For over a decade, the partnership between the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC) has been one of the most visible and consequential parts of the global Hellenic-Jewish-American alliance that has reshaped the Eastern Mediterranean. Kathimerini caught up with AJC CEO Ted Deutch and HALC Executive Director Endy Zemenides in between meetings at the US Senate in support of the “Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act.”

Mr Deutch, you played a leading role in Washington when the Eastern Mediterranean emerged as a strategic priority for the US. As a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, co-founder of the CHIA Caucus and co-author of the EastMed Act, you were instrumental in shaping that policy shift. Do you feel progress in this area has stalled since your departure from Congress?

T.D.: It’s not stalled. There have been some crucial steps in cementing the Eastern Med as a region of global importance and in advancing the 3+1. During both President Trump’s first term and in President Biden’s administration, there were concerted efforts to deepen ties at the top levels of our governments. We’ve been working to strengthen the 3+1, both through our diplomatic work and on Capitol Hill. Since the East Med Act, we also supported the US-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act. Beyond policy, we’re seeing the benefits of this partnership on the ground. I was so moved when Greece and Cyprus sent firefighting aircrafts to help extinguish the wildfires that were blazing in Israel. This kind of progress doesn’t happen with a stall. 

But there are some political realities that we have to face, things that have changed over the years in Congress. 

T.D.: When I was still in Congress, AJC and HALC had a number of members of Congress as partners who were not only deeply committed to the region but who were also strategically placed on key committees to help advance this cause. Many of those champions are no longer in Congress. I feel really lucky to be able to continue this work outside of Congress, but I’m the exception.

Mr Zemenides, what steps should be taken to ensure that the US maintains its strategic interest in the EastMed?

E.Z.: We start by acknowledging how different the international environment is today. There would be those that might project less of an emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean as the US shifts to competition with China and tries to “stabilize” and then leave the Middle East. Obama tried that and it didn’t work. Instead, you had a Turkey that believed it was free to pursue hegemonic aspirations, emboldened terrorist groups, China and Russia becoming a greater presence in the region, and Middle East Christians constantly at threat. East Med diplomatic initiatives and institutions were created and advanced to bring an arc of stability into this sea of instability. If the US and Europe want to prevail in the competition with China, these diplomatic successes and the infrastructure that has resulted from them have to be built on. The “Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act” is a perfect starting point. If the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is going to be the answer to the Belt and Road Initiative, the US and its partners must capitalize on the capacities built through these partnerships.

Mr Deutch, you head an organization that was instrumental in creating the environment in which the “3+1” and the Abraham Accords were possible. The AJC also has excellent relations with India and with the EU. Perhaps no other organization has better insight into how important IMEC can be. What would you urge policy makers to prioritize?

T.D.: First, thank you for acknowledging the many ways in which AJC is ideally situated to support this visionary, potentially transformational idea. In Abu Dhabi we recently convened a summit on IMEC. We have many reasons to feel optimistic but we recognize that the Hamas attack has complicated the timeline. With Middle East hostilities waning, Israel is again positioned as the natural gateway between the East and the West. While much of the investment must come from the private sector, government support is needed to establish a welcoming regulatory environment and relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements. It’s clear that an initiative of this nature, requiring extensive international cooperation, can be affected by unplanned external events. Policy makers need to see the value for their countries – and constantly be explaining the value to their constituencies – in order to insulate IMEC from external, political disruptions. 

Mr Zemenides, do you think Greece and Cyprus should be satisfied with how policy makers in DC think of them when it comes to IMEC?

E.Z.: Not so far. But to be fair, IMEC is still more a concept than a strategy or plan in the minds of Washington policy makers. Now is the time that Greece and Cyprus should be particularly aggressive in claiming their place in the IMEC conversation. And they bring certain advantages that other European partners do not: East Med legislation, infrastructure projects like the GSI or natural gas infrastructure with Israel and Egypt, diasporas that engage in the US foreign policy debate. With Cyprus set to assume the presidency of the EU and Greece on the UN Security Council, now is the ideal time to claim their place at the IMEC table.

We have talked about cooperation so far, but conflict is just as prevalent in the region. What are the biggest threats to stability? 

T.D.: Turkey remains a problem. Erdogan appears to be doing everything in his power to frustrate not just the 3+1 but the very ideals of Western democracies. From collaborating with Russia, sponsoring and sheltering Hamas, blackmailing NATO, warmongering against Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, Syrian Kurds, and Israel, to squelching legitimate political opposition within Turkey’s borders. We must push back on Turkey’s negative actions across the board. We will continue to work with key stakeholders to ensure the long-term success of the Abraham Accords and the creation of a more integrated region, and that must include the bulwarks of Israel’s strategic depth – Greece and Cyprus, bolstered by US leadership.

Mr Zemenides, do you think Turkey is a lesser or greater threat to stability in the region than it was a year ago?

E.Z.: Greater, without a doubt. Turkey feels emboldened for several reasons, their “side” won in Syria, Trump keeps indicating a fondness for Erdogan, the US ambassador has huge influence, and both Europe and Washington have been timid in the face of democratic backsliding. If this feeling is bolstered by the removal of sanctions and restrictions, if the US grants Ankara spheres of influence in the Middle East and stays mum as Erdogan demolishes the last vestiges of democracy, the likelihood of Turkish adventurism, especially in the context of the administration’s goal of withdrawal, will increase exponentially. Turkey is clearly at the table when it comes to several regions, but it is important to constantly be asking, “Whose side of the table is it on?” Accommodationists of Ankara like to fashion themselves as realists, but it isn’t being a “realist” to forget Ankara’s de facto leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and [Islamist militant group] HTS, it isn’t being a “realist” to ignore the expansive claims of the “Blue Homeland.” Hope is not a strategy, and hoping that giving an inch to Turkey will lead to stability [is like] Chamberlain [hoping] for the same in Munich.

Mr Deutch, Mr Zemenides just mentioned the possibility of sanctions against Turkey being lifted. Does that concern you?

T.D.: Turkey has been in violation of US law for years and must comply before we consider giving it access to our most advanced weaponry. This is also a question of values. Turkey has a lot to prove to the American people before it is given the privileged position of being readmitted to the F-35 program. It has demonstrated a willingness to use American-made weapons with impunity against American allies and partners and contrary to US interests. See what is happening with Hamas, Iran and domestically. This is not the behavior of an ally. 

Mr Zemenides, what do you think?

E.Z.: A defense relationship with the US is not a right but a privilege and it is not a privilege that Turkey has earned. Turkey consistently violates US law and acts contrary to US interests, and that should disqualify it immediately. Since the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, how can an administration committed to peace and stability reconcile giving Turkey the best of weapons technology when Turkey has already demonstrated a propensity to use such weapons against US allies and partners, violating Greek airspace or occupying Cyprus with US weapons? During the first Trump term, defense officials and members of Congress kept emphasizing the danger of co-locating F35s and S-400s in Turkey. Why is that alarm being muted all of a sudden? Let’s remember that Turkey doesn’t really want to be a long-term customer of the United States. It wants a technology transfer, actually just to steal US technology and build its own defense industry into a competitor of the US. To grant them this ability without major, paradigm-shifting concessions would be the least “America First” thing that can be done.