thinking was downvoted. People like to read nice things and delude themselves I guess. How nice it would be if this problem just solved itself?
Anyway, here’s a comment on this article from Rob Lee, an actual expert. Enjoy.
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1476639117471629317
>A better explanation is that Russia realizes that Ukraine will be a long-term hostile neighbor, is determined to retake the Donbas, is arming itself for that purpose, and it is better to act now before Kyiv has greater conventional deterrence (can target Russian cities/bases)
>Ukraine is a national security threat that pins down much of the Russian Ground Forces needed to defend the Donbas. Either Russia will try to force changes to Ukraine’s constitution/political orientation or force NATO to stop strengthening its military to “solve” that threat. 2/
>A Russian military operation would be much more costly if Ukraine has cruise and ballistic missiles that could target important Russian bases and cities, and future Russian coercion efforts would be weaker if Ukraine had those kind of capabilities. 3/
>I think Moscow believes that Kyiv won’t make any concessions unless they are forced to by Washington or by Russian military force. Putin is currently trying with the former (and not attempting negotiations with Kyiv) and will likely attempt the latter if it fails. 4/
>Russia has broader security concerns with NATO and is using this as an opportunity to try to solve some of those with the threat of force against Ukraine. But the events in Ukraine are the more pressing concern for Moscow (and NATO membership isn’t the proximate cause). 5/
>Russia’s current actions are not routine. They have given:
>1) specific demands
>2) tied to a short timeline
>3) promising a “military and military-technical” response
>4) with substantial military capabilities capable of an escalation including an invasion on short notice. 6/
>They are deliberately backing themselves into a corner where their credibility will be questioned if they don’t achieve concessions or use military force. These are classic elements of a compellence strategy, which usually requires force if the target doesn’t change its behavior.
>There are different tiers of force that can be used as part of compellence, so a large-scale invasion isn’t the only possible option. Russia could shoot down TB2, target Ukrainian artillery/MLRS used in the Donbas, or unleash its long-range fires on the Ukrainian military. 8/
>The key questions:
>-how ambitious are Russia’s objectives?
>-how much force does Moscow believe it has to use to force Kyiv to make those concessions?
>I’m not sure, but Russia is making it clear it considers the current events unacceptable and worthy of using force to stop them.
>The spring buildup failed to achieves Russia’s aims at deterring these steps, and the HMS Defender incident, Ukrainian TB2 strike in the Donbas (the footage was released publicly), and NATO bomber flights over Ukraine/Black Sea, etc. are public embarrassments for Moscow. 10/
>I think there are restraints for Moscow about what kind of military force is possible (i.e. I think killing civilians or damaging Ukrainian cities would be very unpopular among Russians), but Russia can inflict serious pain on the Ukrainian military without a larger invasion. 11/
>So when we try to assess Moscow’s cost-benefit analysis of using force against Ukraine we need to not just assess the costs of an escalation for Russia, but also their perceived costs of *not* “solving” this issue now, which they likely think is greater.
>We shouldn’t forget about the Karabakh example for Moscow and Kyiv. Azerbaijan was determined to retake those regions, spent decades of heavy defense spending and arms imports to prepare, and then attacked when the balance of power shifted with the support of a NATO member. 12/
>I don’t know what Putin is thinking, but Russia’s rhetoric and actions are in line with an attempt at compellence and there will be a credibility cost if they don’t act or achieve concessions. Since the latter is unlikely, I think a military escalation is more likely than not.13/
Our threat assessment over the past months has changed when it comes to Ukraine. We now perceive and urgent need to nip the Ukraine issue in the bud now than having to absorb a more costly conflict in the future. Ukraine is embolden by military support from the West and under the auspices of train and assist support from NATO, they are arming themselves with inventory that will put us towards a far more costly confrontation.
We are now engaging their masters in Washington to reign in their dogs. This includes a security guarantee to stop supplying offensive capabilities to Ukraine because sooner or later, they’ll feel confident enough to make an attempt on the Donbas. Diplomacy is being given one last throw of the dice and I believe even the U.S is taking this seriously because their intelligence intercepts would have confirmed to them that if they don’t contain Ukraine, stop the supply of armaments, they will very well be giving us the nod to do what we feel necessary.
We don’t plan to invade Ukraine but we will certainly inflict pain with precision strikes and overwhelming force that will roll back their military capability for decades to come and empower the Donbas forces as a sort of ‘free Ukrainian army’ to use as a pain point to keep the country unstable for a long time.
Guys, we need russia for their oil, what if we make friends with them and the US? Make them all friendlier? one less “strategic challenger” always helps? Reach out now, make friends, putin is in his 60’s, he might stay in power for at least another 10 or 15 after that, we make friends with the new guy?
Is it? All these articles on Russia and Ukraine feel like they will be completely irrelevant in 1 month, 1 year, 10 years.
There’s just far too little known.