How Putin failed to achieve his military aims in Ukraine by satellite | Sean Bell & Philip Ingram

How Putin failed to achieve his military aims in Ukraine by satellite | Sean Bell & Philip Ingram

I don’t think there will be easily any resolution to this conflict that delivers success to President Putin part of the reason why it has all gone wrong is the type of operation that they were doing was building on what they had done in 2014 with the little green men the gru coming in that liberation of KH was a really powerful symbolic message to the world and yet it’s also proven to be probably an Achilles heel for zinsky but it always goes back to the same old Playbook and the old Playbook is get into a game of attrition you are Putin’s in a circle cuz this is fundamental to the conflict how do you take truth to power what was interesting at the beginning of the conflict and and pre Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine was the buildup that was going on now Vladimir Putin in the Years beforehand had run a number of different exercises and Maneuvers threatening the Ukrainian border so um prior to February 20 22 um there was for a a run-up period people wondering whether this was another series of exercises or whether Vladimir Putin was serious about an invasion of Ukraine and I produced a series of indicators and warnings um which every intelligence officer does and was sitting ticking them off and then you could see a change in the rhetoric in some of the comments that were coming out from the United States and the United Kingdom and um some of the information that was leaking into the public domain was um more detailed than you would have expected and this was clearly British intelligence and US intelligence pushing stuff out to try and suggest Vladimir Putin don’t we know what you’re doing and for me you know I produced a series of Assessments and you know indicated the date and time of Russia’s crossing the line of departure almost to the minute um but that was because you know those indicators and warnings were flagging up and the big one for me was the report of the blood outload um into forward field hospitals because you don’t outload perishable medical supplies and blood in particular unless you going to do something with it um and it was all about the logistics identifying the ammunition outload identifying the combat supplies outload um uh and all of that put in places which could support formations as as they were going across across the border I don’t know what you saw yeah I I I probably looked less tactically and more strategically because um in 2014 obviously Russia went into Crimea and U wanted to test what the West’s reaction would be and apart from a few stiff letters really nothing happened but I think within days um Ukraine had cut off the water supply fresh water supply now 85% of the fresh water came from kof the dam and Beyond and all of a sudden you could sense this friction building the battle in the D you know the the the um long war that happened there and you just felt this is unfinished business and all of a sudden when the troops started massing again the the in between years Ukraine had talked about joining the EU um that was uncomfortable Putin then there was talk about joining NATO and suddenly you just sense this whole um imagine NATO on the doorstep of Russia on the doorstep of Crimea the strategically important port to sasap pole and it’s meant to be Crimea that’s part of Ukraine and yet Russia saw that as absolutely part of Russia and all of a sudden that everything was in place now and then as you say masses of forces on the border and it seemed a degree of inevitability that Putin would go in the question then became the West was just prevaricating going what are we going to do about it and I think what was fascinating then is the expectation was certainly from Moscow was this will be over in 3 to 10 days well and yeah well it wasn’t just Moscow that that expectation came from and and what was clear to me was um from the way the intelligence came out and the way the West reacted was the intelligence was five eyes intelligence so UK US Canada Australia and New Zealand have got a special intelligence relationship um which um Native countries are extremely jealous of um and we get you know the the German Chancellor turning around say saying there’s no point in doing anything you Ukraine is going to fall within a couple of days and European leaders sort of following um an element of that but then the favored European leaders who get back briefed on you what five eyes Community is saying were slightly more hesitant um and I think the five eyes Community were sitting back and just watching to see what the um initial reaction would be because what was quite clear was ukrainians knew what the Russian plan was and had put an an aw lot of measures in place to counter that plan were they though cuz I i’ sort of um noted that back in in the dbass region Ukraine had put most of their forces down there expecting that would be the main effort for Russia whereas actually although there was a little bit of a furor there the main effort appears to be to go against Kei uh and and and therefore that led to this huge number and of course the other thing that um as military guys we would tend to look at this through a military lens but Russia didn’t use its military to leave the operation it loses the FSB well exactly and this and they were ill placed with no plan B so all and and this is where you know it’s interesting you say that because I had assessed that the main effort was going to come through the East through the dbas um because from a a military perspective um if you’re going to have maximum effect in capturing territory to influence the toppling of um a government then it would have been pushing through the East where um the ukrainians would have had difficulty because they were keeping some some of their troops back for um uh keev and and elsewhere um the Russians missed out on that I I think their plan to try and topple the zalinsky government from a pure planning perspective was really good you know put um uh their intelligence services on the ground to try and identify zilinsky other key leaders secure government areas inside cave um whilst you put a an Airborne um and um air um air mobile uh attack into uh an airport um and you capture that airport bring your Airborne forces in and they wait and control the area while you’re waiting for the ground forces to link up it’s a bridge too far moment type tactic um unfortunately the Russian planning didn’t go into the detail and overestimated their own capabilities and grossly overestimated their own capabilities whenever um it became apparent that the ukrainians had been prepared for this to a degree so they shot down a number of the helicopters that were coming in they managed to have more than just local defense troops the public statement is that those local defense troops around um uh um around the airport that managed to push the Russians back where they were you Gru and um highly trained Russian paratroopers then the Russians lost two Transport Aircraft they probably lost a battalion or two two battalions of airborne troops that were due to be air landed into the secured Airfield and that just took the impetus out of it whilst that was happening the the the column of armored vehicles that were coming down the ukrainians trained in Ambush techniques using British supplied weapons and US supplied weapons cut the head off the um uh the Convoy come down cut the tail off then just started attack in the middle at will but but I I do wonder whether fundamentally Russia thought thought that this wouldn’t be a military conflict I agree they they thought that the ukrainians um had been nified that they were under a government that was forcing them therefore they’d welcome the troops in with open arms that seems to be the narrative that’s played out and if you believe that then you would conduct a half-hearted military campaign more to intimidate people and the moment actually Ukraine steps up with bravery tenacity and actually some degree of military capability as well that’s a shock 40m Convoy stand still right target suddenly there’s a rethink moment for Russia and again they got their Basics wrong you the the route they came down was ideal for getting into into keev but you couldn’t maneuver off it with armored capability so anyone would have realized and I you I remember planning for NATO going into Kosovo and one of the big areas of concern that we had was the main route in um going up went through two massive tunnel areas that could have been stopped by two people in them they’ have they’ stop the whole of NATO coming in which is why we had a massive left hook from the Germans going in through Albania um and the Americans prepared to take a massive right hook if if necessary uh and that would have gone through Serbia itself luckily that didn’t have to happen so they got a lot of their basic intelligent preparation of the battle space wrong and their understanding of the ukrainians wrong and it was quite clear that they had not identified the the amount of preparation that was going on and the svr Agents that were running around it was a bit like Keystone Cops at times you they’ pop up in an armored SUV um and all of a sudden they disappear and they weren’t getting the messaging back into the Russian decision- making but again Putin sitting in his exalted level behind his great big oak desk in Moscow with um his very large glass of vodka um over in best Russian Crystal with his white cat on his knee being briefed by everyone saying of course they’re going to they’re going to give in and everything else was proved that you know people who work from that hierarchical perspective can easily be misled and that can lead to consequences further down the line and the consequences are from a strategic perspective Putin has already lost the conflict yeah so the battle for bmot um was the most bloody battle I think since World War II um I think history will judge that about 30,000 casualties but I think if when history books are written about this it for two reasons it I think it’s fascinating one of which is it became a meat grinder mother of all meat grinders um which was a concern to Putin so he brought the Vagner group in you have gen progan loads of prisoners convicts because assuming that Russians would be happier watching convicts die in in a meat grinder than they would their own sons and okay so these guys were just thrown at the Battle phas I think that was and the second one which I think is also fascinating is there was lots of military advice being given to zalinski don’t get dragged into to a war of attrition a war of attrition is almost medieval it’s two armies meeting on a pre-ordained battlefield having a cup of tea it’s 8:00 right we go at each other and the biggest strongest survives well if you have the bigger Army that is a battle you’re going to win so don’t get drawn into that and yet for a m for a matter of Pride um for it became hugely symbolic the whole battle for bmot and I think although it started with a main assault in August um it wasn’t until uh May that finally you know so it was some months later before actually uh Russia prevailed on the battlefields it left the whole place devastated but strategically not an important town tactically all sorts of messaging flowing from that so it’s it’s interesting I got a slightly different take on it um and you know we we both analyze this from our from from our own similar perspectives and and we come up with different ways I think the battle for bmot um highlighted a couple of things one inside the inside Russia initially when prosan was brought in um it was Putin trying to find a different way of doing things um and giving a stop to pran who was his good friend um and giving him something to do inside Ukraine Pro because I think pran wanted to maintain that level of influence that’s in there but that created real frictions between pran gasimov Shu um and and everyone in the hierarchy and and those frictions are what ended up in PR eventually being withdrawn from the area and the the attempted coup that we know of I think from a Ukrainian perspective the ukrainians recognized that Bak mut had become this psychological fixation for the Russians both from a political perspective you Putin had to get it pran said he was it was going to capture it um and from the military perspective they’ thrown so many resources at it that um they thought that by throwing more resources at it in typical Russian or Soviet style that they’ just break through from the Ukrainian perspective they saw it as a perfect opportunity to fix the Russians they fixed them in place they fixed them politically they fixed them militarily and that allowed the ukrainians to do something that we haven’t given them full credit for they they took a large proportion of their combat prepared troops and put them out into the UK and other Western countries to be trained to be trained in new tactics to pick up new pieces of equipment to be trained on how to fight the Bradley how to fight Western tanks and you the the the fighting a western tank is so completely different to fighting um a a a Russian tank because the Dynamics inside the vehicle change it’s a crew of four a crew of three and as soon as you get changes like that and and you’ve got changes of tactics and everything else trying to change the way you fight and trying to re-equip yourself with different equipment and new equipments and such a variety of equipments whilst you’re in contact with the Enemy and a stronger enemy that’s pushing forward you need to create that time um and you there’s a great military activity that you we’ve both been involved in which is trading space for time and I think the ukrainians creaded the little bit of bmot space for the time to allow them to take a big chunk of the military get them retrained and get them prepared to go back in again and and when they came back in again that’s when we saw the ukrainians start to push for this this um counter offensive last year but they didn’t have the wherewithal to carry out that cont and that’s where for me it doesn’t it doesn’t quite tie up um I I I get that logic but um as you say I think the the history books that we written about B mood and come up with their own ideas about it we still don’t know the Ukrainian casualties throughout that period but um many reports suggest they were as many significant um maybe not quite as many um and I think as you say it did Mark the end of pran or the beginning of the end because despite his best efforts he wasn’t able to get the ammunition from gaso who who were playing games going right um our army has been criticized for being ineffective progan was throwing criticisms at the Army saying I can do it but actually you can only do it by me grind during his way criticize Sher defense you know right was on the wall exactly and and he he didn’t ask to choose which window or he wasn’t as to have a heart attack next weekend oh no he his plane blew up yes well you Mar opul in the early days of Russia’s reinvasion became symbolic for the ukrainians I think um they expected it to fall completely until the um the azof balion um decided to you carry out kuster’s last stand in the as of steel Works um and there were two issues with that one politically they had been formed almost in a private Army way in the Ukrainian Army and that private the private Army links um were linked to extreme right wing and that played into Putin’s Nazism cry that was there but that had changed a number of years beforehand and they were an integral part of the r the the Ukrainian military um and were slightly more highly trained but I think it got into the point where it showed the resolve of individuals and individual Fighters and individual commanders especially when a lot of them were protecting their families um and their friends who were living you know under the under the steel works in the tunnels and bits and pieces and it showed the complexity of fighting and built up areas especially whenever you’ve got um a force that’s able to go underground to protect itself but then pop up and different places and elsewhere we’re not seeing that in other conflict around the world at the moment but and it then became this psychological um symbolism for both the Russians who thought this is this is a a mosquito in the room we have to swat it and in military terms it really was but for the ukrainians it was a symbol of resolve that increased this this feeling of nationalism and yes we can um hold the Russians at Bay um and that’s what played out over the the weeks and months that the AO Battalion held yeah I I buy into that I think as you say it’s on the coast um there were lots of reports even today that talk about Russia’s actually objective is the whole of the South Coast across through adessa build a land bridge to M mova and transnistria and actually marup pole was a stepping stone towards that one they had to have yeah I think what was fascinating though again sitting back when the books are written I suspect that we’re only talking about two or three months after the initial Invasion Ukraine is on the back foot things are looking pretty bleak for Ukraine the Western Community hasn’t stepped in and offering loads of support um and the Very fact that A Few Good Men are locked up uh surrounded in battle as you say Custer’s Last Stand and rather than giving out whichever you know logic would dictate they fought on and it became a really powerful symbol for I think zalinski of to Russia going you ain’t going to have this easy you know you might have the bulk but we’ve got the spirit we’ve got The Bravery we’ve got the tenacity this is not going to be a rollover and I think the legends of marup probably are still powerful today in the resolve of you and Ukrainian Air Force coming in your resupplies going in command and control coming in ammunition resupplies going in by helicopter pilots on suicide missions you know most of them didn’t get back out again um and they and they they still flew into try to support what was going on which showed the psychological impact that there was on the whole thing and I think that you the the the failure of Russia to capture keev and then the length of time it took them to secure the azof steel factory at Mar opo was the beginning of the end of Russia’s you um aspirations outside that pure Eastern donbas region and I agree it’s it’s to get that land bridge but again I I think it goes back to there must have been some people back in Russia after that who went there there ought to be a plan B now because our initial plan was predicated on there being limited resistance now just look what happened this was a completely lost cause they fought on what prospects does that have for the rest of the country and and in a way we yet we still saw a grinding War of Attrition carrying on and again it’s very difficult I think to make judgments in the moment but looking back at it I do think that will be quite a symbolic moment for Ukraine yeah and and I agree with you you logic would suggest that um someone should have gone back and said we need to relook at this but then you know the person controlling the input and output to Putin was patrushev um he’s he’s been he’s been sidelined very quickly now um and we haven’t heard much from them and Putin might have just realized how lit how much was being controlled into him to um direct his decision making on you only partial information because your patev and Shu and gasimov were the architects of the Nazism and the and the way behind it how if you are Putin’s in a circle because this is fundamental to the conflict how do you take truth to power well because it’s a philosophical question we can ask but but how do the Close Quarters folks to Putin honestly provide feedback when if he doesn’t like what he’s hearing they get marginalized but if he if they do like he does like what they’re hearing they get supported well 100% And and you know as was ever the age-old question through history so the same same thing with Hitler um we could argue it was the same thing with some of the decision making that went on around our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere so you know I’m Putin in that sort of area um where his reaction to something that he didn’t like may be um you take a window cleaning job um and that does not usually end well so people AR aren’t of the mind to feed them the truth they feed him what he wants to hear there’s a lot made of KH in September 22 uh once again I find myself at the Tactical level you can pick apart what went on but symbolically um Ukraine pushed Russia back something like 20,000 square kilometers uh in a matter of weeks and and that was just before the sort of winter doesn’t stop fighting but it makes it a lot more difficult and the narrative that president zinsky took to the world was give me the weapons I can do the job and it was really powerful and he demonstrated that he could do it and that I think will be another one of those chapters where up till then the West has given some anti-tank weapons defensive weapons were really reluctant to get involved all of a sudden they went actually Ukraine might be able to do this and therefore plans for the spring offensive the West unlocked its Treasure Trove of Munitions even started to step up and say tanks you know it was a turgid political battle to get tanks released but eventually two then lepus and a few Abrams and and all of a sudden everything was set for spring and that’s another conversation but it feels like that liberation of KH was a really powerful symbolic message to the world and yet it’s also proven to be probably an Achilles heel for zinsky because it didn’t play out the way that he might have hoped well I think yes the I agree with you completely The Liberation of harv and then the liberation of hon in in the south the early days um and it pushed back I I I think part of the reason why the West was reluctant to give the ukrainians the equipment up front was the complexity in integrating that and and changing tactics whilst whilst you’re in contact and there needed to be somewhere at some point where you could create not an operational an operational pause would have been brilliant but you fix the enemy in a way that you you have time to do this properly and if we’d shoved all our equipment in very early the ukrainians wouldn’t have know how to fight it they’d have probably been able to operate it but they’d have lost it and that would have sent bigger political repercussions back than waiting until um we had that back moment that that fixed them I think har um or um this year whenever the Russians have come back in to re to retake that pocket um or try to retake that pocket and pushed in um is is a symbol of the Russians recognizing that the international language had changed and you the debate around attacking um targets inside Russia itself and therefore they saw that as a safe um area for them to um build up their forces in they recognize that in belgar Rod you the ukrainians through their Russian um nationalist uh units had gone and caused a few disruptions there and they needed troops to secure that area but whil they there to secure that area they also had um you the Russian president presidental election that was coming up he wanted to show some form of success he wanted to try and dislocate um Western thinking and dislocate Ukraine’s ability to concentrate its Reserve forces anywhere so it was always an no-brainer to come back in across the border again to try and take HEV as as Ukraine’s Second City his backup masarova was we’re just creating a buffer zone um and the flaw in it and what he didn’t expect was the West to turn around and say oh no you can now use Western weapons inside um inside Russia and therefore once again I think what made a degree of tactical sense at the time and we’ve got Putin with his long handle screwdriver probably playing the Tactical Commander piece what made tactical sense at the time um has led to another operational level or possibly strategic level mistake is because it is an interesting perspective because I um absolutely buy into the the buffer zone argument because from a military perspective um what his main effort at the moment for Russia um if Russia can take the donbass and the landbridge and Crimea that can be sold as a success he hasn’t got that yet diverting limited resources to a second front makes no sense at all uh kke is a big city and it would be incredibly difficult to take that would be probably far outweigh his ability to do that and therefore diluting your main effort would mean you’re lik to fail on both fronts whereas at least the buffer zone argument Bel garod has come under regular attack it can’t play well back into to Russia he’d always said that he was going to build a buffer zone and probably being a bit of an opportunist to said let’s launch that operation if they cap um collapse go at them so you’ve got to have the Reserves to do that but I I I suspect all we’re seeing at the moment is a degree of pragmatism most ANS in the west uh assess that Russia hasn’t got the material I men and material to actually do any sort of decisive breakthrough and if they do they’re going to have to focus it like the tip of an arrow where would you do that at the moment almost certainly the dbass yeah and and you can see the Russians probing across the whole of the front line looking looking for that weak point that goes in and you know again on the men material you a lot of commentators are turning around saying oh Russia’s got so so much more capability and everything else it’s mobilized its defense industrial base enormously well and is out producing the West in artillery shells and armored Vehicles it’s replaced a lot of the ones that lost early but it’s still not meeting its needs and that’s why and and with um Manpower and everything as well that’s why you know we we’ve only just seen defense Intelligence coming out and explaining the um recruiting that’s going on through Africa um you he’s relying on ammunition basic ammunition and Equipment being supplied through North Korea he’s relying on uh Iranians to supply drones and ballistic missiles and of course relying on China to supply through the Iranians and North Koreans components for other weapons we’ve seen some light Chinese vehicles um on on the battlefield um and and VAR other things so his defense industrial base is not what he needs to um build up the capability to open that second front to properly exploit it um and yes he does want a form of a buffer zone but there’s I can’t see what that would do unless he’s got the strength to maintain the dbas region um he would have and here’s where I think is anticipating a change if there’s a change in the political support um going into Ukraine from the EU and from the United States and of course this is the year of Elections and we’ve just seen a collapse in many governments across the EU after the EU elections um and we’re anticipating potentially some change in the United States that might have an impact on Ukraine so I think that’s what Putin’s playing for at the moment yeah I have no doubt there’ll be a long game here but but I say it is interesting going from the day one as we started with they’ll roll through and everybody will capitulate now half a million casualties later an unsustainable 40% of your um money being spent on defense bringing stuff in an axis of Evil forming none of it seems to be you know quite you know the aims of make Russia Great again it’s not Putin is now indicted by the criminal court stop NATO expansion Nat’s expanded the direct result of this on the battlefield yes but you know it it’s not over by a long chalk and it does feel about a stiffening resolve around the International Community not just about the military but the political and the economic strands and we won’t have time for that today no but but but I think I think what this has done is it’s reinforced and it’s woken the West up to the fact that you defense is not about just having a strong military it’s about having a strong military backed up by a strong defense industrial base backed up by the political will to do that and that costs but it costs in a way that can be good for the country because your defense industrial base your Russia Russia’s economy is going through you invest your defense industrial base you’re spending your taxpayers dollars pounds or whatever um in creating jobs in your own country creating taxes in your own country creating um more service Industries and support Industries um and supply chain Industries in your own country it’s a good thing I think the issue of crime is an interesting one um if you’re looking at we call centers of gravity don’t we about what is the one thing your enemy has that he won’t want to lose yeah and the pter saster pole and crime is something that Putin would not want to lose now militarily almost impossible to take from a Ukraine perspective um we could argue that c at moment but you know predominant view is that it would be incredibly difficult to do that however if you were going to do it one of the things you’d want to do is to get rid of the Russian Navy to stop them being part of it and Ukraine’s very effectively without having an AV Zone managed to move the Black Sea Fleet off into the sea of AO out of the way or or or under the Black Sea for a or under the Black Sea for a number of them the other thing you’d want to do is um the umbilical that links um Crimea to the mainland is the kers road Bridge Road rail Bridge um and you want to take that out very difficult to do um it was taken out once but because of the nature of it you literally just replace the slabs an off you go again it doesn’t take long to replace but I think what’s interesting the attacks on the um airfields there The Radars there the naval headquarters there is just gradually eroding Russia’s military capability they’ve also shown the Ukraine shown that they can take out the kurts road bridge not withstanding everything that Russia’s doing if I was a military guide I’d let them do whatever they need to do I’ve shown that I can take that out and by making that the only umbilical now I can raise questions in Putin’s mind about if they did take that out again and genuinely put main effort into Crimea what would I do about that and and that might shift the calculus because at the moment it feels from military perspective that Russia is on the front foot Russia is deciding the agenda and it’s quite difficult for Ukraine to find a way around that whereas if there was a credible threat to Crimea that might just flick a switch in Putin’s head that went I can’t can’t afford to lose that I need to I need to rethink my strategy yeah I I I agree with you completely there and it’s interesting you Crimea has got this psychological um uh importance both to the ukrainians and to the Russians you know it is it’s the place all the wealthy Russians go went in Holiday you know they they all they all had their Villas down there they booked at it there was always this sharing of the facilities between Ukraine and Russia with the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet based there of course it was only seeded to Ukraine by Russia by have a a thank you for their support in the in the 1950s um and therefore had been under Russian control so so Russia still believes oh ours we we yes we give it to them but but actually we didn’t really mean to give it to them we’ll have it back well Ukraine was a county of effectively the S the sovet UN he wasn’t giving it to another country and and and that’s what I came in and it’s important in you’re controlling that area of the the Black Sea and all the rest of it was there so there’s that psychological Pace I think from the Ukrainian perspective it’s an example of something that the history books will bring out as one of of the biggest successes for the Ukrainian military approach to um attacking the Russians and that’s what I call their special operations executive type activities so in Russia we’ve had you know as you said um probably 30 to 50% of the Black Sea Fleet damaged or sunk by a country that hasn’t got a Navy the Black Sea Fleet Naval headquarters destroyed large air defense sites and radar sites destroyed Commando raids going in almost at will there have been one or two that haven’t gone as well as ukrainians would have liked um logistic dumps airfields and everything else being attacked of course the K Bridge being attacked Russia saw Crimea as you know basically its good forward operating base for its aircraft and for its reserves and for its Logistics and everything else and Ukraine is showing that they can almost attack elements in that once they’ve got the weapons together with impunity and we’re seeing reflections of that elsewhere in the D bus region but also then going into Russia itself now increasingly with the UAV attacks against um Russian cities um uh against Russian military airfields against um oil and gas refining plants across the whole of Russia we’re seeing military factories accidentally Catching Fire we’re finding railway lines where trains are being derailed and the signal boxes are mysteriously blowing up and everything else aren’t they a bit more like the you described as the mosquitoes because they they are tactically frustrating for Russia not withstand the oil refinery attacks because I think that is that’s strategic you fund your War campaign you need to have the oil flowing but the rest of them we make a big thing about them in the media but in the harsh reality of the war land territory is the one metric of success isn’t it uh no I think and and here’s where I I differ slightly with a lot of commentators the territory if if we’re looking at from one dimensional perspective yes territory you know how’s the front line moved conflict is one dimensional anymore it’s 3 four five six dimensional and if you’re looking at the effect it’s having and you’re looking at it from a long-term perspective and I think General banov who’s behind all of this has recognized that there’s not going to be a quick solution so working from a long term effectively the front line there’s massive defenses the defenses are stronger than we’ve seen in any conflict ever in history that that are there and it’s going to be very difficult so what banov is doing is he’s slowly with the resources he’s got he has got enough resources hollowing things out from behind um and it is having a disproportionate effect on the support for the T the Tactical operations the front because the Russians rely on rail Supply they rely on you the the factories producing the goods so the the quality of what’s coming out of the defense industrial base is slightly less because that Electronics Factory is gone or that primary engine manufacturer has can’t produce the the components and they’re having to Source it from elsewhere and you know a lot of the places sourcing it from our North Korea you know there is no way on Earth would I put a North Korean shell in an artillery barrel and stand anywhere near it when someone pulls the I’d love to know the statistics on that exactly I think many commentators I think you said as well what taking that strip of land all the way across denying Ukraine access to the to the coast and also linking up with transnistria potentially now it might be a stretch objective it may not be the core objective but there was a lot of targeting of adessa for a while and it did stop the grain exports until they found another way it and of course there was the musk for being shot there the whole issue of the the the whole the whole thing you the failure to take cave first of all um and um stopped Putin achieving his political aim um what is he could have done to put pressure on to do that was if he’d managed to take that hole of the coast and stop Ukrainian exports completely that would have starved and strangled Ukraine because we saw some of the political difficulties there have been with um Ukrainian gra exports going out through Poland and other parts of Europe and the Polish Farmers up in arms and and everything else so Putin clearly understood that he could influence some of the thinking that was going on elsewhere in Europe but his um Achilles heel that he he had to try and protect was getting stuff out through the the Black Sea and and Ukraine continuing to do that um and the ukrainians by sinking and damaging so much of the Black Sea Fleet have you know effectively stopped the Russians been able to imp influence it yeah I was also fascinating because when you look at a Desa um because we Rel we of talk about other conflicts around the world the impact of tunnels there’s literally hundreds of miles of catacombs and tunnels underneath the Desa and that would be a nightmare for Russia to hold um if the if the um marup pole still works with a relatively small area was hard this would be an order of magnitude or maybe more harder um because um so it would have been almost a classic step too far but it’s funny how we were very worried about it for a time it’s fallen off the radar a bit at the moment well it’s because I think Russia doesn’t have the military wear with all they they they stretch themselves too much you the front line we’ve got over 1,200 kilometers of front line at the moment putting that into context you the whole of the British military deployed tomorrow to deal with the front line we’d be lucky to be able to control 100 kilometers I think properly um and that’s probably very ambitious um uh you know the Russ as they’ve tried to do in other places had a bypass um policy you they’ have bypass probably a death support itself if they could have closed it off from the rest of the country just just let it sit there and and and and fester if they could have got up to transnistria and and done that link up to transnistria and and you turn that 1200 km front line into you know 2,000 or 2,500 km front line that would have been beyond ukrainians been able to deal with it at all and they would have had to go straight to the negotiating but if Russia had threatened it more then it would have forced Ukraine to put more troops there which would made it thin down the front it was it’s just a fascinating PA it is and I you know I look forward to being able to sit down with some of the the Russian commanders and get into the detail of some of these are why did you do that yeah exactly so you why has Russia not met its um objectives and aims I I think there’s a number of reasons here one um it tried to do too much with too little um um you know it had clear political objectives and um operational level of objectives which it failed achieve very early on they didn’t have a plan B um as you brought out earlier um and that in itself is is a complete mistake um and I think part of the reason um why it has all gone wrong is um the type of operation that they were doing was building on what they had done in 2014 with the little green men the gru coming in and bloodlessly captur ing Crimea um which was a very bold um fantastic move by the Russians at the time um but outside the normal Soviet tactics normal Soviet tactics and they thought they could do something as sophisticated um but the key decision makers didn’t understand the true capability of their militaries they didn’t understand that this level of complexity was beyond their junior commanders Beyond a lot of their senior commanders um and they um underestimated the enemy you you never underestimate the enemy and the enemy to the Russians was the ukrainians and the level of resolve that they put in and the levels of preparation that they got to carry out um and I think they probably prepared themselves for um greater Russian success so they were in smaller bands of determined individuals ready to um attack in more Guerilla style tactics or small military tactics rather than from a big formation and when they suddenly realized that those tactics had stopped this enormous military from coming in in its tracks and they could start to push them back again and they were they then disabled um uh Russia’s ability to achieve its strategic objectives and then the support started to come in from the West Russia didn’t react and it took Russia over a year to realize it had to start to change its tactics and we we’re seeing a number of different attempts to change tactics and the way they’re approaching things but it always goes back to the same old Playbook and the old Playbook is get into a game of attrition um and just wear the enemy down by throwing more and more resources at it um and then try and wear the political support down by creating Ukraine fatigue yeah I I don’t disagree with that I think um one of the things that a lot of autocracies tend to uh believe is that military capability is military equipment they have massive parades they showcase tanks and big missiles look how strong we are beating their chest in public in the west I think we long ago realized that you need a whole load of other elements not least of which people well motivated well- trained professional uh people um conscript armies don’t give you that and um and it’s pretty clear that the Russian military doesn’t delegate the way we do to get our young corporals a degree of autonomy they don’t they don’t have that NCO card or that’s part of the problem and and so I think there’s that impression to seduce the Russian leadership we are much more powerful yes they may have more equipment it doesn’t necessarily mean and it just shows you how decisive the moral component is I think the um and the conscription model it’s come up in this country recently for um the general election it’s not something that the British government because it it’s so um uh important and I think the other thing that um on reflection does Russia think it’s going to achieve its objectives does it think it’s going to win and I don’t know what the concept of winning looks like now um if its objectives were make Russia great gain stop the expat NATO they failed is it about taking some land and dealing with the consequences and I think what’s fascinating is that whatever the outcome on the battlefields the wests resolve that in the 21st century Nations should not be able to redefine boundaries by the use of force fundamentally that is wrong and therefore I don’t think there will be easily any any resolution to this conflict that delivers success to President Putin um that will be down to political resolve and as you said that that’s an unknown Feast the tragedy is that millions of people have been displaced loads of towns and cities devastated hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives for what yeah yeah and I and that’s the tragedy I think you war is diplomacy by other means you know it is not an activity by itself and therefore it will only be resolved diplomatically but it’s setting the conditions for that diplom diplomatic resolution that’s going in and we’re nowhere near that yet because both sides are are PS apart Putin has to have something he can call success I think he is and we’re listening to his rhetoric he’s changing his criteria for Success um as you know as the wind blows and will probably take anything he can get that it could call success the West uh is you politically going right we’ we’ve done a lot for Ukraine now we recognize the difficulties there are here and the West is caught in a real dilemma but they know that if they give in to Putin then that will send a clear message to the likes of XI jingping or others who’ve got other Ambitions elsewhere so as we’re looking at the future you know every intelligence officer gets issued the one tool to be able to look at the future that’s there so I brought I brought mine with me so you the crystal bow that we’re looking at and that that’s that’s in trouble um you know it’s trying to take what’s going on and our knowledge and apply it through the crystal ball to see to see what’s going on what’s very clear at the moment is Ukraine does not have the Tactical wherewithal um the military wherewithal um to push the Russians back and restart a counter offensive they started the C offensive too early last year with two key components missing one the ability to create uh at least local Air superiority over their Ground Forces as they attacked in and that’s why the Russian helicopters and and Russian um aircraft had such an impact on the The Limited offensives that that were going in um and to a level of combat engineering to break through the defensive lines um uh that the Russians have put in place um uh those defensive lines are stronger than anything else that we’ve seen now in the last week or so we’ve heard the the ukrainians are creating a comb engineer maneuver formation so they’re ticking that and we’ve got the long anticipated f-16s and everything else coming in and the authorizations to use um Western air defense missiles forward and we’ve seen the ukrainians practice some um anti-air ambushes with some success a little bit of political Fallout but with some success so that to my mind was them practicing but until they get all of that in and get it in place place and get it properly planned and everything else they’re not in a position to use it so I think that through the summer of 2024 the ukrainians will be able to stabilize what’s going on on the front line potentially push the Russians back from harv but not really achieve much we’re looking at into 2025 and probably late spring early summer when the ground is ready for the much heavier Western pieces of equipment to allow the ukrainians to have any hope of some form of counter offensive if they’ve got those other components in place they may not be in place by then yeah it’s a really difficult one I’m not a great subscriber to Crystal Wars as you and I both know um looking at it from a harsh military perspective it’s not going to be an easy year for um the Ukraine um Russia is on the front foot Russia has the initiative there are lots of reasons to be hopeful for Ukraine but it feels like damage limitation this year year um not least of which because things like you mentioned f16s they’ve inhaled they’re coming this summer they’ll be the answer to the maidens prayer Ukraine according to the intelligence won’t have the pilots until potentially next year maybe at the end of next year to man them so that’s unlikely to be a key capability the 60 billion of Aid is taking a while to flow in um so I think it’s going to be very difficult if Ukraine can stabilize the front line and plug the leaks in the dam then that will end the year well I think the big ticket items for me are this is now becoming a um a defense industrial base it’s a war of industrial scale Russia has immediately stepped up tripling the size of its defense industrial base the West has the potential to do far more but hasn’t actually done it you know Russia’s going to produce 4 and a half million artillery shells this year we promised a million and we we about 30% through that halfway through the year that doesn’t feel great but if we can step up there politically I think the that’s the key one if the 60 billion that was unlocked for America who knows what a change of administration in the US would do but feast or famine is really damaging for Ukraine and um although the EU puts almost as much money in it doesn’t provide the military wherewith all and therefore that’s why the defense industrial base is so important to step that up uh and it’ll be interesting how far they go and then finally I think it becomes a what’s the end State um and my fear is if there was a change of administration in the US and president Trump was to get in who loves to do a deal that he just sits down with his old pal President Putin keeps president sensy outside the door and says what do we need to do to bring this to an end um and Ukraine is left with a sort of Finland winter War type seeding territory and I think that would be symbolically for the world incredibly dangerous but it might meet a political agenda in the US no I agree it might meet a short-term political agenda and and this is where we in the west are focused on short-termism whereas this AIS of evil looks looks at things from a much longer term perspective so you if that did come out Xi Jinping would look at Taiwan and go well all I have to do is ride out International condemnation for oh 3 years or five years I could do that I got the world withold to do that um and therefore I’m taking it um but it’s also it’s not just there it’s also in Africa you know already Russian forces under the bargainers 2.0 are operating Africa and we we we’ve then got instability across so many other different regions as well so you by coming up with that as a solution might seem to solve something in the short term but could lead very quickly to a much larger global conflict yeah tactical tactical Victory strategic failure and and and I always remember the interview with the Vietnamese commander and the American Commander at the end of the Vietnam War where the American Commander turned around to the Vietnamese commander and said we have never lost a tactical battle against you and the Vietnamese Commander went so matters not

The war in Ukraine was expected to last several days, two years later, the conflict is still ongoing. Military analyst Sean Bell and intelligence expert Philip Ingram deep dive into the key battles that have taken place since 2022, and reveal why they believe Putin has failed to achieve his military aims.

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