Great hope and not a little pride were initially attached to the presence of these media in Latvia, in what appeared to be a clear illustration of the freedom media enjoy in the Baltic states and the West more widely, in stark contrast to the Kremlin’s state censorship and relentless propaganda.
But has the experiment worked out as hoped – not only for the media themselves but Latvia as the host country? And what do Ukrainian media think of the whole thing? The Latvian Radio program “Open Files” examined the role of Russian independent media in the ongoing information war.
It all started with a post by the then Latvian Foreign Minister (and now State President) Edgars Rinkēvičs on Twitter in English, shortly after the adoption of laws further restricting media freedom in Russia in March 2022.
“As Russia closes independent media and introduces complete censorship, I reiterate Latvia’s readiness to host persecuted Russian journalists and help them in any way we can. Russian public in Russia and around the world must receive truthful and objective information,” said Rinkēvičs.
178,000 people have emigrated from Russia to European Union countries since the start of the war. Latvia has issued slightly more than 6,000 visas to Russian citizens, of which journalists and their family members account for 500 so that these media professionals can carry on reporting on Russia from within a European Union and NATO member state.
Some of the best-known Russian media to make the move have included Meduza, and the former Moscow bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. But things have not always gone smoothly, as the controversy surrounding another large news outlet, TV Rain, clearly demonstrated.
Latvia has no illusions about the influence of Russia’s independent media and its ability to compete with Russian propaganda. However, it is important to offer an alternative to the Kremlin’s narrative, said Dace Melbārde (New Unity party), parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“It is very important that these journalists, who operate in an uncensored environment and who have free access to information about what is really happening in the world, about what is happening in the war in Ukraine, that they can prepare media material in Russian. Of course, I do not particularly harbor any great illusions that it is easy to compete with Russian propaganda, but still, this is the way we offer alternatives.”
As Melbārde explained, humanitarian visas are given after careful scrutiny to people at risk of deprivation of liberty or even loss of life in their homeland due to their actions or statements. Visa granting is a multi-step process with no guaranteed outcome.
“It is still valid that when issuing these visas, a thorough assessment is carried out, involving law enforcement institutions, because one of the essential basic principles, of course, is also the security of the Latvian state and its society. It is important to make sure that the media and journalists who work here will not work in any way against the Latvian state and its society,” said Melbārde.
Pskov region from across the border
Denis Kamalagin, editor-in-chief of the regional publication “Pskovskaya Gubernia Online” [The Pskov region of Russia actually borders Latvia], says that there have been no changes in the media outlet’s editorial policy in the two years since the editorial office moved to Latvia.
“People are increasingly looking to us for information specifically about the war. And they are not just opponents of the war. (..) The main task is to tell the truth about the war and preserve information that will prevent history from being rewritten in the future.”
Sometimes a Latvian word sneaks into the content, indicating the location of the editorial office, but in general “Pskovskaya Gubernia” continues to work as a Russian media outlet primarily for a Russian audience. They consider it their function, for example, to publish news about the activities of the Pskov 76th Division in Ukraine. including news about mobilization and about the division’s losses.
“We call things by their real names. Yes, we write that 650 residents of the Pskov region died during the invasion of Ukraine. Where is the support for the aggressor army there? We don’t write that they are victims! We don’t call them victims. If anyone in Latvia has any complaints about that, I would be happy to discuss it with them,” said Kamalagin.
A correspondent of “Pskovskaya Gubernia” has been to occupied Mariupol. And the media outlet is considering the possibility of going to occupied Crimea as well.
“From a diplomatic point of view, we’ll probably break some rules. But from a journalistic point of view, it’s absolutely important material because no one else will write about it,” says the editor.
Content about the war – including obituaries and reports from the occupied territories – attracts an audience that the media outlet didn’t have before. Today, supporters of the war read the publication and discuss it in the comments with opponents of the war and also with readers from Ukraine.
“When Ukrainians write in our comments that he deserves it – that soldier who died – then patriotic readers tell them: “Get away from our Russian channel!” I think – if patriots consider us a Russian channel, then we are half-objective. We are not driving them away, they have the right to express themselves.”
Controversial commentators
Novaya Gazeta Evropa, a publication that is one of the leaders among independent media in terms of audience and reaches one and a half million users per month, also publishes content that can appeal to an audience outside the liberal “bubble.” For example, it reports on the fashion for funeral wreaths for Russian soldiers .
Nothing has changed in the editorial policy of this publication either. “Novaya Gazeta Evropa” still firmly positions itself as an anti-war and anti-Putin publication with a focus on human rights, stated the publication’s editor-in-chief Kirill Martynov:
“We write, first and foremost, from a humanist perspective with a focus on human rights. We write about why war is a radical evil and why it never had to start in the first place.”
At the same time, the publication regularly publishes texts by writer Yulia Latynina who sharply criticizes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has suggested that the Russian “throne” could be taken over from Vladimir Putin by his daughter, and who in October delivered a video blog that questioned whether imperialism was such a bad thing.
Latynina often writes commentaries on the course of the war and sharply criticizes the decisions of the Ukrainian government and the tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as expresses the opinion that the war continues because it is politically advantageous for Volodymyr Zelensky.
Martynov justifies granting Latynina a platform on the grounds of freedom of speech:
“Yulia Latynina has been publishing texts in Novaya Gazeta for more than 25 years. We publish Latynina as, on the one hand, a legacy, and on the other, as an element of freedom of speech,” he claims.
Nevertheless, her articles also include a note stating that “the editorial staff may disagree with the author’s opinion.”
In his opinion, all the other content in Novaya Gazeta Evropa serves as a counterbalance to Latynina, but he admits that “perhaps we could use a strong author who could balance her out. But there is no such author today.”
Ukrainian journalists unimpressed
Leading figures in Ukrainian journalism object that giving a platform to commentators like Latynina calls into question the editorial staff’s commitment to the idea of creating a democratic Russia.
Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy editor of the internationally renowned English-language Ukrainian publication The Kyiv Independent, points out that while such people may be against Putin being in power, they are not necessarily against what is happening in more general terms.
“They are not against the system that has been built – they are simply outside and therefore dissatisfied. If we listen to what Latynina says, she is for authoritarian politics in Russia. She is simply opposed to one specific person who is in power,” said Sorokin.
Well-known Ukrainian journalist and publicist Vitaly Portnikov expresses himself even more directly, saying: “She practically plays up the Russian narrative that the root of the problem is bad Zelensky, not Putin’s ‘brilliant’ decisions.”
The former head of the Russian Union of Journalists, Igor Yakovenko, who is in exile in Lithuania, has also voiced his harsh criticism of Latynina’s texts on his YouTube channel, saying:
“Latynina is nostalgic for the times when people were impaled and beheaded in city squares. She has never heard words like ‘progress’ and ‘development’.”
The editorial choices of independent Russian media outlets signal to Ukraine that they are not allies united against a common evil – not least because they give voice to Russian soldiers and commentators like Latynin with controversial views.
There are also other reasons, Sorokin explained: “Unfortunately, Russia’s independent media is deluded, still living in a world they created. When they say this is Putin’s war and most Russians are against this war, it’s simply not true. It’s just something comforting to say because it makes the Russian people look better than they are.”
This in turn leads to the following conclusion: Ukrainians do not want to cooperate with the Russian opposition, because these Russian oppositionists are simply not like that at all, Sorokin explained.
The lack of interest in cooperating with Russia’s independent media is not only due to differences of opinion, but also pragmatic considerations. There are doubts about whether these media are truly even capable of influencing public opinion in Russia.
Of the total number of emigrants, only a very small portion are politically active and see their role in promoting change in Russia.
Igor Gretskiy, the author of a study “New Russian Emigration to the European Union”, a researcher at the International Center for Defense and Security in Estonia, pointed out that among the emigrants, only approximately 4 to 5 thousand had any track record of political activism.
His study looks at two waves of emigrants – those who emigrated in the spring of 2022 immediately after the full-scale invasion, and those who emigrated in the fall of the same year, fearing mobilization.
Among the first were some politically active citizens and journalists, however, the majority of the emigrants were information technology (IT) specialists.
“They are not that politicized. Most of them don’t care what’s happening on the political scene. They just immediately realized that because of the sanctions, they would be tied exclusively to the Russian domestic market and would lose the opportunity to compete for the best IT vacancies in the world,” he explained.
In turn, the autumn emigrants – young men – were simply looking for a place to hide until the end of mobilization. Gretskiy believes that the audience reached by independent Russian media is small among Russia’s population of 148 million.
“It doesn’t matter how many independent editorial offices there are, their audience in Russia is quite small. One study measured the audience for anti-Putin narratives in Russia, and the conclusion was – only about 5 to 7 million.”
Gretskiy believes that in Europe, and specifically in Latvia, the hopes placed on Russian emigrants that they could serve as a catalyst for change have not been borne out by experience. His research finds that many émigrés believe that a quick collapse of the Putin regime is only possible if Russia loses the war. However, they are not prepared to hasten Ukraine’s victory.
“People are very reluctant to donate or participate in projects related to the Ukrainian armed forces. Perhaps for some of them it is a question of identity. They still identify themselves with Russia, with Russian society, with everything Russian. Standing up against the Russian army – even if it commits crimes, engages in looting and so on – creates conflicting reactions in their minds.”