Author: Darko Šuković

Instead of confronting the fact that Montenegro has not met even the minimum conditions to close Chapter 31, the authorities in Podgorica, some actively and others as accomplices, are misrepresenting Brussels’ decision to the domestic public as an act of revenge by Zagreb, thereby reviving old anti-Croatian prejudices and animosities.

For a long time, the government of Montenegro has confidently claimed that it would close ten chapters by the end of this year and, metaphorically speaking, open the doors to the EU with boots. After adopting the Resolution on the genocide in Jasenovac, what’s turn to be a shot in its own knee, optimism was cut in half, but the manipulation with domestic public continued, with claims that four chapters were already written down as historical successes of Spajić’s cabinet and Mandić’s parliamentary majority. In the end, in Karađorđeva street, they trembled at whether Brussels would give the green light for three chapters or only two.

As we were waiting for the final decision, a counter-propaganda narrative was prepared, traditionally shallow, noisy, and harmful. Closing three chapters was proclaimed a success, and the ultimate confirmation was found, predictably, in the fact that the previous government had closed just as many in an entire decade. At the same time, the failure to close Chapter 31 was presented as the primary result of the ill intentions of neighboring Croatia. It was framed as Zagreb’s revenge for the Resolution on the genocide in Jasenovac. Some said it in verse, some in prose, but the leaders of the executive and legislative branches rode the thesis that it is not enough to do homework for A when there is always some Bulgarian in the committee assessing the work. (The allusion to the problems of North Macedonia with its neighbor, was allegedly a creation of Vice Prime Minister, Filip Ivanović.)

Through the media outlets on their service, as over an old worn horse, the government is trying to impose this interpretation to the public – as a small crash on the fast-track road to Brussels. However, the story is as misplaced as the lavender fields of the notorious Milan Mijo Lekić.

Official Zagreb was certainly firm in its position that Montenegro should not close 4 chapters in its negotiations. It is undeniable that adopting the Resolution on the genocide in Jasenovac literally forced the Plenković government to tighten relations with Podgorica. But, according to sources in Brussels, Croatia was not alone in opposing the closing of Chapter 31; it was actually one of nearly half a dozen countries that were against it. Only after the insistence of several of the EU’s strongest members – Chapter 10 was closed. (Which, in the coming weeks, will bring bad solutions to some important issues for the media community… but who cares about such “trivialities.”)

The fact that the decision not to close all chapters was not based on emotions, rather on an objective assessment of the situation in that field, becoming crystal clear when you see exactly which chapter was not closed. In the foreign policy, security, and defense exam, Montenegro could have received a passing grade only from those lenient professors for who we used to say, that will not give you passing grade, only if your chair breaks during the test.

The number of wrong answers from Chapter 31 is, in fact, an irrefutable argument for the correct decision to return Montenegro for a retake exam. The adoption of the Resolution on the genocide in Jasenovac is the most glaring example of the diplomatic recklessness of the Montenegrin authorities, but it is not the only blunder. There were also the gaffes of the Parliament speaker during a meeting with Milorad Dodik, the bluntly denial of Kosovo’s independence, insults directed at EU Parliament envoy Tonino Picula…

Regarding unfulfilled obligations, the destruction and humiliation of the defense and security sectors, Admiral Dragan Samardžić, a man who built the Montenegrin Army “from the ground up” how knows how the system works and how it is suffocated by the current minister and his accomplices, spoke in great detail last week. Mark Rutte also knows all of this. NATO’s Secretary General has already warned President Milatović that Montenegro has been without an ambassador to the Alliance for too long, that it is not fulfilling its obligations in missions to assist Ukraine, that the Chief of Staff of the Montenegrin Army has been banned from participating in the EU and NATO military committees… He also knows that in reality, the promised 2% of GDP for defense has not been achieved, and that the army is stagnating while the government buys two patrol boats for €120-150 million through a shady procedure… Possible, he also knows why the radar that was given to us as a gift from the Alliance, to cover a “gap” in the space controlled by NATO, is still gathering dust in Luxembourg instead of being installed on Zekova Glava?

“Do you believe that in the EU and NATO they don’t know that a Putin supporter is sitting in the defense minister’s chair here?” Samardžić said in resignation. After the vote in the Committee of Permanent Representatives of EU Member States on Friday, it’s clear that they do know very well. They know about the Krapović and Mandić positions towards the soldiers who disgraced the Montenegrin uniform in Kosovo and Štitarica. They also know about the literal mockery of the Agency for National Security (ANB), as clearly demonstrated by the appointment of a certain Ivica as its director. Maybe the amateurs who have found themselves in control of the state really believe that to amends relations with Croatia, it’s enough to put a Croat at the head of national security. But once you enter the system of collective security, you must remember that those who manage it are aware that every chain in it- it is only as strong as its weakest link.

Clearly, Jakov Milatović knows this. As unusual as it is for a president to “tweet” an ad for sardines, there is no doubt that he has also recognized “an attack on our national security” in the appointment of Ivica Janović as the successor to Bato Milić. Probably the equivalent to the previous appointment of the president’s current advisor, Dejan Vukšić, to the same position – as head the National Security Agency. Setting aside the controversial lawyer from Kotor, Milatović’s reaction to the selection of an unknown person from Tivat (or Budva, it doesn’t matter) for the interim director of the ANB shows that the conflict between two former minister- apostles is no longer a personal quarrel but a more serious political rift.

It is interesting, though it seems increasingly irrelevant, that this dimension of the relationship between the president and the prime minister is better understood by some less powerful Western addresses, than by the Quint. The powerful five, trapped by their own superficiality and stubborn refusal to admit that once again they had catastrophically wrong choice for its partners, still believe they can resolve things by having Miki and Jaki smoke the “peace pipe.” As if they haven’t learned anything from the failed attempts to plead on Plenković regarding Chapter 31.

It’s becoming increasingly difficult to explain the political blindness of the Quint regarding events in Montenegro. Only this team of ambassadors still doesn’t realize they’re being misled by pro-Serbian parties, who are convincing them that they are sincerely committed to Montenegro’s EU accession and NATO membership. For example, it is incomprehensible that the U.S. ambassador, who has been here for six years, visibly destruction of society and the state still perceives as fulfilling the European agenda and approaching Western values?! And let me explain my remark that all this is becoming less important: things are simply beginning to unfold according to their own internal logic and dynamics, independently of the unsustainable projections of someone in Washington or Brussels. 

But let’s leave Western values aside for a moment. I have repeatedly noted that no one is less interested in them than the Quint ambassadors. Let’s look at the problem from the perspective of stability, to which this structure is most, if not only, committed. And let’s ask ourselves in astonishment with the prolonged duration: how is it possible not to understand how dangerous it is, instead of facing our own mistakes and responsibility for the missed opportunity on the EU path to, to shift the blame onto Croatia and slowly create “anti-Croatian hysteria”? Is it possible not to see how parties under the control of Belgrade and Moscow, after scoring points by provoking Zagreb and closing three chapters instead of ten, are now trying to politically profit by shifting the blame onto Croatia, dangerously tapping into the strings of old prejudices and animosities?