Trump’s Syria strategy aims to enable US military withdrawal while weakening Iran’s influence, pressuring Hezbollah, and balancing regional alliances, though internal contradictions and Israeli entanglements threaten long-term coherence.
As President Donald Trump’s Middle East strategy takes shape following his mid-May trip to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria appears to be taking an increasingly central role for his administration.
Officials in Riyadh, Doha, and other regional capitals have successfully identified shared interests with Washington, utilizing the Syria file as an area where regional issues can be addressed, or at least mitigated and controlled. That shared interest hints at the Trump administration’s broader regional strategy, albeit one that continues to struggle with harmful inconsistencies that ultimately undermine the approach, like the Israel-Iran war.
Washington has rapidly shifted its approach to Syria. In May, Trump suddenly advanced sweeping sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization with Damascus at the behest of Gulf leaders like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after the Assad regime’s December collapse. While there are sound humanitarian considerations for making these moves, such logic is unlikely to be at play in today’s Washington.
What Are Trump’s Plans for America’s Relationship with Syria?
Instead, the move primarily supports an eventual US military withdrawal, a significant regional focus in the Trump administration. While that decision should have happened years ago, given the constitutional illegality of the US deployment and the territorial and general strategic defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in both Syria and Iraq in 2019, today’s conditions are ideal for a complete withdrawal.
Still, to temper Congressional criticism given the body’s affinity for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Washington wants a deal between the Syrian Interim Government and Kurd-led group that retains organized control of both the anti-IS mission and IS prison camps in Syria’s northeast. It is currently mediating talks between Turkey, Damascus, and the SDF in this regard.
That approach is wise, it takes a narrow consideration of Syria’s relative stability, namely its capacity to contain terrorist threats within its borders and not devolve into a new civil conflict that would threaten that dynamic. As US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack made clear in recent statements, this approach advances the administration’s parallel goal of maintaining the “enduring defeat” of the Islamic State.
To be sure, the group remains unable to conduct major transnational attacks through its Syrian and Iraqi branches undetected and is effectively a shell of itself today.
The US Will Remove Thousands of Troops from Syria
This administration appears to understand that reality, gradually decreasing its troop deployments and shuttering bases in the country as it works towards a Damascus-SDF deal. Barrack recently confirmed this approach, announcing Washington’s intent to reduce the number of bases in Syria from eight to one. That interview included details that 500 of the 2,000 publicly acknowledged troops in Syria returned home, with five of eight bases closed or handed over to the SDF to date.
Washington is pressuring the group into talks with its arch-rival, Turkey, and the new Damascus government through this gradual, ongoing drawdown. Previously, the SDF had successfully appealed to US officials and the US Congress for support amid rumors of a US pullout, leading Trump to reverse full withdrawal efforts in 2019. His administration appears more determined to see a troop drawdown this time around.
Reshaping the Syria file in such a manner complements the Trump administration’s other Middle East concerns. The Lebanese Hezbollah is central to the administration’s thinking in this regard. Syria is no longer a viable supply line for the group, which sits at arguably its weakest in decades due to profound Israeli military operations that continue today despite a November 2024 ceasefire.
The Trump administration, working with the Gulf and Lebanon’s new, reformist government, likely hopes to advance disarmament efforts that finally resolve the Hezbollah issue. The group regularly cites two primary sources undergirding its raison d’être, namely, defending Lebanese territory from Israel and radical Sunni militias.
Washington and the Gulf could prop up Damascus and Syria’s broader transition to eliminate the latter’s reasoning while permanently ending that supply line, tilting the leverage in favor of Lebanese leaders in their negotiations with Hezbollah. The recently frozen Israel-Iran war only bolsters this thinking, highlighting a broad anti-Iran and anti-Axis of Resistance focus, given Trump’s drastic shift to a hawkish anti-Iran position aligned with his so-called “maximum pressure” approach to the country.
Of course, Trump’s unpredictability leaves a layer of doubt around such thinking. But if that approach in Lebanon succeeds, far from certain given the state of talks in the country and Israel’s refusal to leave five strategic locations inside the country’s sovereign territory, it would weaken Iran’s regional influence.
Hezbollah was defined as the crown jewel of Tehran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” allowing it to externalize its security to protect itself while advancing its regional interests. With the group completely disarmed, Tehran’s ability to be intransigent would be further blunted, as proven by Hezbollah’s refusal to enter the conflict in recent days.
Such an outcome would feed into the administration’s strong pro-Israel credentials. To be sure, the US has wisely decoupled many of its regional decisions and interests from those of Israel in recent months under Trump’s overarching America First foreign policy approach. But the president also gave Israel free rein in its attacks on Iran, notable given the decades-old Washington policy of vetoing such a move, and directly attacked Iranian nuclear sites in recent days.
This dynamic resembles the ambiguities that constituted Trump’s first term, highlighted today by the ongoing public debates between interventionists and non-interventionist restrainers. While some have correctly identified the latter camp gaining notable influence in the president’s second term, his erratic approach to politics and desire to project strength have emboldened the interventionist, “peace through strength” camp.
That difficult situation presents unknowns to his Syria policy.
While there is a through line from Damascus to Beirut and Tehran, any new exchanges of fire after a shaky Israel-Iran-US truce risks upending Washington’s clear interest to do less in the region and lower the military footprint. The consequences of hawkish anti-Iran policies and an unhinged Israeli war on the Islamic Republic drew in more US military assets, including a carrier strike group from the strategically critical Asia-Pacific, in direct contradiction to this interest.
The United States should consider doing less militarily in the region, not more. Trump can achieve results that harm Iran’s relative power in the region through a Syria policy that supports the country’s transition without being overly prescriptive and by recognizing the limitations of hard power.
As the United States has consistently overextended itself when adopting such hawkish policies, Washington would be wise to realize that its interests must equate to a veto of Israeli interests that aim to trap it in the region, fighting other countries’ wars on its dime.
About the Author: Alexander Langlois
Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst and Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/Joshua Sukoff.