North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited a uranium enrichment facility both prior to Trump’s election in 2024 and following his inauguration, where he called for workers to dedicate themselves to boosting the output of fissile materials needed for the production of tactical nuclear weapons. (KCNA/Yonhap)
Creating the right circumstances for a freeze in North Korea’s nuclear program and ensuring South Korea its own space for autonomous diplomacy.
These are the two tasks where many former high-ranking government officials and veteran public figures recommend that the next South Korean administration channel its diplomatic capabilities early in its term in order to reestablish the Korean Peninsula’s complete denuclearization as a strategic goal.
The nuclear issue on the peninsula has effectively been in freefall since the breakdown of the second North Korea-US summit, held in Hanoi in February 2019.
The situation reflects a complex mix of factors that include North Korea’s assertion of its categorical unwillingness to abandon its nuclear capabilities, including its stipulation of nuclear weapon advancement in Chapter 4, Article 58 of its constitution; a collapse in international coordination in response to the nuclear program, including the cessation of activities by an expert panel affiliated with the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea on April 30, 2024; and calls for independent nuclear armament from within South Korea, including former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s remarks about “potentially possessing our own nuclear capabilities” on Jan. 11, 2023.
But many are voicing hopeful predictions that a new opportunity to turn the situation around and shake off the feelings of hopelessness over the prospects of denuclearization could take shape with the launch of a new administration in South Korea and the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency.
To begin with, Trump has continued sending signals on his willingness to pursue dialogue since taking office for his second term. In that time, he has referred to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as a “smart guy” and indicated plans to rekindle a relationship with him.
But for the moment, the conditions are still not ripe, and the differences in perspectives between Pyongyang and Washington are stark.
For instance, in remarks made last September — when Trump’s election appeared a foregone conclusion — and during a public visit to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and weapons-grade nuclear material production base shortly after Trump’s inauguration in late January, Kim commented on how seeing the facilities gave him strength and stressed the need for “strengthening the nuclear shield of the country.”
In effect, he has raised the threshold for negotiation, sending the emphatic message that denuclearization is out of the question.
A noteworthy point here is that Trump has already spoken openly about the outline of a new solution to the nuclear issue.
On Jan. 23, Trump delivered a speech via videoconference at the Davos Forum, in his first international address since returning to office. There, he publicly proposed the idea of US-Russia-China nuclear arms reduction talks, suggesting that he thought it was “very possible” for the world’s three major nuclear powers to “denuclearize.”
In a press conference following a White House meeting with the secretary-general of NATO on March 13, Trump said that other unofficially recognized nuclear states such as North Korea, India, and Pakistan should be “involved” in the trilateral nuclear arms reduction talks.
In effect, he has been proposing a new resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue in which North Korea would be brought in to participate in nuclear arms reduction talks spearheaded by the US, Russia and China. At the same time, he added the proviso that the official ultimate goal was “the complete denuclearization of the DPRK,” as indicated in a joint leaders’ statement following a US-Japan summit on Feb. 7.
On June 18, 2018, US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un walk alongside one another during the first-ever US-North Korea summit in Singapore. (Hankyoreh file photo)
Once South Korea’s new president and administration arrive in office after the June 3 election, the key environment they will face in terms of the nuclear issue is one where Kim has declared denuclearization to be off the table, while Trump has proposed talks on nuclear arms reductions.
Several former high-ranking officials stressed the importance of Seoul securing leeway for independent diplomatic activity to avoid being stuck on the sidelines of the battle of wills between Kim and Trump. In particular, they called for certain specific steps.
To begin with, they advised taking on the role of a catalyst and partner in North Korea-US negotiations, rather than opposing them on the grounds of concerns about being “bypassed” or small deals that do not emphasize denuclearization. The message here is that because the first step toward denuclearization would be a halt to the North’s nuclear activities, Seoul’s diplomatic capacities should be focused on setting the stage for a freeze.
A second recommendation was the simultaneous pursuit of inter-Korean negotiations on conventional armament controls alongside any nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the US. This would entail holding close discussions with the US on the corresponding measures needed to pursue nuclear freeze and denuclearization talks — including adjustments to joint South Korea-US military exercises and easing North Korean sanctions with the use of snapback provisions — and making efforts to achieve some level of progress in inter-Korean relations.
Third, they advised the simultaneous pursuit of efforts to end the Cold War system operating in Northeast Asia alongside a three-stage resolution of the nuclear issue consisting of a freeze followed by reductions and eventual abolishment.
Former Minister of Unification Lim Dong-won has observed that the North Korean nuclear issue is the “product of hostile relations between the US and North Korea.” In that sense, these officials are calling for a shift from the temporary military armistice system to a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, as referred to in Article 3 of the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018, and Article 2 of the North Korea-US Joint Statement on June 12 of that year.
The veteran figures also stressed that the calls for South Korea’s independent nuclear armament that have been fueled by the sense of “helplessness” over the nuclear issue are potentially disastrous for the vision of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and achieving a peaceful, nuclear-free peninsula. Accordingly, they advised taking a clear stance against those calls while developing well-considered response measures.
By Lee Je-hun, senior staff writer
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