On July 11, 2025, following Abdullah Öcalan’s call to disarm and dissolve the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 30 guerrillas symbolically burned their weapons in Jasana Cave, Slêmanî, a historic symbol of Kurdish independence movement in the 1920s.

The next day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the formation of a new parliamentary commission, including the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), to oversee the PKK’s disarmament and its transition into politics.

In his speech, Erdoğan named “Damascus, Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah [Slêmanî], Erbil [Hewlêr], Aleppo, Hatay [Iskenderun], Istanbul and Ankara” as “common cities” of Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. His reference echoes the Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) adopted by the Ottoman Parliament in January 1920. Article 1 of the pact declares that “[t]he future of the territories inhabited by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros will be determined by a referendum. On the other hand, the territories which were not occupied at that time and inhabited by a Turkish majority are the homeland of the Turkish nation.” Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked this vision, which opposes the secession of historically Ottoman lands with Muslim populations.

By abandoning the PKK’s founding principles—including armed struggle for an independent Kurdistan—and now backing integration into the very Turkish state that long denied Kurdish existence, Öcalan has effectively aided in implementing Article 1 of the Turkish National Pact. The borders Turkey failed to reclaim after World War I are now being redrawn by stealth, not diplomacy. It is unclear whether Öcalan has done this deliberately or he has been deceived by the Turkish state.

Erdoğan’s broader political aim adds another layer to this realignment. To amend the constitution and run for a third presidential term beyond 2028, he needs Kurdish votes and parliamentary support—particularly from DEM. The ultranationalist MHP, once instrumental in rallying nationalist sentiment, has lost its effectiveness. For Erdoğan, securing DEM’s cooperation serves a dual purpose: it fragments the opposition vote while providing the appearance of political pluralism, without endangering his grip on power.

Turkey’s Military Expansion

Under the guise of fighting terrorism, Turkey has built dozens of military bases inside the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, some as far as 40 miles deep. With over 15,000 troops, armored vehicles, and fortified positions, Ankara has replicated the long-term occupation model it used in northern Cyprus, where Turkification followed military entrenchment. As in Cyprus, Turkey shows no intention of withdrawing from the territory it occupies.

Since 2018, Turkey has also occupied portions of Western Kurdistan (Rojava) in Syria. In December 2024, it backed political figures aligned with Ankara, including Ahmed al-Sharaa, the current leader of Syria. Ankara has also pushed for the dismantling of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Meanwhile, U.S. policy—led by Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack—has recently shifted toward integrating the SDF into the Syrian army and opposing any moves toward federalism. The United States now backs “one Syria, one army, one government.” Kurds in Syria have denounced Barrack’s remarks.

The new Syrian regime under al-Sharaa has also shown openness to join the Abraham Accords. In this way, Kurds are being sidelined in order to stabilize a country that once fueled Middle Eastern instability. By supporting a centralized government in Damascus, the Trump administration is poised to upend the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), threatening a rare experiment in grassroots democracy and self-rule.

But al-Sharaa would not be following Turkish preferences if he sides with Israel. Turkey’s presence in Syria remains precarious. As Damascus cautiously engages with Israel, any potential agreement between Al-Sharaa and Tel Aviv could undermine Ankara’s regional influence. This shift could create new strategic openings for the Kurds.

A Dangerous Revival?

This so-called peace process, or “terror-free Turkey” as the Turkish state calls it, may be as short-lived as the Trump-Elon Musk partnership. But if it materializes—and with DEM as part of tripartite coalition Erdoğan can tolerate— Turkey could revive a modern version of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments from the Ottoman era using disarmed PKK fighters to police Kurdish areas, suppress dissent, and block emerging Kurdish entities in Iran and Syria, thus undermining the KRG’s standing. The original Hamidiye, used to control Kurdish and Armenian populations, was abolished in 1908 by the Young Turks. But Ankara’s current policies suggest that history may yet repeat itself.

At the same time, a political détente with DEM may grant Kurds limited cultural and linguistic concessions. However, such gestures are unlikely to lead to meaningful structural change. Turkey’s name will remain unchanged, Kurds will not be recognized as a distinct nation, and there will be no official acknowledgment—let alone compensation—for decades of state repression and denial. Any progress will likely be cosmetic, aimed at containment rather than empowering Kurdish identity or political autonomy.

The consequences of this process will be far-reaching for Kurds in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. To prevent irreversible damage to Kurdish achievements and avoid a return to the pre-2003 status quo, authorities of KRG and AANES must urgently form a security, military, intelligence and economic pact, engaging the Kurds in Iran and their parties too.

Only a united front can guarantee Kurdish survival. Outsiders can assist—but Kurds must define their own political status.