IN BRIEF: Disinformation in Slovakia
Dominant narratives: health-related (COVID-19, vaccines), concerning the war in Ukraine and foreign policy
Who spreads disinformation: Russia, alternative media, domestic politicians (e.g. PM Robert Fico)
Most common fake news: Ukraine or the West being most responsible for the war. “Ukrainian Nazis” killing Russians in Donbas, media and the opposition having contributed to the attack on Robert Fico, Slovakia being exploited by the EU, the US no longer being an adversary, replaced by Ukraine
Combating disinformation: the activity of independent media and NGOs, fostering media literacy
In this episode, we explore the disinformation landscape in Slovakia with Vladimír Šnídl, Slovak journalist working for the daily Dennik N, author of book Truth and lies on Facebook (2017) and co-author of school manuals published by Dennik N.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: Slovakia has faced a significant surge in disinformation, particularly in recent years. What are the dominant disinformation narratives circulating in the country?
Vladimír Šnídl: In general, the dominant narratives revolve around topics that are popular on social media. They touch on issues that people live with. So during the COVID-19 pandemic, of course, the most popular disinformation was about COVID-19 itself and vaccines. When the war in Ukraine started, the most popular disinformation shifted to the war.
Slovakia is quite an interesting laboratory for all the experts who focus on this field. It belongs to the countries most affected by Russian propaganda, especially by conspiracy theories.
When we compare it with Poland, the Czech Republic, even Hungary—among Central and Eastern European EU member states—there is only one other country so deeply affected by these phenomena, and that is Bulgaria.
So Bulgaria and Slovakia are the countries most affected by disinformation, Russian propaganda, and conspiracy theories.
And why is it so?
There are, of course, several reasons. One of them is the quite low level of trust people have towards institutions. Slovaks, in general, don’t trust institutions, don’t trust the state that much, and don’t trust the media. This creates space for so-called alternative media.
These alternative media use, of course, especially social media. Another reason is that in Slovakia, there is quite a strong sentiment towards the communist regime. It’s stronger than in the Czech Republic, stronger than in Poland. There is a sentiment toward the era when Slovakia was part of the Eastern Bloc. So these are some of the reasons.
But at the same time, we see that distrust is becoming quite universal. We also have high and rising levels of distrust towards the media, institutions, politicians, and experts in Poland. And still, Slovakia is ahead when it comes to disinformation. The other question I’d like to ask is: why is the sentiment toward the communist times stronger in Slovakia than in other countries of the region?
One of the reasons is that the period of transition in Slovakia was more difficult. There was a significant economic shock compared, for example, to the Czech Republic. Another reason is that Slovakia has been significantly affected by emigration—more than other countries. The Slovak population is about 5 million, and over 400,000, possibly more than half a million people, live abroad.
And mostly, we’re talking about people who are pro-Western, younger, active—so when you take, from a relatively small nation, let’s say 10% of the population that is more pro-Western and mostly liberal, these people are simply missing from the country. They cannot influence others in their day-to-day lives. This is something you don’t see in the Czech Republic.
The Czech Republic hasn’t been affected by emigration to such an extent. Poland is a different case, of course, but as far as I know, the situation has improved significantly compared to the first years after Poland joined the European Union. So this is another reason I see.
So coming back to the narratives—you mentioned that when something appears in society, in politics, or on social media, it becomes a dominant narrative, like war-related disinformation.
I would just add that we’re talking about topics that provoke emotions—fear and so on. These are emotionally charged topics, or topics that shock society.
Can you give me some specific examples? Not just themes, but actual disinformation narratives?
Yes, I can give you an example regarding perceptions of the war in Ukraine. When the think tank GLOBSEC conducts surveys and asks people in various European countries who started the war—Russia, Ukraine, or the West—they offer those three options.
In Slovakia, around 50% of the population believes that either Ukraine or the West is most responsible for the war. So about half of the population buys into the Russian propaganda—that the aggressor is not the aggressor.
On the other hand, only about 40% of Slovaks correctly identify Russia as the aggressor. In the Czech Republic, with the same question, 70% say Russia is the aggressor. In Poland, it’s more than 90%. So this is one striking example.
Incredible. And why is that? Is it a bottom-up phenomenon—organic within society—or more horizontal, coming from abroad? Or is it top-down, with Slovak politicians actively spreading disinformation?
Just to clarify, it doesn’t mean that 50% of the population is pro-Russian. In other surveys, when people are asked in which direction they want to see the country go—towards the West or the East—the latest data shows that only 20% of Slovaks say they want to align with the East, while over 60% say they want to align with the West.
So believing in Russian propaganda doesn’t mean people want to join Russia. And yes, you raised a good point. Slovakia is quite specific in that the main channels of pro-Russian propaganda today are not disinformation media like Sputnik, but Slovak politicians themselves—especially the Prime Minister.
For example, Prime Minister Robert Fico, who is both the most influential politician on social media and the most powerful figure in the government, repeats Russian propaganda. He claims the war began in 2014 when “Ukrainian Nazis” started killing Russians in Donbas.
He directly copies Russian propaganda and spreads it in his speeches. That’s quite unique—you won’t see this in many other EU countries. Politicians see the survey results and realise how easy it is to attract these people. So they repeat Russian narratives because they see that it works.
So do you think it’s a chicken-and-egg situation? Is Fico shaping public opinion, or is he just picking up on existing social sentiment and turning it into legitimized political narratives?
It’s a spiral. We started to observe Russian propaganda in Slovakia around 2014, when an ecosystem of pro-Russian disinformation websites emerged.
At the beginning, they weren’t very political. But in 2013–2014, Slovakia saw the creation of disinformation media that spread Russian propaganda. We know that people behind these media outlets were in contact with the Russian state.
They used American social media platforms—especially Facebook and YouTube—to strengthen these pro-Russian narratives. Then, politicians—some of them—saw that these narratives were gaining traction on social media. They began to adapt and amplify them.
So it was no longer just the disinformation media. Politicians began to appear in videos, repeat these narratives in television debates, and gradually pushed the situation into another phase.
Okay, here comes a simplistic question—what is currently the most widespread fake news in Slovakia?
For example, last year Slovak society was shaken by the shooting of Prime Minister Robert Fico. Government parties tried to use the situation to spread theories—what I would call conspiracy theories—suggesting that the media and opposition parties were behind the attack.
In general, the most popular disinformation narratives in Slovakia are related to foreign policy. Robert Fico, especially on social media, rarely talks about domestic issues. And when he does, it’s usually to attack the opposition.
But what really resonates are the foreign policy topics—narratives that claim Slovakia is being used or exploited by the European Union. And since Donald Trump became U.S. President, the United States are no longer portrayed as the main „enemy.”
Now, in these narratives, Ukraine is the new villain—blamed for everything from inflation to cyberattacks on state systems. They need a scapegoat—someone to blame for all of Slovakia’s problems. And, of course, that scapegoat must be external.
And as I said, since Trump is now seen as a friend by pro-Russian Slovak politicians, Ukraine has become the new target.
Sad, but fascinating. Let me ask about the key actors spreading disinformation. You’ve already mentioned Russia, and Robert Fico as a key mouthpiece—but are there other players actively involved?
Yes, I mentioned Russia—but we don’t actually know whether Slovak politicians spreading pro-Russian narratives are doing it to help Russia.
Of course, they do help Russia’s interests—but they’re primarily doing it for themselves. Because it helps them stay in power. And as I said, the main arena for disinformation in Slovakia is Facebook. Social media is where it all happens.
So the key players are those who dominate Facebook—mostly politicians, and also self-styled „influencers” who spread pro-Russian propaganda and conspiracy theories. It’s very easy to be popular on social media this way.
Honestly, sometimes I think I could do this job too. Just hate everything—liberals, the LGBT community, migrants, Ukrainians, the European Union, the media. Spread conspiracy theories—say 9/11 was an inside job. Repeat it, do it creatively, dynamically—and you’ll be popular.
It’s incredibly easy to tap into that audience—the anti-Western, anti-liberal crowd. You just have to talk about traditional values and claim liberals are a threat to our children.
Sounds like a point in the conversation where big tech platforms become one of the bad guys.
Maybe.
How would you define the specific, unique, or exceptional characteristics of the disinformation landscape in Slovakia?
Slovakia is maybe specific—especially because of Facebook. Twitter, or X, isn’t that dominant here. But I’d also like to say that we’re not just sitting around complaining about it. That’s another thing that makes Slovakia somewhat unique—we also fight back. There’s a kind of ongoing struggle. Even though we know the numbers, we’re not giving up.
There’s a strong, pro-Western civil society. You can see that tens of thousands of people are taking to the streets—every second week now. Not just in big cities, but also in smaller regional towns. People are saying clearly: Slovakia belongs to the West, we are not Russia.
They support independent media, they support NGOs, they promote media literacy, and they try to push back against the government. So in that way too, Slovakia may not be entirely unique—but it’s remarkable how many people are able to mobilize in the other direction as well.
What is being done to counter disinformation in Slovakia? And what more would you recommend?
First of all, we don’t rely on the state. We don’t even rely on the European Union. We’re aware that if anything’s going to be done, it has to come from us.
You mean from citizens—or from the media?
From citizens, the media, civil society. What we can do—and this is also my recommendation, based on more than eight years of experience—is focus on education. The main arena for disinformation is social media.
And the big issue isn’t just the platforms or their algorithms. The problem is also that we, as a society, aren’t prepared for how social media works.
People aren’t educated about it. They don’t understand that algorithms will show you negative content, conspiracy content—because all they care about is how long you stay engaged.
So what do we do? We try to prepare people to use social media responsibly. We talk as much as possible about how algorithms work. We try to teach people in our own social circles how to talk to friends or relatives who believe in Russian propaganda. We work on media literacy in schools—we talk to children.
We tell them: don’t spend hours mindlessly scrolling TikTok. Try to use social media for something meaningful. We also train teachers—showing them how they can teach students about social media. So that’s what we’re doing: preparing as many people as we can to navigate this online space.
You can learn more about the disinformation landscape in Portugal here.
