European leaders remain in a panic after Munich Security Conference speeches by Vice President J.D. Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth raised questions about U.S. commitment to defend Europe.
That President Donald Trump appears more sympathetic to Russia than besieged Ukraine and shrugs off the threat a resurgent Russia poses to the rest of Europe. After all, Russian President Vladimir Putin has driven the Russian economy into the ground. He uses his foreign adventurism to distract Russians but with each new conquest, he must subsidize annexed territories and proxy states accelerating both treasury depletion and the need for new conquests.
European officials recognize the Russian threat to free Europe today is as high as at any time since the Berlin crisis. They must also recognize that they can no longer rely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Article V provisions may theoretically commit every NATO member including the United States to treat any attack on a NATO ally as an attack on itself and assist the victim of aggression, but NATO faces two problems with Trump.
First, Article V does not necessarily commit the United States to come to European defense; rather, the article conditions the response with the phrase, “such action as it [any member] deems necessary.” NATO is a consensus-governed organization, so the United States could block any response. Second, even if Washington chose not to block NATO action, there is little NATO could do if the United States simply walked away from a crisis. Put another way, would Donald Trump really risk nuclear war if Russian forces moved into Estonia?
The idea of a European Army overlapping with NATO is not new. Seven years ago, as Europe marked the centenary of the World War I Armistice, French President Emmanuel Macron, upset with Trump’s decision to pull out of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces with Russia, floated the idea that the European Union might need a “true, European army.” “We must have a Europe that can defend itself on its own without relying only on the United States,” he said.
At the time, policymakers treated Macron’s approach more as representative of growing frustration with Trump than as a serious proposal. Today, however, European officials are serious.
Could a European Army replace NATO? And, if so, could that be a good thing?
NATO is a legacy organization. Its contribution to European security throughout the Cold War was valuable, but two interrelated weaknesses that grow from its charter now grow serious enough to threaten NATO’s utility. The first problem is NATO’s consensus-driven approach to decision-making. This barely worked during NATO’s first decades, but the responsibility of countries that found themselves in disagreement, like France and Greece, to temporarily remove themselves rather than filibuster operations salvaged the alliance. The problem of consensus has only grown with NATO enlargement.
The notion that Montenegro or Slovenia should have equal say in security policy as the United States sits poorly in Washington. Second, the Turkish problem looms large. When Turkey entered NATO, it was a country that aspired to a more European outlook; today, it is anti-Western and a terror sponsor. Turkey has openly blackmailed NATO over Sweden’s inclusion, and questions borders and the Exclusive Economic Zone with NATO member Greece and European Union member Cyprus.
If Europe were willing to invest in and build a European Army, it could solve both problems. Gone should be consensus. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe embraces a “Consensus Minus One” policy to prevent any single state from filibustering operations; this could be a good model for a European Army. Likewise, a European Army could exclude Turkey, disempowering the Turkish despot Recep Tayyip Erdogan with the stroke of a pen.
While some European elites might fret that the problem is Erdogan and not Turkey, this is wrong: Over his two decades in control, Erdogan has indoctrinated more than 30 million Turks through curricula changes in Turkey’s education system and completely overhauled the military. Even if Erdogan swung from gallows tomorrow, Europe would still be facing Erdoganism for decades to come.
What then would be the downside of a European Army replacing NATO?
Here, the problem would be North America. The United States relies on Europe—and, indeed, Turkey—for some early warning missile launch detection. Armenia, however, could replace Turkey’s contribution as could separate bilateral deals with countries like Cyprus and Poland.
Separating European and North American defense would also leave gaps in place regarding Anti-Submarine Warfare. Current tensions between Washington and Ottawa further raise question about U.S.-Canada coordination though, presumably, these tensions will resolve when both Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau move on.
M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) vehicles with 1st Battalion, 181st Field Artillery Regiment, Tennessee Army National Guard participating in Saber Strike 17 execute a fire mission at Bemoko Piskie, Poland, June 16, 2017. This year’s exercise includes integrated and synchronized deterrence-oriented training designed to improve interoperability and readiness of the 20 participating nations’ militaries. (U.S. Army photo by Markus Rauchenberger)
While a European Army may not be a magic solution, it is a debate worth having. For too long, NATO’s advocates have cheered the theory of NATO above its reality. NATO needs true reform, not just greater investment.
Perhaps the silver-lining to the dispute between Trump and his European antagonists is a real opportunity to consider the future of an alliance that is in desperate need of reform and overhaul.
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Dr. Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. He is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. The views expressed in this opinion pieces are the author’s own.